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Foras Um Chláir Speisialta An AE
Boord O Owre Ocht UE Projects

A MONITORING AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE-BUILDING



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Peace and Reconciliation Programme

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Foreward

2007 has been a significant year for all those involved in peace-building in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland. It has been a year of new beginnings and positive political advancements. As the PEACE II Programme draws to an end, it is important that lessons are learned that can help to maximise the impact of the 2007-2013 PEACE III Programme.

Independent consultants PricewaterhouseCoopers were commissioned by the PEACE II Monitoring Committee to undertake research to explore best practice in an international context and develop a monitoring and evaluation framework for peace building, reconciliation and conflict resolution interventions for future programmes. The findings are particularly encouraging as they reveal that the experience in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland are at the cutting edge of monitoring and evaluating peace-building interventions.

The Special EU Programmes Body and the PEACE II Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group welcome the findings of this independent research. The Managing Authority will ensure that the detailed findings and recommendations within this report are considered and inform the on going monitoring and evaluation of future funding programmes.

Special EU Programmes Body.

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Executive summary

Introduction and terms of reference

1. Measuring and quantifying the impact of Peace-Building and reconciliation interventions is a challenging task. Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution are complex terms which have no common definition and are often centred on developing more intangible outcomes such as changes in relationships and attitudes that do not lend themselves readily to quantification. In addition, evaluation is further complicated by the following factors:
 - The outcomes from Peace-Building are essentially long-term, which makes short-term monitoring and evaluation difficult.
 - It is difficult to isolate the impact of specific Peace-Building interventions from the complex political, economic and social contexts in which they are located.
 - Each of the main actors (donors, recipients, the community and politicians) has different expectations of outcomes.
2. As a result, developing indicators and measuring outcomes can be considered a common problem across Peace-Building and reconciliation interventions. This has also proved to be the experience in Northern Ireland/Ireland under the PEACE I (1995-1999) and PEACE II Programmes (2000-2006).
3. Given the difficulties of developing and agreeing acceptable indicators for measuring peace and reconciliation, SEUPB commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to undertake research aimed at developing a generic monitoring and evaluation framework for Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution interventions, based on the experience of Northern Ireland/Ireland and elsewhere. The research aims to produce the following outputs:
 - **A generic framework for monitoring and evaluation** of Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution;
 - **A menu of indicators** for use in assessing inputs, processes and outcomes with an emphasis on outcomes in terms of results and impacts;
 - **Detailed recommendations for the application of the framework** in a Northern Ireland/Ireland context;
 - **An outline of potential methodologies** to be employed in the collection and analysis of each of the data items. This aspect will also include a discussion of the benefits and costs of the various methodologies suggested; and
 - **Practical guidance on the application of the indicators** in a simple form and layout.

Methodology

4. The methodology for this study comprised two main stages:
 - **Stage 1: International review of best practice.** This involved scoping and identifying alternative methodologies and indicators for evaluating other Peace-Building/conflict resolution interventions; and
 - **Stage 2: Transferability assessment.** This involved assessing the application of the proposed new framework to the Northern Ireland/Ireland context.

5. In regard to the international review of best practice, the methodological approach included two phases of a desk-based literature/scoping review and key informant interviews with funding bodies and individuals in the academic and research sector, as detailed below:
- **Literature/scoping review and desk-based analysis:** this phase involved a desk-based review of the academic and policy literature and evaluation reports and documents on Peace-Building and reconciliation and conflict resolution interventions in other jurisdictions. In this phase, over 40 documents and reports were reviewed and an extensive website research was also conducted; and
 - **Key informant interviews:** to supplement the review of documents and reports, interviews were held with key informants from funding bodies supporting Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution interventions, and researchers or academics involved in conducting evaluations of such programmes. These interviews focused on exploring the application of different methodological approach and their strengths and weaknesses.
6. In relation to the transferability assessment, a number of tasks were undertaken that included:
- Assessing the framework against best practice EU evaluation guidance;
 - Examining the costs and benefits of applying the alternative methodologies to Northern Ireland/Ireland. Indeed, during the course of the study, the EU and the British and Irish Governments agreed to support a PEACE III Programme for 2007-2013. A draft PEACE III Operational Programme was designed in early 2007, making it important for this study to ensure the transferability of any alternative methodologies to this programme; and
 - Holding a participative workshop. Potential options for Peace-Building programmes in Northern Ireland and Ireland were presented and discussed during a participative workshop involving members of the Distinctiveness Working Group and the Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group. This workshop provided the opportunity to agree on proposals and recommendations for future Peace-Building programmes in Northern Ireland and Ireland.

A generic monitoring and evaluation framework

7. Two of the key challenges in identifying different approach to evaluation are the sheer number of approach, and the degree in which they borrow from and develop practices from each other. On the basis of an extensive review of the academic and practice literature and interviews with key informants from funding bodies and the evaluation/research sector, nine best practice models or approach for monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building outcomes were identified. These models are identified below and summarised in the following paragraphs:
- Do No Harm;
 - Logical Framework Analysis;
 - Action Evaluation;
 - Theories of Change;
 - Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment;
 - Conflict Sensitivity Analysis;
 - The Aid for Peace approach;
 - Comprehensive Visioning and Strategic Analysis; and
 - Social Dialogue approach.

Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) - Do No Harm

8. This approach is centred on helping development agencies find indicators about the effects of humanitarian intervention on inter-group conflicts. These indicators are then employed to examine the potential risks facing interventions in violent or post-war communities and the work also proposes that 'dividers and connectors' - roads, markets, cross-group attendance in schools and public places - could be identified to measure such changes in inter-group relations.

Logical Framework Analysis

9. Probably the most widely used tool for planning and managing development projects, Logical Framework Analysis promotes a structured approach to evaluation by setting out the intervention logic of a programme and identifying appropriate key indicators. This approach has been used as a basis for monitoring and evaluating existing PEACE Programmes in Northern Ireland/Ireland.

Action Evaluation

10. Action Evaluation places emphasis on the project level. This approach aims to clarify the specific micro- level aims of a project and focus on the importance of the systematic collection of data. The approach supports the need to involve all the key stakeholders at the early stage of a project, in order to agree common goals for monitoring and evaluation. In this regard, Action Evaluation is not a directive approach and prefers to allow micro- level initiatives to emerge or evolve through the collective actions and analysis of a range of projects.

Theories of Change

11. The Theories of Change approach to monitoring and evaluation starts from the macro-level but understands that micro- level aims might also have a macro- level impact. The approach assumes that most micro- level programmes and projects have macro- level goals and underlying assumptions. In this regard, the approach focuses on how the immediate aims of a project can be linked to how society can achieve sustainable peace, and consequently how progress along both these paths can be measured. Ten Theories of Change are presented as to how society in a conflict or post conflict environment can be transformed. These are outlined below:
- **The Individual Change Theory:** Peace comes through transformative change of a critical mass of individuals, their consciousness, attitudes, behaviours and skills;
 - **The Healthy Relationships and Connections Theory:** Peace emerges out of a process of breaking down isolation, polarisation, division, prejudice and stereotypes between/among groups;
 - **The Withdrawal of the Resources for War Theory:** Wars require vast amounts of material (weapons, supplies, transport, etc.) and human capital. If we can interrupt the supply of people and goods to the war making system, it will collapse and peace will break out;
 - **The Reduction of Violence Theory:** Peace will result as we reduce the levels of violence perpetrated by combatants or their representatives;
 - **The Root Causes/Justice Theory:** We can achieve peace by addressing the underlying issues of injustice, oppression/exploitation, threats to identity and security, and peoples' sense of injury/victimisation;

- **The Institutional Development Theory:** Peace is secured by establishing stable/reliable social institutions that guarantee democracy, equity, justice, and fair allocation of resources;
- **The Political Elites Theory:** Peace comes when it is in the interest of political (and other) leaders to take the necessary steps. Peace-Building efforts must change the political calculus of key leaders and groups;
- **The Grassroots Mobilisation Theory:** When the people lead, the leaders will follow. If we mobilise enough opposition to war, political leaders will have to pay attention;
- **The Economics Theory:** People make personal decisions, and decision-makers make policy decisions based on a system of rewards and incentives and punishment/sanctions that are essentially economic in nature. If we can change the economics associated with war-making, we can bring peace; and
- **The Public Attitudes Theory:** War and violence are partly motivated by prejudice, misperceptions, and intolerance of difference. We can promote peace by using the media (television and radio) to change public attitudes and build greater tolerance in society.

Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)

12. The Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) is a means of anticipating, monitoring, and evaluating the ways in which an intervention may affect or has affected the dynamics of peace or conflict. PCIA can be applied to a full range of development activities in a conflict prone region and is focused on ensuring that interventions do not aggravate violent conflict and contribute to building peace within and between communities. PCIA, therefore, is similar to Gender Analysis and Environmental Impact Assessment which helps identify and understand the impact of an initiative on peace and conflict. In this regard, the PCIA approach has moved development projects towards a greater interest in Peace-Building.
13. PCIA consists of five main steps as follows:
 - **Step 1:** Assessing the environment. The first step is to look at the environment in which you are operating to establish whether it is conflict-prone;
 - **Step 2:** Completing a risk and opportunity assessment. Having determined the environment is conflict prone, the second step is to examine how the peace and conflict environment may affect a project or initiative. This acts as a screening exercise that examines the dynamics of the conflict environment and its likely impact on the proposed project. Four broad areas are outlined for pre-assessment that include: location, timing, political context and other salient factors;
 - **Step 3:** Assessing potential peace and conflict impacts during project design;
 - **Step 4:** Assessing potential peace and conflict impacts during project implementation; and
 - **Step 5:** Assessing potential peace and conflict impacts as part of post-project evaluation.

14. In assessing potential impacts, the contributions of projects towards Peace-Building are examined at one or more of five levels that include:
- Their impact on institutions managing conflict and promoting peace;
 - Their impact on the dynamics of violence, including military and human security;
 - Their impact on political structures and processes;
 - Their impact on economic structures and processes; and
 - Their impact on social empowerment and reconstruction.
15. To guide the assessment of impact for each of these levels, worksheets have been developed for funding bodies and evaluators which include sample indicators.

Conflict Sensitivity Analysis

16. As a means to gain a better understanding of the context in which funding organisations work, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis involves the study of the profile, causes, actors and dynamics of a conflict. Overall, conflict sensitivity seeks to:
- Understand the operational context in which funding bodies operate;
 - Understand the interaction between interventions and the context; and
 - Allow funding bodies to act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.
17. In this regard, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis aims to provide the basis on which to inform conflict sensitive programming and particularly to understand the interaction between the intervention and the context. On the basis of the analysis, indicators for monitoring and evaluation can then be developed to measure the overall impact a given intervention has had on its context, and the context on the intervention.

The Aid for Peace approach

18. The Aid for Peace approach focuses on assessing the needs for Peace-Building in a given country or area and then tailoring the intervention's objectives and activities to these needs by identifying their Peace-Building relevance and developing appropriate indicators. The approach can be employed during the planning, implementation and evaluation stages, preferably all three, and is broken down into four key stages, as outlined below:
- **Stage 1: Peace-Building needs analysis:** analysing the conflict dynamics and Peace-Building process of a country or area by examining the parties to the conflict, the root causes of the conflict, the factors escalating the conflict and what Peace-Building potential exists;
 - **Stage 2: Peace-Building relevance assessment:** the objective of this stage is to assess whether the overall direction of an intervention (policy, programme or project) corresponds and is relevant to a country's/regions Peace-Building needs as analysed in the previous Peace-Building deficiency and needs analysis. This assessment is conducted using a relevance scale;
 - **Stage 3: Conflict risk assessment:** this assesses the effects of the conflict on an existing or planned intervention. The objective is to identify problems and risks with which the projects and interventions will be confronted in areas of conflict. For new interventions, the assessment aims to anticipate the potential conflict-related risks for the intervention; and

- **Stage 4: Peace and conflict effects assessment:** this examines the effects of an intervention on the conflict and peace situation and assesses what changes have occurred, or may occur, as a result of the intervention. Input, output, result and impact causal chains or indicators can be employed here. The approach places emphasis on defining a number of output and result indicators within this chain and less focus on impacts as it is considered that these are often too difficult to measure due to the attribution gap. It is also proposed that, during the planning stage of an intervention that these indicators are developed using participatory planning methods and the indicators are closely linked to the previously defined needs.
19. With regard to methodology, the Aid for Peace approach builds in and combines other evaluation methods and tools such as input-output-result-impact chains, relevance scales and Conflict Sensitivity Analysis or Theories of Change, and risk assessment methods and checklists.

Comprehensive Visioning and Strategic Analysis: Conflict Transformation

20. This approach uses two frameworks - Comprehensive Visioning and Strategic Analysis – to evaluate Peace-Building programming and its impacts on the larger context. The Comprehensive Visioning Frame emphasises the importance of a broader vision of peace to guide Peace-Building programmes. The Strategic Analysis Frame complements the Comprehensive Visioning frame by analysing the role of different actors working on development and peace to engage in Peace-Building activities.
21. In implementing this approach, the main actors are asked to complete a matrix which they can use to answer a number of these questions and issues that provide guidance for programming assessment, monitoring and evaluation. This matrix examines a number of issues that include:
- Who should be involved in defining, conducting and evaluating the project? This is considered for both the short (the current situation) and long term (what can be achieved through Peace-Building programming); and
 - What are the issues that maximise impact?
22. Combining the vision and the analysis encourages all those involved in a project evaluation to focus on both Peace-Building efforts and also on where and how specific Peace-Building actors are best placed to have an impact.
23. In the process of using the matrix, appropriate measures are generated in direct response to the actors, networks, capacity and infrastructure identified at the present (the baseline) and for the longterm future. As the project develops, the framework continues to be used periodically to check that the project is advancing along sound lines, but also is sufficiently flexible to respond to changes at both micro- and macro- levels.

Social Dialogue approach

24. This approach is employed to evaluate Peace-Building programmes which focus on promoting social dialogue and encouraging attitudinal change. In general, social dialogue programmes have largely funded two types of Peace-Building activities that include:
- **Strategic level approach:** targets the 'middle level' leaders of society (politicians, journalists, academia and municipal leaders). The aim of the initiative is to facilitate negotiations between both sides of the community; and
 - **Grass root level approach:** supports community dialogue and targets local people such as teachers and young people. The objective of the dialogue is to help participants to express their feelings and emotions about the conflict and to learn from the perspectives of the other community.
25. Typically the activities under the programmes are comprised of a series of inter-group encounters between representatives of opposing groups/communities held weekly or monthly and extending over a period of 3-4 months to a year. Evaluation of these Peace-Building interventions is based on an analysis of social dialogue between the opposing groups and four criteria have been developed for evaluating the quality of the interaction. These include:
- **Symmetrical active participation of the participants:** This refers to the extent to which the participants take an equally active role in the encounter (talking, suggesting ideas, participating actively in the games) in contrast with a situation in which one group is dominant. Key indicators for measurement include the level of equal participation and the amount of time representatives from each group talk during the discussion;
 - **Symmetrical active participation of the facilitators:** This refers to the degree that the facilitators take equal part in actively facilitating the encounter. Key indicators for measurement include the extent to which participants invite inclusive discussion;
 - **Inter-group interaction:** This relates to the degree of interaction between the two groups during the encounter, in contrast with a situation of no interaction. Key indicators for measurement include the level of joint agreement and the number of aggressive questions; and
 - **Atmosphere:** This relates to the degree of positive or negative atmosphere at the encounter (an atmosphere of sympathy and mutual respect rather than indifference or hostility). Key indicators for measurement include the level of atmosphere during the meetings (positive-negative).
26. Analysis is conducted of all the descriptions, classifications and data that is gathered to identify patterns and trends that characterise encounter activity. To assist this analysis, numerical measures and scales have been developed to enable evaluation of the degree to which the encounter activities meet each criterion.

27. Reflecting on each of the best practice approach, the following table summarises the key strengths and weaknesses and examines the wider transferability of each approach to the Northern Ireland/Ireland context. Transferability is assessed according to the following criteria:
- **Level of application:** micro or macro approach?
 - **Inclusion of indicators:** does the approach outline a specific framework for indicators? yes or no?
 - **Level of resources required:** is the approach resource intensive?, high or low level of resources?

Transferability of best practice methodologies to Northern Ireland/Ireland

28. In Northern Ireland/Ireland, the key Peace-Building initiative is the PEACE II Programme which completed financial commitments at the end of 2006. A successor to the PEACE II Programme for the 2007-2013 period, PEACE III, is in the design stage and is due to be launched at the end of the year. In this light, any proposed methodological approach needs to be appropriate for this forthcoming programme.
29. In considering the transferability of the best practice methodological approach to Northern Ireland/Ireland and the PEACE III Programme in particular, two key criteria need to be met. These include:
- **A framework of indicators.** Quantitative and qualitative indicators are required to regularly assess progress and examine impact. The inclusion of indicators as an evaluation tool is also set out under EU guidance; and
 - **Incorporation of micro- and macro- levels.** The PEACE Programmes are focused on supporting a range of projects at the micro- level but the framework needs to assess how these projects impact on and influence the macro- level.

Table 1: Key strengths and weaknesses and wider transferability of methodological approach

Methodological approach	Key strength	Key weakness	Level of application	Inclusion of a framework of indicators	Level of resources required
Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCP) - Do No Harm	Established an important principle in monitoring Peace-Building.	Can be viewed as overly simplistic.	Applicable to both macro- and micro- levels.	No	Low
Logical Framework (Log Frame) Analysis	Clarifies project objectives and highlights the need to link planned activities with desired outcomes.	Places much emphasis on quantifiable indicators and can focus Implementing Agents to think mechanistically rather than being innovative.	Largely focused on micro/ project level but can be transferred to programmes.	Yes	Medium
Action Evaluation	Sets more modest or realistic targets for micro- level projects.	Provides limited analysis of the linkage between the project and strategic level.	Largely focused on micro/ project level.	No	Medium/ High
Theories of Change	Makes explicit the underlying reasons for an intervention.	Can be too theoretical for some practitioners and is most useful as a planning tool to test assumptions during the programming stage.	Largely focused on macro- level.	No	Low
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)	Outlines a broad process for assessment and incorporates a strong analysis of context.	A broad and general framework which may restrict operationalisation. Little direction is also provided to examining the interaction between sectors and interventions.	Largely focused on macro- level.	Yes	High
Conflict Sensitivity Analysis	Provides an analysis of the conflict environment and assessment of the dynamics within a particular situation.	Provides a general framework which may restrict operationalisation.	Largely focused on macro- level.	Yes	High
Third generation PCIA: the Aid for Peace approach	Employs a range of other methodologies within one approach.	Getting agreement on the causes of the conflict and goals and visions of an area can prove difficult as it can raise political tensions.	Applicable to both macro- and micro- levels.	Yes	High
Comprehensive Visioning and Strategic Analysis: Conflict Transformation	Proposes a good balance between theory and practice.	More readily applicable for qualitative analysis.	Applicable to both macro- and micro- levels.	No	High
Social Dialogue approach	Provides a comprehensive assessment of interactions between participants involved in the conflict.	Analysis can be subjective which could lead to bias.	Applicable to both macro- and micro- levels.	Yes	High

30. From assessing these criteria against the best practice methodological approach outlined in Table 1 above, it is evident that only five approach are potentially applicable. These include:
- Logical framework (Log Frame) analysis;
 - Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA);
 - Conflict Sensitivity Analysis;
 - Third generation PCIA: the Aid for Peace approach; and
 - Social Dialogue.
31. Having analysed the comparative strengths and weaknesses of each of these approach, it is proposed that the Aid for Peace approach should be adopted as a methodological approach to support the monitoring and evaluation framework for the PEACE III Programme. The main reasons for selecting the Aid for Peace approach over the other four approach are outlined below:
- The Aid for Peace approach proposes a detailed approach which includes a number of stages ranging from Peace-Building needs analysis to peace and conflict effects assessment. Aid for Peace, therefore, employs a comprehensive step by step approach through all stages of the evaluation process which can combine key elements of other best practice methodologies, as follows:
 - In conducting the Peace-Building needs analysis in the Aid for Peace approach (Stage 1), the tools and indicators outlined in the Conflict Sensitivity Analysis and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment can be used to assist or guide analysis. In addition, the Theories of Change could also be applied to the Aid for Peace approach to help understand what changes are appropriate to address the defined needs and inform understanding of how change can occur in society in order to achieve future goals and visions; and
 - The Aid for Peace approach incorporates an assessment of risk and an input-output/result chain approach to evaluation. This model of evaluation has been promoted by the European Commission but also incorporates similar elements to Log Frame analysis. In this way, Log Frames, which promote risk analysis and the identification of indicators to measure outcomes and activities, are very similar to the conflict risk assessment (Stage 3) and peace and conflict effects assessment (Stage 4) in the Aid for Peace approach.
 - The Social Dialogue approach is only relevant to specific types of actions (i.e. examining interactions between participants within workshops or other specific group situations). Given the sizeable number of projects or operations that are likely to be funded under PEACE III, the scale of the programme suggests that the Social Dialogue approach could not be employed as an overall framework but could be used to assess specific projects, particularly those which focus on facilitating group interactions between representatives of different communities in Northern Ireland. As a result, this approach has been excluded as a stand alone monitoring and evaluation framework.

Recommendations

32. With a view to monitoring and evaluating the Peace-Building programmes in Northern Ireland/Ireland, it is recommended that the Aid for Peace approach should be adopted. The Aid for Peace approach incorporates a number of stages that need to be employed during the planning stages of a Peace-Building programme and subsequent evaluations. Our recommendations for adopting the Aid for Peace approach to future Peace-Building programmes and in particular, the PEACE III Programme, are outlined in accordance with these stages.

Stage 1: Peace-Building needs analysis

33. **What are the Peace-Building needs of Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland?**

Recommendation 1: It is recommended that SEUPB develop a short paper which synthesises the current Peace-Building needs of Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland. Having articulated 'the problem' or 'key problems' that the PEACE III Programme is trying to address in relation to the causes of the conflict, outlined the vision and goals of the programme and invited feedback through the consultation process, this short paper would bring this analysis together. This paper should provide reflections from the consultation exercise and comment on whether the analysis of 'the problem' has been changed or validated as a result of the feedback. This short paper would clarify the Peace-Building needs of Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland for 2007-2013 and would then be used as a basis to assist future evaluations at the programme level and at level of operations.

Stage 2: Peace-Building relevance assessment

34. **Does the overall direction of the PEACE III Programme correspond to the Peace-Building needs analysis conducted under Stage 1?**

Recommendation 2: Following the consultation process and having articulated 'the problem/s' that the PEACE III Programme is trying to address in relation to the causes of the conflict, it is recommended that SEUPB use this as a framework for assessing applications. It is also recommended that the process requires applicants to articulate the problem/s they are seeking to address, to outline their vision and goals and how change can occur, and to express how this matches with the direction provided in the PEACE III Programme.

Stage 3: Conflict risk assessment

35. **What are the effects of the conflict on the PEACE III Programme?**

Recommendation 3: It is recommended that SEUPB should give consideration to conducting a risk assessment of the PEACE III Programme and identifying potential actions or contingency plans that would address these risks or any implications resulting from changes in the political or security environment. In addition to this, it is recommended that SEUPB should closely monitor developments in the political and security environment and in the event of any significant changes during the 2007-2013 period (this could relate to an upsurge in civil unrest or more positive progress on restoring the institutions), and commission research which examines how the political and security environment impacts on the programme at the local level.

Stage 4: Peace and conflict effects assessment

36. **What effects has the PEACE III Programme had on the conflict and peace situation and what changes have occurred as a result of the intervention?**

Recommendation 4: It is recommended that SEUPB should give consideration to incorporating the indicators, identified in this report (see Section 4), within the PEACE III Programme. This includes the indicators focusing on the priority and programme level. When the projects under each of the priorities have been identified, it is recommended that SEUPB should work closely with Implementing Bodies and beneficiaries in a participatory manner to identify and agree on indicators for success for each intervention and ensure the indicators are closely linked to the defined needs (i.e. that the indicators relate to the outcomes of Stages 1 and 2).

37. To supplement the indicators and the EU regulatory requirement to conduct *ex-ante*, *interim* and *ex-post* evaluations on the PEACE III Programme, it is also proposed that a programme of research is developed and commissioned by SEUPB as part of the overall programme evaluation plan.

Recommendation 5: It is recommended that SEUPB should develop a work programme of research following the *ex-ante* evaluation and that consideration is given to including the studies identified in this report (see Section 4). It is also recommended that any research proposed under the PEACE III Programme is included within the work programme or evaluation plan to promote co-ordination and strategic approach and facilitate aggregation across the programme. The work programme can then be reviewed at the mid-term stage of the programme. It is also proposed that SEUPB should work closely with Implementing Bodies and beneficiaries to identify and agree on the areas for research. To facilitate the programme of research, it is recommended that SEUPB should set up a forum for each priority to meet regularly to discuss impacts of the programme.

38. In advancing the Social Dialogue approach, the PEACE III Programme and the research programme should also focus on facilitating and examining group interaction within a number of different levels. This follows on from the work of John Paul Lederach¹ who presents Peace-Building as a triangle describing the three levels of society at which peace activists might work: the leaders, the grassroots, and the middle level. The top third of the triangle involves the fewest number of people and is the most publicly visible, and the bottom level the largest and least visible aspects of society. In the middle, people often struggle to find a role that may influence the elites above them and draw on the grassroots below them in order to advance Peace-Building.

1 Lederach, J. P. (1997) *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

39. It is proposed that Lederach's triangle would provide SEUPB with a framework to structure activity in the PEACE III Programme and accommodate Peace-Building operations. While the PEACE III Programme is not focused on promoting macro- level political interventions, the framework would provide a basis to help local operations and initiatives based on middle range leadership find a Peace-Building niche within the broader structure of a Peace-Building programme.

Recommendation 6: It is recommended that SEUPB should give consideration to structuring proposed activity in the PEACE III Programme within the framework of Lederach's triangle. This would provide a basis in which to understand how activities at the local and middle range level can be inter-linked, be located within the broader strategy for Peace-Building and impact on developments at the macro- level. Where partnership or group interactions are supported in the PEACE III Programme at the local and middle range level, it is recommended that the Social Dialogue approach should be employed to examine the level of interaction and participation among stakeholders at each of these levels.

1 Introduction

Aim of report

- 1.1 This report presents a generic framework for monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building. On the basis of an extensive review of the academic and practice literature and interviews with key informants from funding bodies and the evaluation/research sector, the report outlines and examines a number of methodological approach that could be applied to assess Peace-Building interventions. From considering best practice approach, the report then provides recommendations for developing a monitoring and evaluation framework for Northern Ireland/Ireland.

Background

- 1.2 Measuring and quantifying the impact of Peace-Building and reconciliation interventions is a challenging task. Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution are complex terms which have no common definition and are often centred on developing more intangible outcomes such as changes in relationships and attitudes that do not lend themselves readily to quantification. In addition, evaluation is further complicated by the following factors, as outlined by Fast and Neufeldt²:
- The outcomes from Peace-Building are essentially long-term, which makes short-term monitoring and evaluation difficult;
 - It is difficult to isolate the impact of specific Peace-Building interventions from the complex political, economic and social contexts in which they are located; and
 - Each of the main actors (donors, recipients, the community and politicians) has different expectations of outcomes.
- 1.3 As a result, developing indicators and measuring outcomes can be considered a common problem across Peace-Building and reconciliation interventions. This has also proved to be the experience in Northern Ireland/Ireland under the PEACE I (1995-1999) and II Programmes (2000-2006) which have aimed to 'reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and promote reconciliation'³.
- 1.4 For example, despite including an indicator framework in the PEACE II Programme, concerns were raised in the 2002 Annual Implementation Report over the usefulness of some of the indicators for measuring programme outcomes. More specifically, the report outlined the difficulties in developing and agreeing on acceptable indicators which would 'reflect the programme's specific objectives and inclusive process in favour of peace and reconciliation'⁴.

2 Fast, L. and Neufeldt, R. (2005) Envisioning Success: Building Blocks for Strategic and Peace-Building Impact Evaluation, *Journal of Peace-Building and Development*, 2,2 2005.

3 EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland 2000-2004, Operational Programme, EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland 1995-1999, Programme Document.

4 SEUPB (2002) Annual Implementation Report.

Terms of reference

- 1.5 Given the difficulties of developing and agreeing acceptable indicators for measuring peace and reconciliation, SEUPB commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to undertake research aimed at developing a generic monitoring and evaluation framework for Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution interventions, based on experience of Northern Ireland/Ireland and elsewhere. The research aims to produce the following outputs:
- **A generic framework for monitoring and evaluation** of Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution;
 - **A menu of indicators** for use in assessing inputs, processes and outcomes with an emphasis on outcomes in terms of results and impacts;
 - **Detailed recommendations for the application of the framework** in a Northern Ireland/Ireland context;
 - **An outline of potential methodologies** to be employed in the collection and analysis of each of the data items. This aspect will also include a discussion of the benefits and costs of the various methodologies suggested; and
 - **Practical guidance on the application of the indicators** in a simple form and layout.

Methodology

- 1.6 Work for this study began at the end of June 2006 and the methodological approach has been undertaken in two main stages that included:
- **Stage 1: International review of best practice.** This involved scoping and identifying alternative methodologies and indicators for evaluating other Peace-Building/conflict resolution interventions; and
 - **Stage 2: Transferability assessment.** This involved assessing the application of the proposed new framework to the Northern Ireland/Ireland context.
- 1.7 In regard to the international review of best practice, the methodological approach included two phases of a desk-based literature/scoping review and key informant interviews with funding bodies and individuals in the academic and research sector as detailed below:
- **Literature/scoping review and desk-based analysis:** this phase involved a desk-based review of the academic and policy literature and evaluation reports and documents on Peace-Building and reconciliation and conflict resolution interventions in other jurisdictions. In this phase, over 40 documents and reports were reviewed and an extensive website research was also conducted. A full bibliography is provided in Annex F;

- **Key informant interviews:** to supplement the review of documents and reports, interviews were held with key informants from funding bodies supporting Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution interventions, and researchers or academics involved in conducting evaluations of such programmes. These interviews focused on exploring the application of different methodological approach and their strengths and weaknesses. Interviews were scheduled with representatives from the following organisations:
- DG Regio;
- The Berghof Centre for Constructive Conflict Management;
- The Hebrew University for Jerusalem;
- Europe Aid;
- Directorate General on External Affairs;
- The Department for International Development;
- The Canadian International Development Agency;
- School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London;
- Search for Common Ground;
- Catholic Relief Services;
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID); and
- The Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency.

1.8 In relation to the transferability assessment, a number of tasks were undertaken that included:

- Assessing the framework against best practice EU evaluation guidance⁵;
- Examining the costs and benefits of applying the alternative methodologies to Northern Ireland/Ireland. Indeed, during the course of the study, the EU and the British and Irish Governments agreed to support a PEACE III Programme for 2007-2013. A draft PEACE III Operational Programme was designed in early 2007, making it important for this study to ensure the transferability of any alternative methodologies to this programme; and
- Holding a participative workshop. Having conducted a desk-based analysis of the transferability of the different methodological approach, potential options and recommendations for Peace-Building programmes in Northern Ireland and Ireland were identified. These options were presented and discussed during a participative workshop involving members of the Distinctiveness Working Group and the Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group. This workshop also provided the opportunity to agree on proposals and recommendations for future Peace-Building programmes in Northern Ireland and Ireland.

⁵ The European Commission (1004) Evaluating EU Activities: A Practical Guide for the Commission Services, DG BUDG, July 2004.

Report structure

1.9 The following sections of this report are structured as follows:

- **Section 2: Challenges in monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building.** This section provides a background to the study by outlining the particular problems and challenges involved in monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building outcomes. Following that, the section reflects on the experience in Northern Ireland/Ireland and examines the monitoring and evaluation framework established under the PEACE I and II Programmes;
- **Section 3: A generic monitoring and evaluation framework.** This section identifies and assesses a range of methodological approach that can be employed for evaluating Peace-Building outcomes; and
- **Section 4: Towards a monitoring and evaluation framework for Northern Ireland/Ireland.** Reflecting on international best practice, this section outlines a preferred approach for monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building interventions in Northern Ireland/Ireland. The section concludes by identifying detailed recommendations and guidance for applying the approach.

2 Challenges in monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building

Introduction

2.1 This section provides a background to the study by outlining the particular problems and challenges involved in monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building outcomes. Following that, the section reflects on the experience in Northern Ireland/Ireland and examines the monitoring and evaluation framework established under the PEACE II Programme. The section is structured as follows:

- **The development of Peace-Building:** this outlines the reasons underlying the increasing focus on Peace-Building and the evaluation of Peace-Building interventions;
 - **Definitions:** this examines different definitions of Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution;
 - **Monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building:** this examines the inherent difficulties involved in monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building interventions and examines particular tensions in the evaluation process;
- and
- **The Northern Ireland/Ireland experience:** this assesses the framework that has been established to monitor and evaluate the PEACE I and II Programmes in Northern Ireland/Ireland.

The development of Peace-Building

2.2 The interest in evaluation of peace building, reconciliation and conflict resolution is a consequence of both the growth of initiatives aimed at initiating and embedding peace negotiations and agreements, and recognition of the inadequacy of existing approach. The United States Institute of Peace⁶ details forty comprehensive peace agreements between 1989 and 2005, including fifteen in Africa, eleven in Asia, seven in Europe, five in the Americas, and two in the Middle East. The problem is that, in many cases, war has not been succeeded by peace but by a no-war no-peace stalemate, harried by intermittent violence, economic struggle, crime, persistent suspicion and public dissatisfaction.

2.3 In Northern Ireland, for example, it is possible to point to a set of tasks in which a degree of progress has been made during and since the Belfast Agreement. These include: prisoner releases; policing reforms; the establishment of North/South and East/West bodies; changes in the Irish constitution; decommissioning; and, even power-sharing episodes. This linear list of tasks, while important, did not address the more amorphous problems of trust and the creation of an agreed vision of society, which continue to frustrate the post-agreement landscape. This helps to explain the perception by outsiders that it is a successful process

6 The United State Institute of Peace (<http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html>.) The general pattern described in the USIP website is generally echoed in the other major sites. The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame hosts the Peace Matrix Project, which sets out to compare recent and current peace agreements, calculates that comprehensive peace agreements have been signed between 1989 and 2001 in at least 26 countries, and at least eight more have been negotiated since 2001. The Conflict Data Project at the University of Uppsala classified 46 comprehensive peace agreements between 1989 and 2004. (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/UCDPtoplevel.htm>).

and the more pessimistic views of people who live there. The completion of a peace accord merely marks the start of another phase in a peace process and, in some cases, another phase of conflict. Consequently, international support agencies and academics have become more interested in Peace-Building, especially in post-accord societies, and in how it can be assessed, evaluated and improved.

Definitions

2.4 Early approach to evaluating Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution borrowed heavily from evaluations of development projects, but were uncomfortable when applying their concrete objectives. A fundamental problem lies in a lack of agreement about the constituents of the package of 'Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution', as outlined in the terms of reference. Lynch interprets this as 'the question of where Peace-Building and conflict resolution work at community (micro) and regional (mezzo) levels fit into the overall process of conflict transformation'⁷.

2.5 What do we mean by conflict transformation? What do we expect this work to contribute to conflict transformation? Are there limits to what we can expect micro and mezzo-level Peace-Building work to contribute to conflict transformation? In this context, what is our picture of a 'successful impact'⁸? Fast and Neufeldt also highlighted the difficulties caused by confused definitions:

'The literature on Peace-Building offers differing interpretations of the concept, which limits its usefulness. The variation usually centers on the stage at which Peace-Building occurs and the range of actions that constitute Peace-Building. A sampling of three definitions illustrates these distinctions: Evans⁹ and Lederach's¹⁰ definitions include efforts before and after an outbreak of conflict, whereas Boutros-Ghali's¹¹ definition focuses on actions following the outbreak of conflict. Further, one definition refers to Peace-Building as strategy (Evans), another as action (Boutros-Ghali), and the third as processes, approach, and stages (Lederach), a more comprehensive vision¹².

2.6 The water is further muddied by other complications. Two in particular are important. Charles Villa-Vicencio argues that reconciliation 'strives to transcend the logic of what seems possible while assuring that the crossbar is never too high that people shy away from it'¹³. He attempted to approach the problem of defining Peace-Building by proposing benchmarks against which it might be measured¹⁴. Among the most important of these benchmarks is 'the pursuit of justice', which also features in most other definitions but does not feature in the

7 Lynch, C. (2006 ongoing) Assessing for a Peace-Building Impact: A framework for evaluating the impact of PEACE Programmes, Dublin City University, Centre for International Studies, 2006 ongoing.

8 Lynch, C. (2006 ongoing) Assessing for a Peace-Building Impact: A framework for evaluating the impact of PEACE Programmes, Dublin City University, Centre for International Studies, 2006 ongoing.

9 Evans, G. (1993) Co-operating for peace: The global agenda for the 1990s and beyond. St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen and Unwin.

10 Lederach, J. P. (1997) Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

11 Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. New York: United Nations.

12 Fast, L. and Neufeldt, R. (2005) Envisioning Success: Building Blocks for Strategic and Peace-Building Impact Evaluation, Journal of Peace-Building and Development, 2,2 2005.

13 Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Erik Doxtader (eds) (2005) Pieces of the Puzzle, Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.

14 Among Villa Vicencio's eleven benchmarks are: 'Reconciliation is about pursuing justice'; 'Reconciliation is a process'; 'Reconciliation does not necessarily involve forgiveness' - a claim contested in Desmond Tutu's 'No Future Without Forgiveness' (Canada, Rider, 1999).

SEUPB brief. Further, since the late 1960s, 'community relations' has been the most commonly used term to encompass efforts aimed at tackling divisions in Northern Ireland, borrowed from the race relations field in the United Kingdom. On the basis of responses during the consultation exercise for A Shared Future, it still is the preferred phrase for most people in Northern Ireland¹⁵.

- 2.7 So the problem is how best to approach the task of monitoring and evaluating 'Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution', when the terms overlap so much and do not explicitly include community relations or justice. The most promising approach is to seek an all-embracing term - either 'reconciliation' or 'Peace-Building' - and then disaggregate it in such a way as to include specific sub-tasks. A number of good definitions are available for both terms, but two are proposed as appropriate to this task - Fast and Neufeldt's definition of Peace-Building, and Hamber and Kelly's description of the tasks involved in seeking reconciliation. The two are not incompatible: 'Peace-Building' is the most widely used generic term in the academic and practice literature, and 'reconciliation', as outlined by Hamber and Kelly, sets out five clear activities to pursue reconciliation¹⁶.
- 2.8 Taking the Fast and Neufeldt definition first, they understand Peace-Building as "actions taken to prevent violent conflict from erupting, and efforts taken to end violent conflict and subsequently to transform relationships, interactions, and structures after the violence subsides. Peace-Building activities can be undertaken on many 'tracks'¹⁷ and in many sectors, whether development agencies, community-based organisations, the media, business or political leaders. The goal is to create, support, or enhance healthy and sustainable interactions, relationships and structures that are tolerant, respectful, and constructively respond to the root causes and symptoms of conflict over the long-term - in other words, to create and support a just peace. As such, Peace-Building can be a separate area of activity as well as an approach to activities which is integrated into more traditional sector-based development programming"¹⁸.
- 2.9 In 2005, Democratic Dialogue carried out a research study on community reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Hamber and Kelly tested and confirmed the concept of reconciliation as involving five interwoven strands¹⁹:
- Developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society;
 - Acknowledging and dealing with the past;
 - Building positive relationships;
 - Promoting significant cultural and attitudinal change; and
 - Creating substantial social, economic and political change.
- 2.10 Both the Fast-Neufeldt definition and the Hamber-Kelly approach are sufficiently broad to incorporate all the three closely related elements - Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution - mentioned in the terms of reference. Together they provide appropriate starting points for this research.

15 Darby J and Knox, C. (2004) A Shared Future: A Consultation paper on Improving Community.

16 Hamber, B. and Kelly, G. (2005) A Place for Reconciliation? Conflict and locality in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Democratic Dialogue.

17 Diamond, L. and MacDonald, J. (1996) Multi-track Diplomacy: A systems approach to peace. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

18 Diamond, L. and MacDonald, J. (1996) Multi-track Diplomacy: A systems approach to peace. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

19 Hamber, B. and Kelly, G. (2005) A Place for Reconciliation? Conflict and locality in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Democratic Dialogue.

Monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building

2.11 The initial models for the evaluation of Peace-Building projects came from the strong tradition of monitoring and evaluation in the development field. From working within this area, Carol Weiss considers that evaluation has four main purposes, which includes:

- Guidance for action: the direct instrumental use of findings;
- Reinforcement of prior beliefs: enhancing confidence of those who press for change;
- Mobilisation of support for desired change; and
- Enlightenment: increase in understanding²⁰.

2.12 Evaluating the impact of Peace-Building interventions, however, is a difficult task. Peace-Building is a complex term which is often centred on developing more intangible outcomes which are longer-term than those facing economic development. This makes short-term monitoring and evaluation difficult. Fast and Neufeldt also comment that it is difficult to isolate the impact of specific Peace-Building interventions from the complex political, economic and social contexts in which they are located²¹.

2.13 In addition, developments in the processes of evaluation have increased tensions and difficulties in monitoring and evaluation. Over the last decade, increasing emphasis has been placed towards presenting evaluation as partnerships between those evaluating and those under evaluation, with the evaluator's role one of facilitation and support. This contrasts with the traditional role in which evaluation has traditionally been regarded as providing authority and external validation. These changes have emphasised and made more explicit a number of tensions frustrating effective monitoring and evaluation. Some of the tensions are inevitable, built intrinsically into the nature of the donor-recipient relationship, but others may be exaggerated.

These tensions are outlined and discussed below:

- Donors versus recipients?
- Quantitative versus qualitative approach?
- Micro versus macro impact?

Donors versus recipients?

2.14 Those conducting external monitoring and evaluation tasks in the 1990s were often confronted by the consequences of different expectations and perspectives from donors and from the recipients of funding. In crude terms, donors wished to ensure that their funds were efficiently administered and that the programmes were making the intended impact. The recipients of the funds often regarded external monitoring and evaluation as at worst an irritating distraction from their work, and at best an opportunity to reflect on how their work might be improved.

20 Weiss, C. (1995) 'Nothing as practical as a good theory: exploring theory-based evaluation for comprehensive community initiatives for children and families', in J. P. Connell, A. C. Kubisch.

21 Fast, L. and Neufeldt, R. (2005) Envisioning Success: Building Blocks for Strategic and Peace-Building Impact Evaluation, *Journal of Peace-Building and Development*, 2,2 2005.

2.15 Both these expectations still apply. The difference emerging over the last decade is that they are less frequently regarded as confrontational. Instead, almost all the influential literature seeks to present monitoring and evaluation as a mutual task facing donors and recipients in order to ensure the most beneficial outcomes possible. The debate is now firmly located around the best ways to accomplish this.

Quantitative versus qualitative approach?

2.16 It is understandable why donors would like to adopt a set of 'objective indicators', but purely quantitative approach to evaluating Peace-Building projects face at least three major challenges. First, they depend on reliable and up-to-date data on such factors as demographic displacement and behavioural or attitudinal change, which are particularly difficult to find in divisive conflicts. Second, they have difficulty in determining the distinction between programme contribution and social change: between contribution and attribution. It is unreasonable to claim a Peace-Building programme is unsuccessful if the background conflict continues, and equally unreasonable to claim success if background tensions improve. The difficulty lies in evaluating the specific impact of a specific programme. As John Mayne from Canada's Office of the Auditor General, put it, 'in trying to measure the performance of a programme, we face three problems. We can often - although frequently not without some difficulty - measure whether or not these outcomes are actually occurring. The more difficult question is just what contribution the specific programme in question made to the outcome. How much of the success (or failure) can we attribute to the programme? What has been the contribution made by the programme?'²². The third challenge is that 'measures like the number of people who have participated in sessions is not telling them what they really want to know' (Consultations with Marc Ross).

2.17 Qualitative approach are equally troubled. An over-reliance on informal approach - 'just asking people' - in itself is unlikely to provide a sound basis for evaluation. It lacks objective measurement and may tempt grant-holders to downplay difficulties. It is unlikely to satisfy other involved parties and donors. Most recent approach to good evaluation have struggled with this dilemma, and most are moving in a similar direction, one which combines a more systematic approach to personal narratives with a verifiable external involvement. As Brusset put it, 'the narrative school of thought is based on a review of the facets of a conflict, and its value lies in making an invitation to greater conflict sensitivity, not better evaluation'²³.

2.18 The tension between quantitative and qualitative approach tends to be exaggerated. One of the most encouraging developments in recent years is the evidence that those working on the project, far from resisting attempts by donors to scrutinise their operations, are very open to seeking objective confirmation that they are going about their tasks in the best way possible, and how their efforts might be improved. Our efforts should be directed towards finding ways of handling it properly.

22 Mayne, John (Office of Auditor General of Canada), 1999. Using Attribution through Contribution Analysis: Using performance Measures Sensibly. Discussion paper. <http://www.io.ssc.govt.nz/pathfinder/documents/>.

23 Brusset, Emery. (2006) Literature Overview of Evaluation Tools for Conflict Prevention, Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland: INCORE.

Micro versus macro impact?

- 2.19 Is it reasonable to expect that small-scale local projects can contribute to the creation of general peace and the reduction of violence, and should their success be measured and evaluated on this basis? It is clear that 'small-scale NGO projects are not able to do the larger political work of reconciliation and relationship building' (Consultations with Marc Ross). Still, many small-scale interventions are explicitly aiming to achieve such a result, and wish to be measured against both specific and general Peace-Building criteria. Ross advocates the benefits of finding behavioural indicators such as the level of contact ranging from workplaces, leisure settings, intermarriage and schools. Other measures might be violence or threats of it, language used in the press to describe the in-group and out-group, and then finally public opinion. The dilemma is that it is hard to link these macro indicators to micro-level projects.
- 2.20 Indeed, the issue is the need to articulate goals for each project that are consistent with the project's activities. So, for example, a programme that fosters small group discussions is hardly going to alter public opinion in a way that we could imagine. They need to work on both the micro- level (what is the impact on participants in their projects?) and the macro-level (what difference did a project make on the wider society?). The problem is that many projects only address the former and suggest that the latter is simply dealt with by altering the culture or society over time' (Consultations with Marc Ross).
- 2.21 All Peace-Building funding bodies face the same problem of assessing the impact of individual micro- level, often local, interventions on the broader fronts of community relations and conflict transformation. An initiative may be successful according to its specific brief but may have negligible impact on the larger conflict, and the link between the two has often been missing in evaluations. Kenneth Bush defined the effects of such initiatives as either a Peace-Building impact or a conflict impact. The former is 'the effect of individual development projects on structures and processes that strengthen prospects for peaceful co-existence and decrease the likelihood of outbreaks, re-occurrence or the continuation of violent conflict; a conflict impact is the effect of projects on structures and processes that increase the likelihood that conflict will be dealt with violently'²⁴.
- 2.22 Lynch points out the need to limit the level of expectations for such local projects and to set more realistic and modest targets for micro-projects. Citing Marc Ross²⁵, she argues that 'for the most part conflict resolution theories back off from claims that they are able, by themselves, to settle long-term intransigent conflict. Their relationship to the larger conflict is seen as indirect and as helping to establish preconditions'²⁶. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that even local peace initiatives should contribute to conflict transformation in general. There are, however, differences about how this might be achieved.

The Northern Ireland/Ireland experience

- 2.23 The involvement of the EU in Peace-Building in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland occurred as a direct response to the opportunities presented by developments in the peace process during 1994, especially the announcements of cessations of violence by the main republican and loyalist paramilitary organisations. The cessations came after 25 years of violent conflict, during which over 3,500²⁷ people were killed and some 37,000 injured.

24 Bush, K. (1998) A measure of peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of development projects in conflict zones. Working Paper #28. Ottawa, ON: The International Development Research Centre.

25 Ross, M. H. (2001) 'Action Evaluation in the theory and practice of conflict resolution', Peace and Conflict Studies [on-line journal], 8(1). <http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs> cited by Lynch, C. (2006 on-going), Assessing for a Peace-Building Impact: A Framework for Evaluating the Impact of Peace Programmes, Dublin City University, Centre for International Studies: Co-operation Ireland.

26 Lynch, C. (2006 on-going), Assessing for a Peace-Building Impact: A Framework for Evaluating the Impact of Peace Programmes, Dublin City University, Centre for International Studies: Co-operation Ireland.


27 Fay, M.T., Morrissey, M., Smyth, S., and Wong, T. (1999) The Cost of the Troubles Survey, Derry/INCORE.

2.24 The PEACE I Programme (the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland) was implemented in the form of a Community Initiative and the EU committed ?500m to the programme over the period 1995 to 1999. The strategic aim of the programme was as follows:

"To reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation by increasing economic development and employment, promoting urban and rural regeneration, developing cross-border co-operation and extending social inclusion".

2.25 The programme was supported with a view to providing social and economic development to underpin the peace process. Indeed, economic growth and progress towards social development were regarded as the two key pillars of the PEACE I Programme that would contribute towards the overall goal of peace and reconciliation. To reflect this, Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the key themes of the PEACE I Programme.

Figure 2.1: Key themes of PEACE I Programme



2.26 However, while the ex-post evaluation concluded that the PEACE I Programme delivered a range of socio-economic impacts and contributed towards the strategic aim of peace and reconciliation through the implementation of programme principles such as partnership, targeting disadvantage and a bottom up approach, it was concluded that identifying the impact on relationships between the two communities at the 'macro- level' was more difficult to discern.²⁹ Reflecting this, the monitoring and evaluation framework under the PEACE I Programme largely focused on measurable indicators such as the number of activities supported, jobs created, levels and types of funding and financial rectitude.

2.27 This led to concerns that the programme was not making an impact on Peace-Building. One EU representative, for example, was quoted as saying that 'Europeans will want to know why the positive forces unleashed by the PEACE Programme have not translated into political progress and political accommodation'²⁹.

2.28 Following on from this, the PEACE II Programme focused greater attention on strengthening the Peace-Building and reconciliation impact. While the overall aim of the PEACE II Programme remained the same as for PEACE I '*to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation*', two specific objectives were included in an effort to identify the distinctive aspects of the programme. These included:

- **Addressing the legacy of the conflict;** the programme is intended to address specific problems generated by the conflict in order to assist the return to a normal, peaceful

28 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003) Ex-post evaluation of Peace I and Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II, Final report.


29 McAdam,N. (1997) 'The cash for peace', Belfast Telegraph, 24th June 1997.

and stable society. Projects and actions will be supported which address the economic and social patterns which have grown as a result of the 'Troubles'³⁰; and

- **Taking opportunities arising from peace;** to encourage actions which have a stake in peace and which actively help promote a stable and normal society where opportunities can be grasped. Projects and actions will be supported which have a remedial effect on sectors, areas or groups which have been hindered in their economic and social development by the conflict and for which the prospect of a more stable society is a new opportunity³¹.

2.29 In addition, the programme had a sub-objective of promoting actions that will '*pave the way to reconciliation*'. These objectives formed the '*distinctiveness criteria*' which were included as key themes in the programme, as shown in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Key themes of PEACE II Programme



2.30 Being incorporated into project selection criteria, the distinctiveness criteria have ensured that the programme has focused on areas, sectors and groups particularly affected by the conflict. However, while the distinctiveness criteria have helped to provide a renewed and specific focus for the PEACE II Programme in terms of peace and reconciliation, identifying the impacts on peace and reconciliation has still proved difficult to identify. A review of the indicators shows that a greater emphasis has been placed in PEACE II on measuring indicators that more accurately reflect peace and reconciliation outcomes, as outlined below:

- Pupils from the two major traditions educated together will have an enhanced understanding, respect and appreciation for each others culture and beliefs;
- Instances of networking, working in partnership or sharing of resources between organisations/groups;
- Cross-community infrastructure still in existence 12 months after the end of the programme;
- Reduced sectarianism and enhanced social cohesion in sectors and activities adversely affected by conflict and division;

30 This includes:-

- Activities/sectors most affected by community division and polarisation and those for which a restructuring is necessary to return to peace;
- Geographical areas showing high levels of community polarisation resulting from the conflict or suffering from the absence of contacts or from tensions between communities; or with significant numbers of displaced persons as a result of the conflict; and
- Groups and individuals which have suffered from the consequences of sectarianism and political violence.

31 This includes:-

- Activities/sectors whose development has been impeded by the adverse image of the region abroad or by lack of confidence in entrepreneurship;
- Geographical areas which have been particularly disadvantaged as a consequence of the violence; and
- Groups or individuals who have been prevented from fulfilling their potential in society or in the labour market or which have been excluded from the labour market as a result of Community conflict and division.

- Cross-community contacts arising from projects supported by the measure that are still active following the end of the project; and
- Evidence of perception of improved community relations in rural communities following activities supported by the measure.

2.31 However, despite including an indicator framework, concerns were raised in the 2002 Annual Implementation Report over the usefulness of some of the indicators for measuring programme outcomes. On a similar basis to the PEACE I, the PEACE II Programme largely includes impact indicators that could be part of any other economic and social programme supported under the Structural Funds. These indicators, for example, include:

- Jobs created;
- Increase in export sales per annum;
- Average reduction in peak journey times;
- Number of enterprises still in existence after 2 years;
- Increase in visitor numbers on 2000 baseline;
- Number progressing within employment/education;
- Enhanced use and penetration of ICT; and
- Decreased number of early school leavers.

2.32 Difficulties have also been faced in identifying and agreeing on a 'programme indicator' for the PEACE II Programme. Further to this, the mid-term evaluation of the PEACE II Programme highlighted the challenges involved in determining the Peace-Building impact of the programme on the basis of the monitoring and evaluation framework. The report went on to recommend that the Managing Authority, SEUPB, consider 'the benefits of establishing a programme evaluation plan to ensure a co-ordinated approach to evaluation across the programme and the various Implementing Bodies'³².

2.33 Taking this forward, the Distinctiveness and Monitoring and Evaluation Groups (these groups include Implementing Bodies and representatives of beneficiaries) have conducted extensive programmes of work examining the PEACE II Programme. The groups have managed a series of research initiatives that include:

- A review of indicators;
- A geographical analysis of programme funding;
- Research on community uptake, SEUPB (2005) *Community Uptake Analysis of Peace II*, Helm Corporation in association with Trutz Haase and Jonathan Pratschke;
- Assessments of the impact of PEACE II funding in particular geographic areas, SEUPB (2004) *Telling the Story of PEACE II, An Assessment of the Impact of Peace II Funding in Strabane, East Belfast and Cavan*;
- Survey research examining the changing attitudes towards the 'other' community, NISRA (2004) *Attitudinal Survey*, SEUPB;

³² PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003) Ex-post evaluation of Peace I and Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II, Final report.

- Research providing understanding and a definition of the term reconciliation, Hamber, B. and Kelly, G. (2005) *A Place for Reconciliation? Conflict and locality in Northern Ireland*. Belfast: Democratic Dialogue; and
- Research assessing the peace and reconciliation outcomes from the economic measures funded under PEACE II, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) *PEACE II Qualitative Assessment of the Economic Measures*.

2.34 This research has supplemented the framework of indicators by focusing on particular issues in-depth and drawing out the peace and reconciliation outcomes through qualitative and quantitative analysis. One of the drawbacks of this approach, however, is that the research focuses on certain specific areas making aggregation across the programme difficult.

Conclusions

- 2.35 A common problem in many Peace-Building interventions is that, in many cases, war has not been succeeded by peace but by a no-war no-peace stalemate, harried by intermittent violence, economic struggle, crime, persistent suspicion and public dissatisfaction. The completion of a peace accord, therefore, merely marks the start of another phase in a peace process and, in some cases, another phase of conflict. As a result, international support agencies and academics have become more interested in Peace-Building, especially in post-accord societies, and in how it can be assessed, evaluated and improved.
- 2.36 Measuring and quantifying the impact of Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution, however, is a difficult task. One of the key problems is that Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution are complex terms which have no common definition. Some definitions, for example, refer to efforts before and after conflict while others focus on actions following the outbreak of the conflict. This limits the usefulness of the terms and complicates evaluation as there is no understanding of what a successful impact represents. Some more useful definitions, however, have been provided. These identify an all-embracing term and then disaggregate it to include specific sub-tasks. Hamber and Kelly's definition of reconciliation, for example, provides a useful definition in this regard.
- 2.37 Over the last decade, developments in the processes of evaluation have increased tensions and difficulties in monitoring and evaluation. Changes which have placed increasing emphasis on presenting evaluation as partnerships between those evaluating and those under evaluation have made more explicit a number of tensions frustrating effective monitoring and evaluation. This includes the tensions between:
- Donors versus recipients?
 - Quantitative versus qualitative approach?
 - Micro versus macro impact?
- 2.38 In Northern Ireland/Ireland, difficulties have also been experienced in assessing the Peace-Building outcomes from the PEACE I and II Programmes. The monitoring and evaluation frameworks, for example, have placed much emphasis on standard socio-economic indicators which has made it difficult to assess the impact on relationships between the two communities at the 'macro- level'. Under the PEACE II Programme, however, increased efforts have been made to capture Peace-Building outcomes by conducting a programme of research. This research, however, is in-depth and focuses on specific areas making aggregation across the programme difficult.
- 2.39 Reflecting on these difficulties and challenges, the next section seeks to examine international best practice in monitoring and evaluation frameworks for assessing Peace-Building outcomes.

3 A generic monitoring and evaluation framework

Introduction

3.1 This section identifies and examines a range of methodological approach that can be employed for evaluating Peace-Building outcomes. On the basis of an extensive review of the academic and practice literature and interviews with key informants from funding bodies and the evaluation/research sector, the approach described and analysed below are selected as the most appropriate and successful efforts to monitor and evaluate Peace-Building projects. Consequently, they represent best current practice in monitoring and evaluation. These approach are presented below and detailed in the following paragraphs:

- Do No Harm;
- Logical Framework Analysis;
- Action Evaluation;
- Theories of Change;
- Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment;
- Conflict Sensitivity Analysis;
- The Aid for Peace approach;
- Comprehensive Visioning and Strategic Analysis; and
- Social Dialogue approach.

Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) - Do No Harm

3.2 Mary Anderson's Do No Harm/Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) set out to help development agencies find indicators about the effects of humanitarian intervention on intergroup conflicts³³. The project concluded that 'dividers and connectors' - roads, markets, cross-group attendance in schools and public places - could be identified to measure such changes. In order to assess the relative importance of these indicators, however, it is considered necessary to add a more qualitative narrative approach. More recently, Anderson's Reflections on Peace Practice (RPP) project used case studies and input from regional practitioners to help determine what works and what does not.

3.3 Anderson's work has its foundations firmly planted in work pioneered by development agencies, but Peace-Building has raised problems about how to assess the impact of such less concrete interventions. 'Do No Harm' was an important breakthrough in highlighting the potential risks facing interventions in violent or post-war communities, but reconciliation and Peace-Building also require more ambitious approach. It is not enough that Peace-Building programmes do no harm. They must also contribute towards building long-term peace.

3.4 Anderson's more recent work with Olson has moved to address this issue. They suggest that local Peace-Building projects rarely evaluate the contribution of their projects to longer-term social objectives. Two explicit objectives are proposed: to reduce the likelihood of violent expressions of differences; and to help build a just and sustainable peace³⁴.

33 Anderson, M. B. (1999) Do No Harm: How aid can support peace - or war. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

34 Anderson, M. B. and Olson, L. (2003) Confronting war: Critical lessons for peace practitioners. Cambridge, MA, Collaborative for Development Action, Inc.

3.5 The key strengths and weaknesses of the 'Do No Harm' approach are outlined in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Strengths and weaknesses of the 'Do No Harm' approach

Strengths	Weaknesses
'Do No Harm' has had a major impact on monitoring Peace-Building.	Sometimes perceived as reactive.
Has shown ability to adapt to new circumstances, and clarify broad goals (see Anderson and Olson, 2003).	Can be viewed as overly simplistic.

Logical Framework (Log Frame) Analysis

- 3.6 Developed in the United States, Logical Framework Analysis is probably the most widely used tool for planning and managing development projects, and features in almost all contemporary evaluation exercises.
- 3.7 The Log Frame approach to evaluation appeals to donors because it encourages the discipline of clear thinking about aims, indicators and outcomes, and to project staff and other stakeholders by providing a concise, flexible summary usable throughout the lifecycle of the project. Its easy adaptability to different evaluation tasks may be illustrated by comparing the application of the Log Frame across two users, KAR³⁵ and the Department for International Development (DFID)³⁶, as shown in Table 3.2 and 3.3.

35 KAR (Knowledge and Research Programme on Disability and Healthcare Technology), 2003. Constructing a logical Framework, Programme on Disability and Healthcare Technology, London: KAR. www.disabilitykar.net.

36 For a more detailed example of DFID's application of Log Frame analysis, see its Log Frame for strengthening counternarcotics institutions in Afghanistan. (dfidweb.dfid.gon.uk/prismdocs/ASIA_AND_PACIFIC_DIVISION?13754202911.doc)

Table 3.2: KAR's Logical Framework

Narrative summary	Verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions/risks
Goal	What are the quantitative ways of measuring, or qualitative ways of judging, whether these broad objectives are being achieved? (estimated time).	What sources of information exists, or can be provided cost-effectively?	(Goal to Supergoal): What external factors are necessary for sustaining objectives in the long run?
Purpose	What are the quantitative measures or qualitative evidence by which achievement and distribution of impacts and benefits can be judged (estimated time).	What sources of information exists or can be provided cost-effectively? Does provision for collection need to be made under inputs-outputs?	(Purpose to Goal): What conditions external to the project are necessary if achievements of the project's purpose are to contribute to reaching the project goal?
Outputs: Indicate each of the outputs that are to be produced by the project in order to achieve project purpose.	What kind and quantity of outputs, and by when will they be produced? (quantity, quality, time).	What sources of information?	(Output of Purpose): What are the factors not within the control of the project which, if not present, are liable to restrict progress from outputs to achievements of project purpose?
Activities: Indicate each of the activities that must be undertaken in order to accomplish the outputs.	We recommend that verifiable indicators are included against all activities. This is essential for projects reporting and monitoring against the Logical Framework.	What are sources of information?	(Activity to Output): 1) What external factors must be realised to obtain planned outputs on schedule? 2) What kind of decisions or actions outside the control of the project are necessary for inception of the project?

Table 3.3: DFID's Logical Framework

Narrative summary	Verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions/risks
Goal: Wider problem the project will help to solve.	Quantitative ways of measuring or qualitative ways of judging timed achievement of goal.	Cost-effective methods and sources to quantify or assess indicators.	(Goal to supergoal) External factors necessary to sustain objectives in the long run.
Purpose: The immediate impact on the project area or target group, i.e. the change or benefit to be achieved by the project.	Quantitative ways of measuring or qualitative ways of judging times achievement of purpose.	Cost-effective methods and sources to quantify or assess indicators.	(Purpose of Goal) External conditions necessary if achieved project purpose is to contribute to reaching project goal.
Outputs: These are the specifically deliverable results expected from the project to attain the purpose.	Quantitative ways of measuring or qualitative ways of judging timed production of outputs.	Cost-effective methods and sources to quantify or assess indicators.	(Outputs to purpose) Factors out of project control which, if present, could restrict progress from outputs to achieving project purpose.
Activities: These are the tasks to be done to produce the outputs.	INPUTS: This is a summary of the project budget.	Financial out-turn report as agreed in grant agreement.	(Activity to output) Factors out of project control which, if present, could restrict progress from activities to achieving outputs.

- 3.8 The question is not whether Log Frames are helpful in monitoring and evaluating development projects, but if they are appropriate to evaluate Peace-Building interventions. Over the last number of years, major relief and development agencies in the United States, Canada and Europe have increasingly adopted Peace-Building initiatives and incorporated Log Frames within this analysis³⁷. This increasing focus on Peace-Building has been largely based on the premise that eliminating or reducing structural injustice and inequality and addressing the causes of poverty are important dimensions of development work for long-term, sustainable peace.
- 3.9 Given the degree of importance placed on this rationale, it is not surprising that many of Peace-Building initiatives, and the Log Frames contained therein, have largely focused on measuring more 'standard' economic and social outcomes. A review of a range of evaluation reports and practical guidance documents produced by organisations such as DFID, the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency, for example, have identified performance indicators across a number of sectors that include, *inter alia*:
- **Agriculture** (e.g. % change in the deforestation rate; agriculture as % of total GNP);
 - **Energy** (e.g.% of households connected consumption; kms of transmission lines);
 - **Education** (e.g. % enrolments by family income level; school drop outs as % of school population); and
 - **Housing** (e.g. % change in number of slum units replaced by new housing; % of population with a set standard of shelter)³⁸.
- 3.10 Efforts have also been made however, to focus attention on employing Log Frames to measure outcomes related to Peace-Building that are beyond more 'standard' economic and social objectives. These include, for example, indicators in relation to developing governance and promoting civil society and pluralist democracy, as shown in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4: Examples of indicators used in interventions promoting civil society and pluralist democracy, and governance .

Objective/ theme	Governance ³⁹	Promoting civil society and pluralist democracy ⁴⁰
Examples of indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Percentage increase in public confidence in institutions. • Number of governance processes in place. • Implementation of laws – corporate and bankruptcy. • Cabinet decision making processes. • Institutions for law and order in place. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceived change in awareness of various democratic issues by the target population. • Change in perception of various human rights and democratic development issues by government representatives. • Change in behaviour of the target population – participation in elections. • Participation in public awareness campaigns. • Extent of NGO participation in regional networks on governance/human rights issues. • Change in number/quality of deliberation with civil society on variety of democratic issues. • Openness of government to local advocacy on human rights.

37 Fast, L. and Neufeldt, R. (2005) 'Envisioning Success: Building Blocks for Strategic and Peace-Building Impact Evaluation', *Journal of Peace-Building and Development*, 2, 2, 2005.

38 UNDG, UNDP, World Bank, GTZ, BMZ (2003) *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations*

39 UNDG, UNDP, World Bank, GTZ, BMZ (2003) *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations*

40 Canadian International Development Agency (2003) *Three Decentralised Funds in the Balkans, Evaluation Report*, December 2003, Performance and Knowledge Development Branch, Canadian International Development Agency

3.11 A menu of other indicators related to enhancing citizen security and developing participatory democratic governance is included in a field manual provided by USAID⁴¹. The key strengths and weaknesses of the Log Frame Analysis are outlined in Table 3.5:

Table 3.5: Strengths and weaknesses of the Log Frame approach

Strengths	Weaknesses
Intrinsic to almost all Peace-Building evaluation.	Produces a focus on the project level rather than on the overall policy goals or purposes and needs to be adapted for micro-macro transferability.
Provides a basis to examine the rationale for a programme/project, the intended outcomes, the activities that will achieve these outcomes and the risks posed to the programme/project.	Developing appropriate Peace-Building indicators can be difficult.
Clarifies the project objectives and the assumptions underpinning specific interventions.	Places much emphasis on quantifiable indicators which may not capture all the outcomes of Peace-Building.
Highlights the need to link planned activities with desired outcomes and to clearly identify the type, range and amount of inputs required for each.	Can be restrictive focusing the Implementing Agencies to think mechanistically rather than being innovative.
Provides a basis for monitoring and evaluation by highlighting the need for, and the prospects of, project sustainability.	Focuses too much on risks of an intervention rather than the opportunities. Conflict is viewed as a risk rather than as something the intervention can address.

Action Evaluation

3.12 Action Evaluation is an approach to evaluation developed by Marc Ross and Jay Rothman which starts by emphasising the distinction between the success of a project according to its internal standards (the immediate and usually local objectives set for a project by the donors) and its ability to impact external realities (the deliberate and incidental effects of the project on Peace-Building within the broader political, economic and social structures and processes).

3.13 Get the internal goals and methodology right, they argue, and the external impact is more likely to be effective. They prefer to start by clarifying the specific micro- level aims of a project, and emphasise the importance of the systematic collection of data. They emphasise the need to involve all the key stakeholders at the early stage of a project, in order to agree common goals for monitoring and evaluation. Action Evaluation is not a directive approach, preferring to allow micro- level initiatives to emerge or evolve through the collective actions and analysis of a range of projects. The key stages involved in Action Evaluation are outlined in Table 3.6⁴³:

41 USAID (1998) Participatory Country Program Strategic Planning, and Performance Monitoring, Field Manual, December 1998.

42 Ross, M. H., 2001, 'Action Evaluation in the theory and practice of conflict resolution', Peace and Conflict Studies [on-line journal], 8(1). <http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs>.

Table 3.6: Action Evaluation

Stage	Activities
Establishing a baseline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Articulation of definitions of success. • Negotiation of definitions between individual stakeholders. • Individuals definitions are woven into shared goals of success.
Formative Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enactment of definitions of success. • Monitoring of success and of definitions. • Adjustment of definitions based on insights gained during real-life activity.
Summative Assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questions are asked and measures (using previously agreed indicators) taken about how well an intervention has stacked up against its own internally-derived goals.

- 3.14 Its advocates also believe that Action Evaluation is the most realistic approach to ensuring that projects have an external influence at the macro- level. According to Lynch, 'Action Evaluation' (Rothman, 2003: 85) is a straight-forward methodology designed to assist key stakeholders in a conflict intervention initiative to collaboratively define success and, using this as a baseline, to incorporate the monitoring and evaluation of these goals into the project management cycle⁴³.
- 3.15 The approach is sceptical of the concept of drawing up a list of 'objective indicators' to measure success. Instead, it is proposed that these need to be specific to the intervention and are best elicited from and with the participants in the project. Nevertheless, Ross and Rothman have identified 'illustrative standards for international or ethnic conflict resolution' as outlined below⁴⁴:

43 Lynch, C. (2006 ongoing) Assessing for a Peace-Building Impact: A framework for evaluating the impact of PEACE Programmes, Dublin City University, Centre for International Studies, 2006 ongoing.

44 Ross, M.H. and Rothman, J. (eds.) (1999) Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorising Success and Failure, London: Macmillian.

Figure 3.1: Illustrative standards for conflict resolution projects**Long term goals:**

1. Institutionalisation: develop local capacity, establish structures that will perpetuate and deepen the work;
2. Reverberation: influence specific micro- level interventions so that they reverberate to the society at large; and
3. Demonstration: establish credible and replicate models for addressing ethnic tension.

Methods to accomplish such goals:

1. Needs assessments: identification of issues.
2. Dialogue: meaningful, regular, sustainable.
3. Confidence building: mutual trust and understanding.
4. Empowering: recognition of the power to achieve creative and peaceful change.
5. Partnering co-operation with other programmes.
6. Engaging: engaging disputants to participate in creative conflict management.
7. Localising: identifying leader of local conflict management.
8. Catalysing: initiating concrete collaborative project between disputing parties.
9. Training: local leaders/activities in contextually appropriate concepts and skills of conflict resolution.
10. Evaluation: development of credible and useful methods for evaluating conflict resolution interventions.

3.16 The key strengths and weaknesses of the Action Evaluation approach are outlined in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7: Strengths and weaknesses of the Action Evaluation approach

Strengths	Weaknesses
Emphasises need for a systematic empirical base.	May underrate structural influences.
Perceived by practitioners as supportive to their work.	Provides limited analysis of linkage between the project level and the strategic level.
Sets more modest (realistic?) targets for micro- level projects.	Agreed goals may be those of the lowest common denominator.

Theories of Change

3.17 The Theories of Change approach to monitoring and evaluation, associated with a range of organisations including Search for Common Ground and Catholic Relief Services, start from the macro- level (the opposite position to Action Evaluation), but share with it a concern that micro- level aims might have a macro- level impact. They assume that most micro- level programmes and projects have macro- level goals and underlying assumptions. The first stage in evaluation is to clarify what these are and make them explicit, and Theory of Change supporters believe that this must involve a collaborative process between all the main stakeholders in the project, including donors, professional staff, the local community and broader societal interests. Together they set the micro- level and macro- level aims for the project and the mechanisms necessary to achieve them. Perhaps most importantly, this explicit approach pays attention to how the immediate aims of a project can be linked to how society can achieve sustainable peace, and consequently how progress along both these paths can be measured. Peter Woodrow articulates ten theories of change which are outlined in the following table⁴⁵.

Table 3.8: Woodrow's Theories of Change

Theory	Basis of theory	Methods/intervention activities
The Individual Change Theory.	Peace comes through transformative change of a critical mass of individuals, their consciousness, attitudes, behaviours and skills.	Investment in individual change through training, personal transformation/consciousness-raising workshops or processes; dialogues and encounter groups; trauma healing.
The Healthy Relationships and Connections Theory.	Peace emerges out of a process of breaking down isolation, polarisation, division, prejudice and stereotypes between/ among groups.	Processes of inter-group dialogue; networking; relationship-building processes; joint efforts and practical programmes on substantive problems.
The Withdrawal of the Resources for War Theory.	Wars require vast amounts of material (weapons, supplies, transport, etc.) and human capital. If we can interrupt the supply of people and goods to the war making system, it will collapse and peace will break out.	Anti-war campaigns to cut off funds/national budgets; conscientious objection and/or resistance to military service; international arms control; arms (and other) embargoes and boycotts.
The Reduction of Violence Theory.	Peace will result as we reduce the levels of violence perpetrated by combatants or their representatives.	Cease-fires, creation of zones of peace, withdrawal/retreat from direct engagement, introduction of peacekeeping forces/interposition, observation missions, accompaniment efforts, promotion of non-violent methods for achieving political/social/economic ends.

⁴⁵ Peter Woodrow, *Strategic Analysis for Peace-Building Programmes*, cited by Church, C and Rogers, M. (2005) *Designing for Results: Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programmes*, Search for Common Ground, Washington.

Theory	Basis of theory	Methods/intervention activities
The Root Causes/ Justice Theory.	We can achieve peace by addressing the underlying issues of injustice, oppression/ exploitation, threats to identity and security, and peoples' sense of injury/victimisation.	Long-term campaigns for social change, truth and reconciliation; changes in social institutions, laws, regulations, and economic systems.
The Institutional Development Theory.	Peace is secured by establishing stable/reliable social institutions that guarantee democracy, equity, justice, and fair allocation of resources.	New constitutional and governance arrangements/entities; development of human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption; establishment of democratic/equitable economic structures; economic development; democratisation.
The Political Elites Theory.	Peace comes when it is in the interest of political (and other) leaders to take the necessary steps. Peace-Building efforts must change the political calculus of key leaders and groups.	Raise the costs and reduce the benefits for political elites of continuing war and increase the incentives for peace; engage active and influential constituencies in favour of peace; withdraw international support/funding for warring parties.
The Grassroots Mobilisation Theory.	"When the people lead, the leaders will follow." If we mobilise enough opposition to war, political leaders will have to pay attention.	Mobilise grassroots groups to either oppose war or to advocate for positive action. Use of the media; non-violent direct action campaigns; education/ mobilisation effort; organising advocacy groups; dramatic events to raise consciousness.
The Economics Theory.	People make personal decisions, and decision-makers make policy decisions based on a system of rewards and incentives and punishment/sanctions that are essentially economic in nature. If we can change the economics associated with war-making, we can bring peace.	Use of government or financial institutions to change supply and demand dynamics; control incentive and reward systems; boycotts.
The Public Attitudes Theory.	War and violence are partly motivated by prejudice, misperceptions, and intolerance of difference. We can promote peace by using the media (television and radio) to change public attitudes and build greater tolerance in society.	TV and radio programmes that promote tolerance; modelling tolerant behaviour; symbolic acts of solidarity/unity; dialogues among groups in conflict-with subsequent publicity.

3.18 An example of a recent Theories of Change framework was that adopted by Church, Goldwyn and Zandvliet 2005 and described by Brusset as a 'Narrative Disaggregation' approach⁴⁶. As Brusset points out, 'it is not a generic set of criteria to evaluate all interventions but an instrument to guide thinking before starting an evaluation. The framework is structured around three thematic areas which are again divided into three specific aspects of an intervention that the evaluation can seek to assess. The framework offers some illustrative questions within each aspect to provide greater clarity in terms of practical application.

Table 3.9: 'Narrative Disaggregation' approach

Thematic area	Aspect covered	Evaluation measure
Goals and assumptions	Why and how is the agency conducting this particular intervention?	Assess Appropriateness. Theoretical Analysis. Strategic Review.
Process Accountability	How was the intervention implemented?	Management and Admin Cost-Accountability Process Appraisal.
Range of results	What were the short and long term results of the intervention?	Output. Outcomes. Impact.

3.19 Theories of Change can be employed for two main tasks:

- **To reveal and understand assumptions:** two assumptions are inherent in each theory: 1) how change works, and 2) the strategic advantage of the chosen theory over other theories for the context. For example, in examining a project's contribution to conflict transformation, it is possible to explore the assumptions behind the intervention and to examine how change at the individual and small group level may contribute to conflict transformation in general. Therefore, by linking the immediate, or internal, goals of a project, the Theories of Change approach develops an idea and tests the assumptions of how this will contribute to change in society at a general level. In this regard, the Theories of Change approach can be particularly useful to evaluate programme design; and
- **To ensure alignment in all levels of the programme design:** when setting goals and objectives, Theories of Change can assist programme planners to understand the basis of change behind particular choices. This assesses whether there are other Theories of Change that are better suited to the situation in which the evaluator is working or whether effectiveness increases if multiple theories are integrated into the design. On this basis, discussions of the underlying Theories of Change can help tighten programme logic and identify gaps and unmet needs.

3.20 The Theories of Change approach works best when sensitive to Ross and Rothman's internal and external features of Action Evaluation, and indeed the two approach, which are based on micro and macro perspectives and apparently in opposition, can complement each other. The key strengths and weaknesses of the Theories of Change approach are outlined in Table 3.10.

⁴⁶ Brusset, Emery, 2006, Literature Overview of Evaluation Tools for Conflict Prevention, Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland: INCORE.

Table 3.10: Strengths and weaknesses of the Theories of Change approach

Strengths	Weaknesses
Strong theoretical basis.	Sometimes suspected by practitioners as being too theoretical and difficult to implement.
Makes explicit the reasons underlying the project's creation.	More applicable to assessing the rationale of an intervention and for examining linkages between the micro- and macro- levels than determining impact.
Emphasises the importance of structural perspective.	

Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)

3.21 The Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) approach was originally associated with Kenneth Bush but is now linked with a broad range of approach, including those favoured by the Berghof Center in Germany. Bush defines PCIA as a means of evaluating (ex post facto) and anticipating (ex-ante, as far as possible) the impacts of proposed and completed development projects on:

- Those structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful co-existence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, re-occurrence, or continuation of violent conflict; and
- Those structures and processes that increase the likelihood that conflict will be dealt with through violent means⁴⁷.

3.22 PCIA is a means of anticipating, monitoring, and evaluating the ways in which an intervention may affect or has affected the dynamics of peace or conflict. PCIA can be applied to a full range of development activities in a conflict prone region and is focused on ensuring that interventions do not aggravate violent conflict and contribute to building peace within and between communities. PCIA, therefore, is similar to Gender Analysis and Environmental Impact Assessment which helps identify and understand the impact of an initiative on peace and conflict. In this regard, the PCIA approach has moved development projects towards a greater interest in Peace-Building.

3.23 PCIA should be undertaken at all stages of a project, programme or initiative. Indeed, as Table 3.11 illustrates, it may be used for different purposes at different stages⁴⁸:

47 Bush, K. (2003) Hands-on PCIA, Part 1, A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), October 2003.

48 Bush, K. (2003) Hands-on PCIA, Part 1, A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), October 2003.

Table 3.11: The different uses of PCIA at different phases of a project or initiative

Phase of initiative or project	How is PCIA used?	Objective
Pre-project	Planning tool for project design and formulation.	Anticipating future impacts; building in conflict prevention/Peace-Building mechanisms.
In-project	Performance monitoring and management tool.	Monitoring immediate impacts.
Post-project	Strategic planning for future phases.	Evaluation, institution learning.

3.24 In conducting PCIA, four broad areas are identified in which to explore the wider Peace-Building impacts of an intervention. These include:

1. Did the project produce substantial or politically significant changes in access to individual or collective material and non-material resources?
2. Did the project create, exacerbate or mitigate socio-economic tensions?
3. Did the project produce substantial changes in the material basis of economic sustenance or food security?
4. Did the project produce challenges to or changes in content of or control over existing political, economic and/or social systems?

3.25 PCIA consists of five main steps as follows:

- **Step 1:** Assessing the environment. The first step is to look at the environment in which you are operating to establish whether it is conflict-prone;
- **Step 2:** Completing a risk and opportunity assessment. Having determined the environment is conflict prone, the second step is to examine how the peace and conflict environment may affect a project or initiative. This acts as a screening exercise that examines the dynamics of the conflict environment and its likely impact on the proposed project. Four broad areas are outlined for pre-assessment that include: location, timing, political context and other salient factors;
- **Step 3:** Assessing potential peace and conflict impacts during project design;
- **Step 4:** Assessing potential peace and conflict impacts during project implementation; and
- **Step 5:** Assessing potential peace and conflict impacts as part of a post-project evaluation.

3.26 In assessing potential impacts, the contributions of projects towards Peace-Building are examined at one or more of five levels that include:

- Their impact on institutions managing conflict and promoting peace;
- Their impact on the dynamics of violence, including military and human security;
- Their impact on political structures and processes;
- Their impact on economic structures and processes; and
- Their impact on social empowerment and reconstruction.

3.27 To guide the assessment of impact of each of these levels, worksheets have been developed for funding bodies and evaluators which include sample indicators. These indicators are included in Annex A but it is stressed that they may or may not apply to specific cases and that opportunity should exist to identify indicators that are appropriate for each individual case. The key strengths and weaknesses of the PCIA approach are outlined in Table 3.12:

Table 3.12: Strengths and weaknesses of the PCIA approach

Strengths	Weaknesses
Intrinsic to almost all Peace-Building evaluation.	As PCIA proposes a broad and general framework, the lack of clarity on indicators may restrict the operationalisation of the framework for funding bodies and Implementing Agencies.
The framework outlines a broad process for assessment which facilitates wide transferability to different contexts.	Little direction is provided in the framework as to examining the dynamic interaction between sectors and interventions. For example, does social empowerment inter-relate with, reinforce or undermine military and human security?
Incorporates the context or environment into analysis by developing an understanding of the conditions under which impacts might occur.	
Undermines the sharp demarcation between development and Peace-Building projects that is often made. Considers that all development projects, not just the overtly political ones, have a potential or actual Peace-Building impact.	

3.28 Building on the work of Kenneth Bush, the PCIA approach has been developed and adapted in recent years and a number of other approach to monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building have been established. Two of the main approach which build on the PCIA approach are Conflict Sensitivity Analysis approach (adopted by many international funding agencies) and the Aid for Peace approach (known as the third generation PCIA). These approach are discussed below.

Conflict Sensitivity Analysis

3.29 International funding organisations have increasingly been involved in adopting conflict sensitive analysis to monitor and evaluate areas of conflict. As a means to gain a better understanding of the context in which funding organisations work, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis involves the study of the profile, causes, actors and dynamics of a conflict. Overall, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis seeks to:

- Understand the operational context in which funding bodies operate;
- Understand the interaction between interventions and the context; and
- Allow funding bodies to act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts⁴⁹.

⁴⁹ FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004) Conflict Sensitive approach to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-Building: Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, 12th March 2004.

- 3.30 In this regard, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis aims to provide the basis to inform conflict sensitive programming and particularly to understand the interaction between the intervention and the context. Conflict Sensitivity Analysis can be carried out at various levels (e.g. local, regional and national) but seeks to take account of the linkages between these levels. This analysis can also be used at each of the three key stages of the programme cycle, as outlined below:
- **Planning stage:** to define new interventions and to conflict-sensitise both new and predefined interventions (e.g. selection of areas of operation, beneficiaries, partners, staff, timeframe);
 - **Implementation stage:** to monitor the interaction between the context and the intervention and inform project set up and day to day decision making; and
 - **Monitoring and evaluation stage:** to measure the interaction of the interventions and the conflict dynamics in which they are situated⁵⁰.
- 3.31 In conducting conflict sensitive analysis there are a range of tools that can be employed. These have been developed by a range of funding bodies and selection of the appropriate tool will depend on the needs and capacities of specific funding organisations.
- 3.32 Some tools, for example, are centred on assessing the risks of negative effects of conflict on programmes, the risks of programmes exacerbating conflict and the opportunities to improve the effectiveness of interventions (e.g. Strategic Conflict Assessment, Conflict Analysis Framework and Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework), while others are based on employing a framework which can provide an insight into overall trends and help plan preliminary responses to early warning in anticipation of an escalation of conflict (Conflict analysis and response definition and early warning and preventive measures). An overview of these tools is provided in a Resource Pack developed by FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld⁵¹.
- 3.33 It is considered those tools that focus most closely on assessing the risks of conflicts in relation to programmes and the opportunities to improve the effectiveness of interventions are more appropriate for developing monitoring and evaluation frameworks. In this regard, two tools which focus on effectiveness and the risks of conflict are outlined and described in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3:

50 FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004) Conflict Sensitive approach to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-Building: Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, 12th March 2004.

51 FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004) Conflict Sensitive approach to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-Building: Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, 12th March 2004.

Figure 3.2: Strategic Conflict Assessment

Strategic Conflict Assessment has been developed by the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK to map out the conflict and current responses to it and to identify future policy and programme options. In this regard, Strategic Conflict Assessment can be largely viewed as a planning tool which provides a basis in which to develop more strategic approach for contributing to conflict reduction and propose more conflict sensitive policies and programmes. The tool, however, can be used at any point in the programming or conflict (pre and post programming and pre and post conflict). Overall, there are three stages in Strategic Conflict Assessment, as shown in the figure below and described in the following text:

The three key stages of conflict assessment



Conflict analysis

- *Structures*: analysis of long-term factors underlying conflict: security, political, economic and social.
- *Actors*: analysis of conflict areas: interests, relations, capacities, peace agendas and incentives.
- *Dynamics*: analysis of long-term trends of conflict triggers for increased violence, capacities (institutions, processes) for managing conflict and likely future conflict scenarios.

Analysis of international responses

- *International actors*: map interests and policies of international actors such as the military and security, diplomatic, trade, immigration, development; assess level of coherence; and, analyse impacts on conflict dynamics.
- *Development actors*: map magnitude and focus of development policy/programmes; analyse development actors' approach to conflict; assess capacities to work effectively in conflict situations; assess potential to influence conflict and peace dynamics.
- *Interactions between development interventions and conflict*: assess impact of conflict on development policy and programmes; assess impact of development interventions on dynamics of conflict and peace.

Developing strategies and options

Identify possible strategies in terms of:

- Developing common donor approach to better respond to conflict;
- Developing conflict sensitive individual donor approach; and
- Adjusting current activities and developing new initiatives.

In conducting Strategic Conflict Assessment, the methodology involves a number of steps that include:

- Desk study: review of relevant documents from a variety of sources; and
- Field work: interviews/workshops with key stakeholders in the donor country; internal consultation with donor staff; debriefing workshop with donor staff and small expert group to give feedback and discuss results.

Department for International Development (2002) Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes.

Figure 3.3: Conflict Analysis Framework

Conflict Analysis Framework has been adopted by the World Bank and aims to highlight the key factors influencing conflict and poverty so that countries can address their main concerns effectively. By highlighting the key factors that affect the level of conflict and poverty, this ensures that development interventions do not instigate (where no conflict exists), exacerbate (ongoing violent conflict) or revive (post-conflict) situations of violent conflict. Of course, the interventions may also be designed to help reduce conflict.

The framework consists of a list of variables set within six categories that are used to guide the analysis and examine aspects of both conflict and poverty. The six categories included into the framework are:

- Social and ethnic relations (e.g. social cleavages, group identity-building, bridging social capital);
- Governance and political institutions (e.g. stability of political institutions, equity of law);
- Human rights and security (e.g. human rights status, militarisation of society, role of media);
- Economic structure and performance (income disparities, income changes);
- Environment and natural resources (availability of land and access to natural resources); and
- External affairs (e.g. regional conflicts, role of diasporas).

Each of these categories consists of several variables, each with corresponding indicators showing changes in intensity of the conflict. There are three levels of intensity captured in the indicator table: warning, increasing intensity and de-escalation (see Annex C for an outline of the variables and indicators). Drawing on this framework, the objective is to highlight the

effect of the intervention on the conflict, and the nature and strength of its link to poverty. In conducting the analysis, the variables presented in the framework are translated to each specific situation and the variables are added to or deleted according to each case.

In conducting a Conflict Analysis Framework, the methodology involved a number of steps that includes:

- Re-interpretation of existing information on the conflict situation of a country/region in line with the framework;
- Workshops with country/regional specialists to cover each of the six categories and analysis of variables;
- Follow up studies on issues identified in the workshop and monitoring of issues identified as conflict sensitive;
- Stakeholder analysis to identify and examine groups who have the ability to affect political and social change and the main groups that are likely to be affected by such change;
- Country consultation with different stakeholder groups; and
- Conducting workshops to discuss integration of the above issues into the poverty reduction strategy or other programmes.

World Bank (2005) Conflict Analysis Framework, April, 2005, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Team, Social Development Department, World Bank.

3.34 On the basis of the Conflict Sensitivity Analysis, indicators for monitoring and evaluation can then be developed to measure the overall impact a given intervention has had on its context, and the context of the intervention. It is proposed that three types of indicators can be developed:

- **Conflict indicators:** to monitor the progression of conflict factors against an appropriate baseline, and to provide targets against which to set contingency planning;
- **Project indicators:** to monitor the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the project; and
- **Interaction indicators:** to monitor the impact of the project on the context and the impact of the context on the project. In many cases, it may prove difficult to address directly the interaction between the project and context, but it is possible to focus instead on more indirect causal relationships.

3.35 While conflict sensitive monitoring is very much conflict specific and the indicators are only relevant to each case, Figure 3.4 provides an example of indirect indicators that have been used to determine impact. Annex C provides a further list of other potential indicators for measuring Peace-Building outcomes.

Figure 3.4: Conflict sensitive indicators, Sri Lanka

Oxfam, Sri Lanka has developed a series of conflict sensitive indicators to evaluate their Peace-Building work which seeks to build relationships and supporting links within and between communities to empower people to transform conflict and to develop the analysis and resolution skills of partners. In one programme, the relationships are built using inter-community exchanges. Indicators (qualitative and quantitative) of the growing relationships between the two previously divided communities include:

- Having difficulty saying goodbye at the end of an encounter event;
- Communications taking place between individuals in different communities above and beyond those organised by the programme (letters, further visits, inter-marriage);
- The formalities of visiting – do visitors behave, and are they treated as relatives rather than as strangers? (does the language used indicate a distant or close relationship?); and
- The use of a path that would be regarded as unsafe at times of tension.

In order to gauge whether the relationship building has had a wider Peace-Building effect, Oxfam has also looked at those who were not directly involved in the actual project (within families and in the community more broadly) to see if they have been affected by the project. Indicators include:

- Comparisons between beneficiary and non-beneficiary villages, especially after periods of conflict or events or instances which have heightened tension.

FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004) *Conflict Sensitive approach to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-Building: Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment*, 12th March 2004.

3.36 The key strengths and weaknesses of Conflict Sensitivity Analysis are outlined in the following table:


Table 3.13: Strengths and weaknesses of the approach to conflict sensitivity

Strengths	Weaknesses
Provides an analysis of the conflict environment and contextual analysis of the conflict dynamics within a particular situation.	Provides a general framework which restricts operationalisation for funding bodies and Implementing Agencies.
Considers the risks for pursuing development in a conflict environment and examines the Peace-Building opportunities.	Largely focuses at the strategic level and has more limited application to the projects level.
Closely considers the effectiveness of existing programmes and interventions to learn lessons and create synergies.	Creates a danger of over-contextualisation which may restrict the opportunities to learn lessons and transfer best practice regarding what works and what does not.
A process orientated learning approach which facilitates participatory methods. This encourages more innovation and transferability compared to more standardised evaluation methodologies.	

Third generation PCIA: the Aid for Peace approach

3.37 While building on other evaluation methodologies, particularly those related to PCIA, the Aid for Peace approach can be highlighted as a distinct methodology for examining Peace-Building interventions. In essence, the Aid for Peace approach focuses on assessing the needs for Peace-Building in a given country or area and then tailoring the intervention's objectives and activities to these needs by identifying their Peace-Building relevance and developing appropriate indicators. The approach can be employed during the planning, implementation and evaluation stages, preferably all three, and is broken down into four key stages as outlined in Figure 3.5 and described in the text below:

Figure 3.5: Four key stages of applying the Aid for Peace approach⁵²



1. **Peace-Building needs analysis:** analysing the conflict dynamics and Peace-Building process of a country or area by examining the parties to the conflict, the root causes of the conflict, the factors escalating the conflict and what Peace-Building potential exists. In addition, this involves a detailed analysis of the peace context by outlining the needs of a country or area. The aim of this stage is to specify the 'ideal' type of situation by identifying what conditions tend to enhance Peace-Building in a particular situation or country. This 'ideal' model is then compared with the real situation. This helps to identify needs and importantly, discusses, makes explicit and gets agreement on values, objectives, visions and goals of Peace-Building which are often areas of tension and disagreement that are based on different cultural and theoretical backgrounds.
2. **Peace-Building relevance assessment:** the objective of this stage is to assess whether the overall direction of an intervention (policy, programme or project) corresponds and is relevant to a country's/region's Peace-Building needs as analysed in the previous Peace-Building deficiency and needs analysis. This assessment is conducted using a relevance scale.
3. **Conflict risk assessment:** this assesses the effects of the conflict on an existing or planned intervention. The objective is to identify problems and risks with which the projects and interventions will be confronted in areas of conflict. For new interventions, the assessment aims to anticipate the potential conflict-related risks for the intervention. Different risk assessment methods and checklists can be used for this stage such as those proposed by Bush, previously mentioned.

⁵² Paffenholz, T. (2005) Third Generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace approach, <http://www.berghot-handbook.net>

4. **Peace and conflict effects assessment:** this examines the effects of an intervention on the conflict and peace situation and assesses what changes have occurred, or may occur, as a result of the intervention. Input, output, result and impact causal chains or indicators can be employed here. The approach places emphasis on defining a number of output and result indicators within this chain and less focus on impacts as it is considered that these are often too difficult to measure due to the attribution gap. It is also proposed that, during the planning stage of an intervention that these indicators are developed using participatory planning methods and the indicators are closely linked to the previously defined needs.

By way of example, an output, result and impact chain is provided for a youth project in Afghanistan below. This project seeks to train young people with leadership potential and was designed following the conflict analysis which outlined a need for support in the establishment of democratic institutions and processes in Afghanistan, including a need to increase the participation of youth and women in politics. Additionally, the analysis of conflict and the Peace-Building needs stressed the importance of capacity building for the peace making process:

Figure 3.6: Example of developing result chains, Young Leaders Forum in Afghanistan



- 3.38 Stage 1 lies at the heart of the Aid for Peace approach. It is during this stage that the causes of the conflict are fully understood, and the needs, vision and goals are clearly outlined and agreed upon. This analysis then provides the basis for assessing the relevance, risks and outcomes of any proposed intervention. For example, having clearly articulated the causes of the conflict and the current needs, funding bodies and Implementing Agencies can force applicants to explicitly state how their projects aim to address the needs and issues of conflict and work towards the goals of the intervention. The Aid for Peace approach argues that in many cases of Peace-Building intervention, the causes of the conflict and related needs of the area are not clearly expressed and agreed upon which creates subsequent problems in programme design and the development of monitoring and evaluation frameworks.
- 3.39 In regard to methodology, the Aid for Peace approach builds in and combines other evaluation methods and tools such as input-output-result-impact chains, relevance scales and Conflict Sensitivity Analysis or Theories of Change, and risk assessment methods and checklists. In terms of evaluation, it is suggested that a range of tools can be employed such as interviews, surveys, case studies and participatory planning and workshops are central to the design phase when the causes of the conflict are assessed, needs of the area are outlined and indicators for monitoring and evaluation are developed. The key strengths and weaknesses of the Aid for Peace approach are outlined in the Table 3.14.


Table 3.14: Strengths and weaknesses of the approach to conflict sensitivity

Strengths	Weaknesses
Explicitly requires understanding and agreement upon the causes of the conflict, the needs of the area and the vision and goals of the intervention among all key stakeholders, including those affected by the conflict.	Getting understanding and agreement on the causes of the conflict and the goals of an intervention (in relation to addressing the causes of the conflict) can prove difficult as it raises political tensions.
Employs a range of other methodologies within one approach at clear distinct stages.	The approach can be time consuming and therefore resource intensive.

Comprehensive Visioning and Strategic Analysis: Conflict Transformation

3.40 One of the most innovative approach to monitoring and evaluation in recent years has been that developed by Larissa Fast and Reina Neufeldt, in association with John Paul Lederach. Its main characteristics are that it uses two frameworks - Comprehensive Visioning and Strategic Analysis – to evaluate Peace-Building programming and its impacts on the larger context. The Comprehensive Visioning Frame emphasises the importance of a broader vision of peace to guide Peace-Building programmes. The Strategic Analysis Frame complements the Comprehensive Visioning frame by analysing the role of different actors working on development and peace to engage in Peace-Building activities; it is both internally and externally focused, and realistic about capacity⁵³. Figure 3.7 provides a framework or process map for Comprehensive Visioning and Strategic Analysis.

Figure 3.7: Peace-Building monitoring and evaluation process map



3.41 The main actors are asked to complete a matrix which they can use to answer a number of these questions and issues that provide guidance for programming assessment, monitoring and evaluation. This matrix is shown in Table 3.15.

⁵³ Fast, L. and Neufeldt, R. (2005) Envisioning Success: Building Blocks for Strategic and Peace-Building Impact Evaluation, *Journal of Peace-Building and Development*, 2,2 2005.

Table 3.15: The Strategic Analysis Framework for Peace-Building

	Actors/Networks		Capacity/Infrastructure	
	Who	What	Who	What
Short-term Immediate	Who are the key individuals and organisations currently involved?	What roles can they play in developing peace?	Who are the key individuals and organisations?	What kinds of programming are appropriate?
Long-term Sustainable	Who are the key individuals and organisations that need to be engaged?	What networks/ actions need to be established?	Who are the key individuals and organisations that can progress Peace-Building?	What is the vision of Peace-Building?

3.42 In filling out this matrix, the 'Who' category considers who should be involved in defining, conducting and evaluating the project, and the 'What' category deals with the issues that maximise impact. The Short-term/Immediate row presents the current situation and identifies the individuals and organisations whose support is needed and what kinds of programming are appropriate. The Long-term/Sustainable row looks at what can be achieved through Peace-Building programming. Combining the vision and the analysis encourages all those involved in a project evaluation to focus on both Peace-Building efforts and also on where and how specific Peace-Building actors are best placed to have an impact.

3.43 In the process of using the matrix, appropriate measures are generated in direct response to the actors, networks, capacity and infrastructure identified both for the present (the baseline) and for the long-term future. As the project develops, the framework continues to be used periodically to check that the project is advancing along sound lines, but also is sufficiently flexible to respond to changes at both micro- and macro- levels. The key strengths and weaknesses of this approach are outlined in Table 3.16.

Table 3.16: Strengths and weaknesses of the Comprehensive Visioning and Strategic Analysis approach

Strengths	Weaknesses
Emphasis on collaboration.	Quite a new approach, so not fully tested.
Good balance between theory and practice.	More readily applicable for qualitative analysis.
Popular with practitioners.	

Social Dialogue approach

- 3.44 In Israel/Palestine, a number of Peace-Building programmes have been supported which focus on promoting social dialogue and encouraging attitudinal change. These programmes have largely funded two types of Peace-Building activities that include:
- **Strategic level approach:** targets the 'middle level' leaders of society (politicians, journalists⁵⁴, academia and municipal leaders). The aim of the initiative is to facilitate negotiations between both sides of the community; and
 - **Grass root level approach:** supports community dialogue and targets local people such as teachers and young people. The objective of the dialogue is to help participants to express their feelings and emotions about the conflict and to learn from the perspectives of the other community.
- 3.45 Typically the activities under the programmes are comprised of a series of inter-group encounters between Jews and Arabs held weekly or monthly and extending over a period of 3-4 months to a year. These meetings are facilitated by one Jewish and one Arab moderator and conducted by educational and communal institutions and organisations. In general, two key approaches are identified for Jewish-Arab encounter work, reflecting two ends of a continuum – those that emphasise co-existence and those that emphasise conflict. At one end of the continuum is the traditional co-existence model, which seeks to bring people together, promote tolerance, and create more positive inter-group attitudes. At the other end, is the confrontational model, which emphasises the conflict and power relations between both parties. Alongside these two primary models is a mixed model which includes elements of co-existence and conflict.
- 3.46 Evaluation of these Peace-Building interventions is based on an analysis of social dialogue between the Jews and Arabs. The data collection exercise involves a number of tools that includes⁵⁵:
- Interviews with directors, co-ordinators, facilitators and participants of the encounter activities, as well as interviews with directors and co-ordinators of the funding body which is supporting and managing the programme;
 - Observations of the encounter activities (actual background data about the encounter, brief narrative description of what went on at the meeting such as topics and discussions and processes and dynamics observed); and
 - Analysis of documents that relate to the encounter activity (project proposals, summaries of activity, project plans, project reports, descriptions of contents and other project material).
- 3.47 Four criteria have been developed for evaluating the quality of the interaction during the encounter were defined. These include:
- **Symmetrical active participation of the participants:** This refers to the extent to which the Jewish and Arab participants take an equally active role in the encounter (talking, suggesting ideas, participating actively in the games) in contrast with a situation in which one group is dominant. Key indicators for measurement include the level of equal participation among Arabs and Jews and the amount of time each party (Jews/Arabs) talks during the discussion;

54 Additional workshops have also been held for journalists on their reporting of the conflict. These workshops are based on training journalists ways of reporting on the conflict but not in ways that could contribute towards increasing tensions and escalating violence.

55 Moaz, I (2001) Conceptual Mapping and Evaluation of Jewish-Arab Co-existence Activities in Israel (1999-2000) Summary Evaluation, May 2001.

- **Symmetrical active participation of the facilitators:** This refers to the degree that the Jewish and Arab facilitators take equal part in actively facilitating the encounter. Key indicators for measurement include the extent to which participants invite inclusive discussion;
- **Inter-group interaction:** This relates to the degree of interaction between the two national groups during the encounter, in contrast with a situation of no interaction. Key indicators for measurement include the level of joint agreement and the number of aggressive questions; and
- **Atmosphere:** This relates to the degree of positive or negative atmosphere at the encounter (an atmosphere of sympathy and mutual respect rather than indifference or hostility). Key indicators for measurement include the level of atmosphere during the meetings (positive-negative).

3.48 Analysis is conducted of all the descriptions, classifications and data that is gathered to identify patterns and trends that characterise Jewish-Arab encounter activity. To assist this analysis, numerical measures and scales have been developed to enable evaluation of the degree to which the social encounters meet each criterion. These scales are included in Annex D.

3.49 Much evaluation of the attitudinal Peace-Building interventions at the grass roots level has been conducted. This has shown that the programmes have had a positive affect on beliefs and attitudes of participants towards other community members. These impacts, however, have tended to be short term as attitudes have tended to revert to their original position or pre-intervention state one or two years after the programme. On this basis, more emphasis is currently being placed on focusing on dialogue at the strategic level and undertaking follow-up actions. The key strengths and weaknesses of this approach are outlined in Table 3.17.

Table 3.17: Strengths and weaknesses of the Social Dialogue approach

Strengths	Weaknesses
Provides a comprehensive assessment of interactions between participants, particularly in regard to discussing divisive issues at the centre of the conflict.	Analysis of dialogue is very resource intensive.
	Analysis can be subjective which could lead to bias.
	Analysis of strategic level approach needs to be confidential to ensure participation.

Conclusions

3.50 From considering best practice approach for monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building outcomes, a range of different approach can be identified. Different methodologies, for example, can be employed at different levels (project, programme and strategic) and stages of the programme or policy cycle (planning, implementation or just monitoring and evaluation).

3.51 However, while there are a range of methodological frameworks, it is also evident that there is a degree of operational overlap between the different approach. In this light, many of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach are often shared ones. Indeed, a number of general principles or lessons can be identified across the methodologies that include:

- **Understanding the context:** PCIA, Conflict Sensitivity and the Theories of Change approach, for instance, each focus on assessing the causes of the conflict, analysing the needs of an area prone to conflict and examining the positive or negative implications of a proposed intervention on peace and conflict. This analysis is conducted at the ex-ante, interim and ex-post stage;
- **A participative approach:** involving key stakeholders in a planning process to agree on the key elements of the project or programme and to help inform and set the objectives. This also involves participants visualising the end of the project/programme and the path towards it. In this way, participants have a role in determining what would success look like? What data are needed to accomplish it? Where the data is or how it can be assembled? What stakeholders can contribute to its success?;
- **Agreeing on specific indicators:** identifying specific indicators for success. Indicators are specific to each place, and to each project, but they should include both internal and external measures. Some principles outlined the need for indicators while others such as Log Frame Analysis and the Aid for Peace approach specifically identified an indicator framework;
- **Periodic monitoring:** this can be conducted using a range of methods that includes, inter alia, reviewing policy documents, accessing records, interviews from a wide range of stakeholders and the community in general, and maintaining records of involvement; and
- **Qualitative and quantitative approach:** employing quantitative indicators but supplementing this with qualitative analysis or a narrative approach.

3.52 Reflecting on each of the best practice approach, the following table summarises the key strengths and weaknesses and examines the wider transferability of each approach. Transferability is assessed according to the following criteria:

- **Level of application:** micro or macro approach?
- **Inclusion of indicators:** does the approach outline a specific framework for indicators? yes or no?
- **Level of resources required:** is the approach resource intensive?, high or low level of resources?

Table 3.18: Key strengths and weaknesses and wider transferability of methodological approach

Methodological approach	Key strength	Key weakness	Level of application	Inclusion of a framework of indicators	Level of resources required
Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCP) - Do No Harm	Established an important principle in monitoring Peace-Building.	Can be viewed as overly simplistic.	Applicable to both macro- and micro- levels.	No	Low
Logical Framework (Log Frame) Analysis	Clarifies project objectives and highlights the need to link planned activities with desired outcomes.	Places much emphasis on quantifiable indicators and can focus Implementing Agents to think mechanistically rather than being innovative.	Largely focused on micro- project level but can be transferred to programmes.	Yes	Medium
Action Evaluation	Sets more modest or realistic targets for micro- level projects.	Provides limited analysis of the linkage between the project and strategic level.	Largely focused on micro- project level.	No	Medium/ High
Theories of Change	Makes explicit the underlying reasons for an intervention.	Can be too theoretical for some practitioners and is most useful as a planning tool to test assumptions during the programming stage.	Largely focused on macro- level.	No	Low
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)	Outlines a broad process for assessment and incorporates a strong analysis of context.	A broad and general framework which may restrict operationalisation. Little direction is also provided to examining the interaction between sectors and interventions.	Largely focused on macro- level.	Yes	High
Conflict Sensitivity Analysis	Provides an analysis of the conflict environment and assessment of the dynamics within a particular situation.	Provides a general framework which may restrict operationalisation.	Largely focused on macro- level.	Yes	High
Third generation PCIA: the Aid for Peace approach	Employs a range of other methodologies within one approach.	Getting agreement on the causes of the conflict and goals and visions of an area can prove difficult as it can raise political tensions.	Applicable to both macro- and micro- levels.	Yes	High
Comprehensive Visioning and Strategic Analysis: Conflict Transformation	Proposes a good balance between theory and practice.	More readily applicable for qualitative analysis.	Applicable to both macro- and micro- levels.	No	High
Social Dialogue approach	Provides a comprehensive assessment of interactions between participants involved in the conflict.	Analysis can be subjective which could lead to bias.	Applicable to both macro- and micro- levels.	Yes	High

4 A monitoring and evaluation framework for Northern Ireland/Ireland

Introduction

- 4.1 From reflecting on international best practice, this section outlines a preferred approach to monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building interventions in Northern Ireland/Ireland. The section concludes by identifying detailed recommendations and guidance for applying the approach at the programme level, particularly the PEACE III Programme.

A monitoring and evaluation framework for Northern Ireland/Ireland

- 4.2 Before outlining a preferred methodological approach for the Northern Ireland/Ireland context, it is first important to set out the existing Peace-Building policy/programme context. In Northern Ireland/Ireland, the key Peace-Building initiative is the PEACE II Programme which completed financial commitments at the end of 2006. A successor to the PEACE II Programme for the 2007-2013 period, PEACE III, is in the design stage and is due to be launched at the end of 2007. In this light, any proposed methodological approach needs to be appropriate for this forthcoming programme.

The PEACE III Programme

- 4.3 As discussed in Section II, while the PEACE I and II Programmes had the common overall objective of 'reinforcing progress towards a peaceful and stable society and promoting reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland', both programmes had different sub-objectives. Economic growth and progress towards social development were regarded as the two key pillars of the PEACE I Programme, whereas addressing the legacy of the conflict, taking opportunities arising from peace and paving the way to reconciliation formed the sub-objectives of PEACE II.
- 4.4 In a similar vein to the PEACE I and II, the overall objective of the draft PEACE III Programme remains the same (i.e. to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and promote reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland) but the sub-objectives have evolved to provide a continued and renewed emphasis on reconciliation. As per the draft programme document, the PEACE III Programme specifically focuses on two sub-objectives, namely reconciling communities and contributing towards a shared society. These strategic objectives are grouped into two priorities as follows⁵⁶:
- **Priority 1: Reconciling communities:** key activities will facilitate relationships on a cross-community and/or cross-border basis to assist in addressing issues of trust, prejudice and intolerance, and accepting commonalities and differences. In addition, key activities will seek to acknowledge and deal with the hurt, losses, trauma and suffering caused by the conflict. This priority is focused on two key objectives:
 - **Building positive relations at the local level:** this objective aims to establish meaningful cross-community and cross-border initiatives that will improve trust and tolerance, and reduce levels of sectarianism and racism; and

56 SEUPB (2007) EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (PEACE III) 2007-2013, Draft Operational Programme.

- **Acknowledging the past:** this objective aims to provide advice, counselling and support services for victims, their relatives and those who care for them. In addition, this element of the priority aims to exchange different views of history and culture and different conflict and post-conflict experiences among relevant groups of the population.
- **Priority 2: Contributing to a shared society:** key activities will address the physical segregation or polarisation of places and communities in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland with a view to encouraging increased economic and social cross-border and cross-community engagement. This priority is focused on two key objectives:
 - **Creating shared public spaces:** this objective aims to regenerate urban, rural and border areas that appear derelict, segregated, under-used, threatening and/or unwelcoming and transform them into neutral and useful shared spaces; and
 - **Key institutional capacities are developed for a shared society:** this objective aims to develop the capacity, knowledge, culture and mechanisms of key institutions to deliver a shared society within Northern Ireland and on a cross-border basis. A particular focus will be on the public service to ensure that the delivery of services is adjusted accordingly to deal in a targeted and concerted manner with issues that contribute to a shared society.

Transferability of best practice methodologies

- 4.5 In considering the transferability of the best practice methodological approach to Northern Ireland/Ireland and the PEACE III Programme in particular, two key criteria need to be met. These include:
- **A framework of indicators.** Quantitative and qualitative indicators are required to regularly assess progress and examine impact. The inclusion of indicators as an evaluation tool is also set out under EU guidance⁵⁷; and
 - **Incorporation of micro and macro levels.** The PEACE Programmes are focused on supporting a range of projects at the micro- level but the framework needs to assess how these projects impact on and influence the macro- level.
- 4.6 From assessing these criteria against the best practice methodological approach outlined in Table 4.18, we have concluded that five approach are potentially applicable. These include:
- Logical framework (Log Frame) analysis;
 - Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA);
 - Conflict Sensitivity Analysis;
 - Third generation PCIA: the Aid for Peace approach; and
 - Social Dialogue.
- 4.7 Having analysed the comparative strengths and weaknesses of each of these approach, it is proposed that the Aid for Peace approach should be adopted as a methodological approach to support the monitoring and evaluation framework for the PEACE III Programme. The main reasons for selecting the Aid for Peace approach over the other four approach are outlined below:

⁵⁷ DG Budget (2004) Evaluating EU Activities: A Guide for European Commission Services; European Commission (2005) The European Commission's Working Paper: *Indicators for Monitoring and Evaluation: A Practical Guide*.

- Although being applicable to the macro- and micro- levels and incorporating a framework of indicators, the Social Dialogue approach is only relevant to specific types of actions (i.e. examining interactions between participants within workshops or other specific group situations). Given the sizeable number of projects that are likely to be funded under PEACE III, the scale of the programme suggests that the Social Dialogue approach could not be employed as an overall framework but could be used to assess specific projects, specifically those which focused on facilitating group interactions between representatives of different communities in Northern Ireland. As a result, this approach has been excluded as a stand alone monitoring and evaluation framework;
- The Aid for Peace approach proposes a detailed approach which includes a number of stages ranging from Peace-Building needs analysis to peace and conflict effects assessment. Aid for Peace, therefore, employs a comprehensive step by step approach through all stages of the evaluation process which can combine key elements of other best practice methodologies, as follows:
 - In conducting the Peace-Building needs analysis in the Aid for Peace approach (Stage 1), the framework, tools and indicators outlined in the Conflict Sensitivity Analysis and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment can be used to assist or guide analysis. In this regard, the Aid for Peace approach is more comprehensive than Conflict Sensitivity Analysis and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment as it can incorporate these tools within a broader approach. In addition, the Theories of Change could also be applied to the Aid for Peace approach to help understand what changes are appropriate to address the defined needs and inform understanding of how change can occur in society in order to achieve future goals and visions; and
 - The Aid for Peace approach incorporates an assessment of risk and an input-output/result chain approach to evaluation. This model of evaluation has been promoted by the European Commission but also incorporates similar elements to Log Frame analysis. In this way, Log Frames, which promote risk analysis and the identification of indicators to measure outcomes and activities, are very similar to the Conflict Risk Assessment (Stage 3) and peace and conflict effects assessment (Stage 4) in the Aid for Peace approach. This means that while incorporating the key benefits of Log Frame analysis, the Aid for Peace approach can also provide a more comprehensive approach by promoting evaluation through Peace-Building needs analysis (Stage 1) and Peace-Building relevance assessment (Stage 2).

Recommendations

4.8 With a view to monitoring and evaluating the Peace-Building programmes in Northern Ireland/Ireland, it is recommended that the Aid for Peace approach should be adopted. The Aid for Peace approach incorporates a number of stages that need to be employed during the planning stages of a Peace-Building programme and subsequent evaluations. Our recommendations for adopting the Aid for Peace approach to future Peace-Building programmes and in particular, the PEACE III Programme, are outlined in accordance with these stages, as outlined and detailed in the paragraphs below. While this section focuses on the programme level, consideration is also given to how the Aid for Peace approach can be practically implemented at the level of strategic operations. The discussion of application at the level of operations is outlined in Annex E.

- **Stage 1: Peace-Building needs analysis.** What are the Peace-Building needs of Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland?

- **Stage 2: Peace-Building relevance assessment.** Does the overall direction of the PEACE III Programme correspond to the Peace-Building needs analysis conducted under Stage 1?
- **Stage 3: Conflict risk assessment.** What are the effects of the conflict on the PEACE III Programme?
- **Stage 4: Peace and conflict effects assessment.** What effects has the PEACE III Programme made on the conflict and peace situation and assesses what changes have occurred as a result of the intervention?

Step 1: Peace-Building needs analysis.

- 4.9 This involves analysing the conflict dynamics and Peace-Building process in Northern Ireland/Ireland by examining the parties to the conflict, the root causes of the conflict, the factors escalating the conflict and what Peace-Building potential exists. In addition, this involves a detailed analysis of the peace context by identifying the needs of Northern Ireland/Ireland in relation to Peace-Building and outlining the vision and goals of the intervention among all key stakeholders. This analysis can be assisted by employing the Theories of Change approach and examining how change can transform the current situation.
- 4.10 Given the political sensitivities in Northern Ireland/Ireland, less emphasis has to date been placed on understanding and gaining agreement on the causes of the conflict. Without an agreed understanding, this has led to difficulties in analysing and identifying the needs of the area and the development of a broad programme which has created implications for evaluation. A clearer understanding on the causes of the conflict and needs of the area could provide the foundation for PEACE III and the basis of a monitoring and evaluation framework.
- 4.11 At present, the PEACE III Programme is in the design stage but an understanding of some of the causes of the conflict and the factors escalating the conflict are outlined in the draft programme document. In addition, the programme outlines the specific needs of the area and the broad programme goals. While understanding that it can be very difficult to get agreement on the root causes of the conflict and the factors escalating the conflict, it is proposed that SEUPB, as Managing Authority, consult on the analysis provided in the PEACE III Programme.

Recommendation 1: It is recommended that SEUPB develop a short paper which synthesises the current Peace-Building needs of Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland. Having articulated 'the problem' or 'key problems' that the PEACE III Programme is trying to address in relation to the causes of the conflict, outlined the vision and goals of the programme and invited feedback through the consultation process, this short paper would bring this analysis together. This paper should provide reflections from the consultation exercise and comment on whether the analysis of 'the problem' has been changed or validated as a result of the feedback. This short paper would clarify the Peace-Building needs of Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland for 2007-2013 and would then be used as a basis to assist future evaluations at the programme level and at level of operations.


Stage 2: Peace-Building relevance assessment

- 4.12 This involves an assessment of whether the overall direction of the PEACE III Programme corresponds to the Peace-Building needs analysis conducted as part of Stage 1.
- 4.13 From gaining an understanding of the conflict and the needs to be addressed, it is important that the PEACE III Programme is examined to ensure that the direction and strategy outlined is appropriate. While this analysis will be conducted as part of the ex-ante evaluation, the relevance assessment can also be used to examine applications for strategic operations (see

Annex E for a fuller discussion on the application of the Aid for Peace approach at the level of operations). From articulating 'the problem/s' that the PEACE III Programme is trying to address in relation to the causes of the conflict, outlining the vision and goals and identifying how change can occur, this sets out the steps for promoting transition in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland towards reinforcing the development of a peaceful and stable society.

- 4.14 Indeed, this places an onus on Operation Leaders in their application form or work plan to articulate the problem they are seeking to address, to outline their vision and goals and how change can occur, and to express how this matches with the direction provided in the PEACE III Programme. In this way, it will be possible to examine the extent to which the analysis and understanding provided by each operation, fits within the framework outlined at the programme level, as highlighted in Figure 4.1:

Figure 4.1: Assessing the relevance of applications in the PEACE III Programme



Recommendation 2: Following the consultation process and having articulated 'the problem/s' that the PEACE III Programme is trying to address in relation to the causes of the conflict, it is recommended that SEUPB use this as a framework for assessing applications. It is also recommended that the process requires applicants to articulate the problem/s they are seeking to address, to outline their vision and goals and how change can occur, and to express how this matches with the direction provided in the PEACE III Programme.

Stage 3: Conflict risk assessment

- 4.15 This stage assesses the effects of the conflict on the PEACE III Programme. The objective is to anticipate the potential conflict-related problems and risks with which the programme will be confronted.
- 4.16 In Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland, the main risks to the PEACE III Programme are likely to be the political instability resulting from any breakdown of the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, any unrest or violent conflict that would increase

community tensions and destabilise the peace process, political segregation or entrenchment and/or a significant economic downturn. These issues are outlined as a key threat in the SWOT analysis provided in the programme document. Going forward, however, there is a need to closely monitor the external environment and anticipate the escalation of potential risks to the programme. Consideration at this stage could also be given to identifying appropriate actions in light of any significant changes to the political and security environment.

Recommendation 3: It is recommended that SEUPB should give consideration to conducting a risk assessment of the PEACE III Programme and identifying potential actions or contingency plans that would address these risks or any implications resulting from changes in the political or security environment. In addition to this, it is recommended that SEUPB should closely monitor developments in the political and security environment and in the event of any significant changes during the 2007-2013 period (this could relate to an upsurge in civil unrest or more positive progress on restoring the institutions), commission research which examines how the political and security environment impacts on the programme at the local level.

Stage 4: Peace and conflict effects assessment

- 4.17 This examines the effects of the PEACE III Programme on the conflict and peace situation and assesses what changes have occurred as a result of the intervention. This assessment can be conducted by employing indicators.
- 4.18 The Aid for Peace approach suggests that careful consideration should be given to setting targets, and identifying and classifying indicators. Overall, it is suggested that the indicators, particularly those relating to impacts, need to be realistic as peace and reconciliation is difficult to achieve within a seven year programming period. In addition, given the potential influence of the conflict/external environment on the programme, it is emphasised that impact indicators are very difficult to measure due to the problem of attribution.
- 4.19 In the draft PEACE III Programme document, a number of output, result and impact indicators are included for each of the two key priorities. From the resource bank of indicators collected as part of this study (see Annex A-C), the current indicators in the PEACE III Programme can be supplemented with other indicators to create a potential 'menu' for monitoring and evaluating the programme. Table 4.1 and 4.2 present potential indicators that could be employed, examines costs and benefits, and identifies the method and timeframe for collecting the data. Indicators for Priority 1 and 2 are presented in turn.

Table 4.1: Supplementary Peace-Building indicators for the PEACE III Programme, Priority 1 Reconciling Communities

Indicator type	Suggested indicators	Benefits	Costs	Methodology	Timeframe
Building positive relations at the local level					
Output	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level of participation by 'marginalised' or 'disempowered' groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A relatively easy indicator to collect data, which provides information on the scope of an intervention (in terms of the number of participants) and level of targeting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited resource required to collect data but information is activity based and does not directly measure peace and reconciliation outcomes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reporting by project promoters and review/check by funding body. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quarterly/six months.
Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incidents of intimidation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measures an important indication of peace within a given area. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information may prove difficult to collect within police statistics but opportunities may exist to interview or view reports of local PSNI/Garda officers. This would also provide more relevant information in each local area as opposed to regional statistics. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PSNI/Garda Síochána statistics and/or reports of local PSNI/Garda officers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annually.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perception that violence is not a legitimate or effective. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A key indicator that measures progress towards transition from a conflict based society to one in which violence is not accepted. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As this indicator would require a survey, this can be a resource intensive data collection method. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Survey of attitudes and behaviours. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid-term and expost.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in the level of confidence people have in their ability to circulate safely in all areas in their community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An important indicator which specifically measures the 'chill factor' which is involved in entering into local areas in which 'the other' community is predominant. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As this indicator would require a survey, this can be a resource intensive data collection method. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Survey of attitudes and behaviours. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid-term and expost.
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of cases in which community leaders, supported under the Programme, are involved as mediators/negotiators and intervene effectively to resolve conflict peacefully. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An important indicator as it measures the extent to which programme beneficiaries have taken on broad learning on Peace-Building and are operating this in practice. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The collection and verification of this information could prove difficult to collect and it would be important to gather the data from a 'neutral' stakeholder. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PSNI/Garda Síochána statistics and/or reports of local PSNI/Garda officers Interviews with key stakeholders within local communities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annually.

Table 4.1: Supplementary Peace-Building indicators for the PEACE III Programme, Priority 1 Reconciling Communities

Indicator type	Suggested indicators	Benefits	Costs	Methodology	Timeframe
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People responding differently (non-violently) to new provocations. • Increasing levels of respect between groups (including racial minorities and on a cross-community basis). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is a key impact indicator which measures the extent to which Peace-Building activities have increased respect between groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As this indicator would require a survey, this can be a resource intensive data collection method. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey of attitudes and behaviours. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term and ex-post.
Acknowledging the past					
Output	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of conflict resolution workshops. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A relatively easy indicator to collect data, which provides information on the level of activity within an intervention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited resources required to collect data but information is activity based and does not directly measure peace and reconciliation outcomes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reporting by project promoters and review/check by funding body. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quarterly/six months.
Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perception that violence is not a legitimate or effective means of resolving conflict. • Reduction in levels of 'trauma' within individuals and the degree to which it interferes with normal activities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A key indicator that measures progress towards transition from a conflict based society to one in which violence is not accepted. • This is a key indicator for measuring the impact of the conflict on individual's lives and examining whether interventions have a positive influence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As this indicator would require a survey, this can be a resource intensive data collection method. • The collection and verification of this information could prove difficult to collect. It would be important to gather the data from a group/professional which is providing the trauma treatment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey of attitudes and behaviours. • Reports/observations from professional counsellor. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ex-ante and ex-post. • Ex-ante and ex-post.
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participants who have replicated the roles of community conciliators and peace mediators elsewhere. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is an important indicator as it measures the extent to which programme beneficiaries have taken on board learning on Peace-Building and applied this to other Peace-Building programmes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The collection and verification of this information could prove difficult to collect and it would be important to gather the data from a 'neutral' stakeholder. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reporting by project promoters and review/check by funding body. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ex-post.

Table 4.2: Supplementary Peace-Building indicators for the PEACE III Programme, Priority 2, Contributing to a shared society

Indicator type	Suggested indicators	Benefits	Costs	Methodology	Timeframe
Creating shared public spaces					
Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in the level of confidence people have in their ability to circulate safely in all areas in their community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An important indicator which specifically measures the 'chill factor' which is involved in entering into local areas in which 'the other' community is predominant. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As this indicator would require a survey, this can be a resource intensive data collection method. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Survey of attitudes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ex-ante and ex-post.
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Behavioural indicators pointing to increasing levels of positive social and business contact among people from both sides (in such settings as markets, shops, pubs, business). Reduction in levels of polarisation (spatial division in defined areas). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An important indicator which examines the extent to which interventions have facilitated greater engagement between different communities in social and business environments. This indicator examines the level of territoriality within a community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As this indicator would require a survey, this can be a resource intensive data collection method. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Survey of behavioural patterns. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ex-ante and ex-post.
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Housing statistics can measure residential polarisation but this is conducted via the census survey which will not be conducted until 2011. Attribution to a peace intervention could also prove difficult. If social and residential (examining the visual level of territoriality e.g. flags, murals) polarisation is to be examined, a survey would be required which can be a resource intensive data collection method. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Official housing statistics. Survey of residential areas. Survey of social/behavioural patterns. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ex-ante and ex-post.

Table 4.2: Supplementary Peace-Building indicators for the PEACE III Programme, Priority 2, Contributing to a shared society

Indicator type	Suggested indicators	Benefits	Costs	Methodology	Timeframe
Key institutional capacities are developed for a shared society					
Output	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of people benefiting from shared services. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A relatively easy indicator to collect data, which provides information on the number of beneficiaries being reached. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited resource required to collect data but information is activity based and does not directly measure peace and reconciliation outcomes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reporting by project promoters and review/check by funding body. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quarterly/six months.
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree to which peace and conflict issues are considered in the formulation and operation of initiatives. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator will examine the extent to which capacity for building peace and reconciliation and a shared future within the public sector has been developed and will assess the extent to which Peace-Building activities have been mainstreamed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The quantification and verification of this information could prove difficult. The assessment of this measure is more qualitative in nature. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with senior civil servants. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ex-post.

4.20 In addition, programme indicators need to be identified for PEACE III. From a review of the indicators and the objectives of the PEACE III Programme, the programme indicators are outlined below. In essence, these are a selection of key indicators, identified at the priority level, which would be aggregated to the programme level.

Table 4.3: Supplementary Peace-Building indicators for the PEACE III Programme

Indicators	Data collection method
Improved levels of trust, tolerance and community cohesion in supported communities.	• Survey.
Behavioural changes in supported communities which point to increasing levels of positive social and business contact among people from different religious and ethnic backgrounds (in such settings as markets, shops, pubs, business).	• Survey.
Increased perceptions of individual and collective security in regard to racial or sectarian attacks.	• Survey.
Increase in the level of confidence people have in their ability to circulate safely in all areas in their supported community.	• Survey.
Increased levels of positive social and business contact on a cross-border basis among people from different religious and ethnic backgrounds.	• Survey. • Monitoring information on the type and level of cross-border linkages established under the programme.
Incidents of intimidation.	• PSNI and An Garda Síochána statistics.
Number of attacks (racist and sectarian in supported communities).	• PSNI and An Garda Síochána statistics.

Recommendation 4: It is recommended that SEUPB should give consideration to incorporating the indicators, identified in this report (see Section 4), within the PEACE III Programme. This includes the indicators focusing on the priority and programme level. When the projects under the each of the priorities have been identified, it is recommended that SEUPB should work closely with Implementing Bodies and beneficiaries in a participatory manner to identify and agree on indicators for success for each intervention and ensure the indicators are closely linked to the defined needs (i.e. that the indicators relate to the outcomes of Stages 1 and 2).

4.21 To supplement the indicators and the EU regulatory requirement to conduct ex-ante, interim and ex-post evaluations on the PEACE III Programme, it is proposed that a programme of research is developed and commissioned by SEUPB as part of the overall programme evaluation plan. This would bring forward a similar concept of a thematic research series which was commissioned by the Distinctiveness Working Group under the PEACE II Programme. The work programme for PEACE III would be agreed at the outset to ensure a strategic and co-ordinated approach, and would focus on particular aspects of the


programme to assess progress towards objectives. This would also provide greater flexibility to analyse qualitative outcomes under the programme. A programme of research for the PEACE III Programme could include the following studies:

- Examining and identifying baselines for activities to be supported under the programme;
- Area based research which assesses the impact of the programme within a local community in a defined urban or rural location. This research would assess the outcomes within wider society, particularly in regard to the level of social cohesion and integration, reduction in community tensions and violence, and increasing acceptance and practice of mediation to resolve conflict issues;
- The impact of cross-community and cross-border initiatives on social and business activities. In particular, this would examine the impact of initiatives to facilitate processes of engagement, break down barriers of prejudice and change behavioural patterns in regard to the conduct of social and business activity (e.g. working, business relations, shopping, socialising and supply chains);
- The ability of the programme to focus on the needs of marginalised groups, facilitate greater participation and empowerment of this sector and increase active citizenship;
- Identifying the key lessons and outcomes emerging from the implementation of innovative public sector delivery models focused on delivering a shared society and examining the potential for broader transferability across the public sector;
- Examining the extent to which the political and security environment impacts on the programme at the local level. This would be particularly relevant if significant changes occurred in the external environment during 2007-2013; and
- Drawing on the Social Dialogue approach, research which examines the quality of the interaction, participation and atmosphere during group encounters. This would be relevant to assess the interaction between public and private stakeholders and social partners within partnership approach (proposed under Priority 1, Building positive relations at the local level), and the interaction between different groups of the population who exchange different views of history and culture and different conflict and post-conflict experiences (proposed under Priority 1, Acknowledging the past). In this regard, the research would focus on two types of inter-group encounters one based on the traditional co-existence model, which brings people together to promote tolerance and encourage inter-group attitudes (Building positive relations at the local level) and the more challenging model which emphasises the different conflict experiences (Acknowledging the past).

Recommendation 5: It is recommended that SEUPB should develop a work programme of research following the ex-ante evaluation and that consideration is given to including the studies identified in this report (see Section 4) It is also recommended that any research proposed under the PEACE III Programme is included within the work programme or evaluation plan to promote co-ordination, strategic approach and facilitate aggregation across the programme. The work programme can then be reviewed at the mid-term stage of the programme. It is also proposed that SEUPB should work closely with Implementing Bodies and beneficiaries to identify and agree on the areas for research. To facilitate the programme of research, it is recommended that SEUPB should set up a forum for each priority to meet regularly to discuss impacts of the programme.

4.22 In advancing the Social Dialogue approach, the PEACE III Programme and the research programme should also focus on facilitating and examining group interaction within a number of different levels. This follows on from the work of John Paul Lederach who presents Peace-Building as a triangle describing the three levels of society at which peace activists might work: the leaders, the grassroots, and the middle level (see the following figure). The top third of the triangle involves the fewest number of people and is the most publicly visible, and the bottom level the largest and least visible aspects of society. In the middle, people often struggle to find a role that may influence the elites above them and draw on the grassroots below them in order to advance peace building⁵⁸.

Figure 4.2: Different levels involved in Peace-Building activity



(Source: Lederach, 2005)

58 Lederach J.P., 2005. *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- 4.23 Lederach describes the kinds of actions and interventions that are appropriate for people in leadership roles such as the military or government, as well as the limitations of elite peacemaking efforts. At the grassroots level, people are pre-occupied by making ends meet and have a very different understanding of the conflict than that held by leaders. Their role in reducing the effects of the conflict and moving towards peace is therefore different to that facing the elites, but essential to Peace-Building, if only because, without their support, the process will collapse. The middle level of Lederach's social hierarchy includes ethnic and religious leaders, academics and NGOs. This is the level that can potentially bridge the gap between the grassroots and the elite levels of society and hence is a very effective and important point to intervene. While peace work must be done at all three levels, it is considered that the middle level is especially important as it links the top with the bottom as well as linking across party lines.
- 4.24 The attraction of Lederach's approach is that it establishes the need for Peace-Building to operate at all three levels of a society in conflict, and indicates roles for and connections between them. Much conflict resolution takes place between leaders around the table or in small-group processes. Yet intractable conflicts always involve the whole community. So methods must be found to scale-up the small group processes to the larger society. Envisioning a changed society encourages imaginative approach at a macro- level, while thinking strategically helps to direct and co-ordinate efforts at a micro- level. Together these two frameworks guide decisions and link efforts, as outlined by Lederach:
- 'With this approach, we look to amplify local capacity so it becomes infrastructure, and expands and extends local actors to become networks. Capacity can refer to actual implementing capacity (i.e. the ability to implement projects) but it can also refer to an actor's reach across horizontal and vertical segments of society.....Transforming actors into networks implies linking actors and their activities in order to expand their individual efforts and extend their efforts to additional actors and participants, much as a spider web links various strands to create a stronger and more effective trap'⁵⁹.*
- 4.25 Lederach's triangle would provide SEUPB with a framework to structure activity in the PEACE III Programme and accommodate Peace-Building operations. While the PEACE III Programme is not focused on promoting macro- level political interventions, the framework would provide a basis to help local operations and initiatives based on middle range leadership find a Peace-Building niche within the broader structure of a Peace-Building programme.
- 4.26 Where partnership or group interactions are supported in the PEACE III Programme, the Social Dialogue approach can complement Lederach's framework by examining the level of interaction in initiatives at the local and middle range level.

Recommendation 6: It is recommended that SEUPB should give consideration to structuring proposed activity in the PEACE III Programme within the framework of Lederach's triangle. This would provide a basis in which to understand how activities at the local and middle range level can be interlinked, be located within the broader strategy for Peace-Building and impact on developments at the macro- level. Where partnership or group interactions are supported in the PEACE III Programme at the local and middle range level, it is recommended that the Social Dialogue approach should be employed to examine the level of interaction and participation among stakeholders at each of these levels.

59 Lederach J.P. (2005) *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Annex A: PCIA sample indicators

PCIA sample indicators ⁶⁰		
Conflict Management Capabilities		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of conflicts in which governmental/non-governmental bodies are involved as mediators, facilitators, negotiators, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Differences in the impact of conflict on men and women. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Belief in possibility of receiving fair treatment/outcomes through public institutions.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perception that violence is not a legitimate or effective means of resolving conflict. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number and types of interventions targeted to address both women and men considering the differences in the nature of conflict impact and priorities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perception that violence is not a legitimate or effective means of resolving conflict.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number conflict resolution workshops – and follow-up. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Respect for process and outcomes of dispute settlement through public institutions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree to which peace and conflict issues are considered in the formulation and operation of initiatives (Do No Harm, PCIA, Conflict-Sensitive Programming, etc).
Militarised Violence and Human Security		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conflict-related deaths or injuries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of displaced people. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perceptions of individual and collective security.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disappearances. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rate and patterns of repatriation/displacement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Levels of criminality (effectiveness of state responses).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incidence of human rights abuses, including rape, sexual torture and violations of children's rights – and effectiveness of official responses to reports of such violations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arrests or detention without probable cause or warrant. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of small arms in circulation (e.g., black market price of an assault rifle).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Levels of domestic violence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incommunicado detention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of children, women and men involved in military activities.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of riots or other uncontrolled expressions of dissent. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment in detention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level of food security.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demonstrations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inhumane conditions of detainment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dependence on private security forces.

60 Bush, K. (2003) Hands-on PCIA, Part 1, A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), October 2003.

Annex A: PCIA sample indicators

PCIA sample indicators *(continued)*

Political Structures and Processes

• Freedom of speech/media.	• Levels of emergency rule in parts or all of the country.	• Perceptions and evidence of corruption.
• Presence of multi-communal political parties/business groups/civil society orgs.	• Freedom of movement public participation in, or influence on, the policy making process.	• Popular perceptions that the political, legal, and security systems are fair, effective, and responsive – or not.
• Free and fair elections (levels of participation in elections).		

Economic Structures and Processes

• Dependence on war economies (e.g., use of black market; reliance on (para) military employment).	• National unemployment rate versus rate among vulnerable populations (ex-combatants, returnee and displaced populations, war-disabled, widows, youth, war-affected regions).	• Availability of basic goods to all communities.
• Number of jobs created in non-military related sectors.	• Dependence on external assistance.	• Personal savings rates.
• Ratio of military expenditure to social expenditures by state.	• Number and size of new businesses.	
• Pre-versus post-conflict export (and investment) levels.	• Regional and national inflation rates.	
• Level of economic control by local or national actors for local or national interests.	• Strength of foreign currency.	

Social Empowerment

• Sense of local ownership over peace processes.	• Number of cross-cutting cultural or social organisations.	• Number of locally-initiated and run Peace-Building initiatives.
• Levels of tolerance/distrust within cultural, social, ethnic, political, religious organisations.	• Inclusive/exclusive schooling system.	• Level of dependence on outside support in conflict resolution and Peace-Building.
• Level and type of social interactions between groups.	• Adult and children's perceptions of other groups/levels of Stereotyping.	• Number of families dislocated by conflict.
• Levels of inter-marriage.	• Role of the media/levels of censorship.	• Number of families with at least one member who is "missing".
• Levels of bilingualism (where language is a political issue).	• Levels of trust between groups.	• Levels of "trauma" within communities and degree to which it interferes with normal activities. Effectiveness of responses to this trauma.
• Level of participation by "marginalised" or "dis-empowered" groups (women, the poor, the disenfranchised).	• Rejection of a gun culture/ militarised culture (glorification military violence).	• Suicide rates (who? Where? Why?).

Annex B: Conflict Analysis Framework variables⁶¹

Category – Variables	Indicators of Warning	Indicators of Escalation	Indicators of De-escalation
Social and ethnic relations			
i. Social and economic cleavages.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pre-existing social and economic divisions causing increasing tension between groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sharpening (pre-existing or constructed) social and economic divisions increasingly causing violence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fostering cohesion. Establishing respect and collaboration between groups.
ii. Ethnic cleavages ⁶²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pre-existing ethnic and economic divisions causing increasing tension between groups. Ethnically, sizable number, economically advantaged or disadvantaged, territorially concentrated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sharpening (pre-existing or constructed) ethnic and economic divisions increasingly causing violence; Increasing political consciousness among ethnically, sizable number, economically advantaged or disadvantaged, territorially concentrated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fostering ethnic cohesion; Establishing respect and collaboration between groups.
iii. Regional imbalances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unequal economic growth along geographical lines (natural or forced). Economic divisions along local areas/regions (natural or imposed). Unequal distribution of public and private investment. Unequal access to social services. Unequal access to relief and development assistance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing geographical divisions of economic growth (natural or forced). Increasing economic divisions along local areas/regions (natural or imposed). Worsening polarisation (groups spatially divided: residence, schools). Increasing unequal distribution of public and private investment. Increasing inequalities of access to social services. Increasing inequality of access to relief and development assistance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic growth more equitable across country. Growing incentives to interact and co-operate. Equitable distribution increasing across local areas/regions. Deliberate effort to ensure increasing equal distribution of public and private investment. Conscious effort ensuring equal access to social services. Conscious effort ensuring equal access to relief and development assistance.

⁶¹ World Bank (2005) Conflict Analysis Framework, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Team, Social Development Department, World Bank, April 11th 2005.

⁶² In the table, for purposes of simplification, the term "ethnic" is used to broadly include ethnic (differences on the basis of language, race, ethnicity, caste, tribe) and religious differences.

Annex B: Conflict Analysis Framework variables (continued)

Category – Variables	Indicators of Warning	Indicators of Escalation	Indicators of De-escalation
Social and ethnic relations			
iv. Differential social opportunities (e.g. education).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited access to or exclusion in education, employment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing differential treatment with systematic biases in education and employment (reservation of seats/jobs for one group, language of dominant group needed for government/civil service jobs). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introducing reforms wherein disadvantaged groups receive equal (and even increased) access to education and public service (government/civil service jobs).
v. Bridging/bonding social capital.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Associations increasingly formed within groups rather than across groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Across-group associations increasingly negatively sanctioned. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encouraging associations across groups and cross-cutting cleavages e.g. supporting women's groups across ethnic lines, community projects across conflict groups.
vi. Group identity building.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organising along ethnic/social lines and signs of violence (we-they syndrome). Politicising ethnic/social issues. Anti-minority/majority speeches. Limited inter-mixing (schools, businesses, friends, marriage, cultural events). Lack of common language and/or religion. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing coalescence of social and political organisations along ethnic lines, and adopting violence to advance cause (we-they syndrome). Highlighting and politicising differences. Escalating anti-minority/majority crimes (hate crimes). Growing segregation (schools, businesses, friends, marriage, cultural events). Language/religion as a tool of division. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Focusing on commonalities. Increasing willingness of dominant; opposition group/faction to talk peace. Punishing hate crimes and anti minority/majority actions. Encouraging inter-mixing of groups (schools, businesses, friends, marriage).
vii. Myth-making.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Negative stereotypes. Contrary renditions of history in curricula. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Worsening negative stereotypes. Increasing contrary versions of history in curricula (denigrating other groups). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Amending untrue history versions so that negative stereotypes diminish. Correcting historical untruths/myths and focusing on shared history in curricula.
viii. Culture/tradition of violence.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> History of tensions. Historically, disputes dealt-with through violence. Carrying of arms seen as a cultural tradition. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> History of violence. Violent historical events receive group praise. Carrying of arms increasingly glorified and encouraged. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> History of cordial relations between groups (and current situation is an aberration). Use of social/political processes, not violence, to deal with disputes. Discouraging the carrying of arms.

Annex B: Conflict Analysis Framework variables (continued)

Category – Variables	Indicators of Warning	Indicators of Escalation	Indicators of De-escalation
Governance and political institutions			
i. Equity of governance & political institutions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One group tending to dominate governance and military. • Groups systematically excluded from government institutions. • Restricting constitutional rights. • Limited minority/majority rights (political, socio-cultural). • Weak and hurried political transitions. • Systematic restrictions on social, cultural practices. • Rigging elections. • Political institutions cementing or exacerbating cleavages and/or biases. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing dominance or absolute control of one group of military, state. • Increasing systematic exclusion of groups from government institutions, and social/economic cleavages and/or political biases becoming rallying points for groups. • Denying constitutional rights on ethnic/social grounds. • Eliminating minority/majority rights (political, socio-cultural). • Incomplete political transitions, with limited focus on democratisation. • Systematic repression of freedoms in social, cultural, economic spheres. • Rigged or no elections. • Political institutions exacerbating cleavages, and increasingly serving as an active tool in ongoing (mainly political) conflicts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishing political institutions with increased representation and powersharing. • Encouraging an inclusionary government. • Granting political power (autonomy in internal affairs), reserving seats for disadvantaged groups (in government and military). • Non-violent and inclusive political transitions. • Ensuring free and fair elections. • Strengthening minority/majority rights (freedom of practice in social, cultural and religious spheres). • Political institutions deliberately designed to overcome cleavages and bridge differences.
ii. Stability of political institutions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weakening democratic system (electoral system, parliamentary organs, district/local levels of governance) or increasingly unstable autocratic systems. • Widespread corruption accepted. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Failing democratic systems and increasingly severe autocratic systems. • Escalating corruption. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moving to consociational democracy (power-sharing) or federalism (regions move to devolution of power). • Releasing political prisoners and returning of exiles. • Addressing issues of corruption.

Annex B: Conflict Analysis Framework variables (continued)

Category – Variables	Indicators of Warning	Indicators of Escalation	Indicators of De-escalation
Governance and political institutions continued			
iii. Equity of law/judicial system.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic and social cleavages tend to be reflected in the rule of law, making for inequitable rights. Gap between laws (legal system) and their implementation. Perception of political or social biases among the public. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic and social cleavages increasingly reflected in the rule of law, resulting in inequitable rights. Rising disregard for laws on paper and oppressive practices. Perception of political or social biases increasingly entrenched among the public. Instituting special laws (special powers act, etc.) outside the constitution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening the judicial system. Ensuring adherence to laws. Concerted effort to remove and correct perception of biases prevalent among the public.
iv. Links between government and citizens.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of accountability of political leaders and institutions. Excluding groups in political sphere (not included in consultations, views not taken into account in decision-making). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing lack of accountability of political leaders and institutions. Increasingly disregarding certain groups in the political sphere, excluding them in consultations, and dismissing their opinions in decision-making. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encouraging an inclusive govt. with accountable leadership. Serious attempt to build trust in government, involve stakeholders (groups) in consultations, consider views of communities in decision making.

Annex B: Conflict Analysis Framework variables (continued)

Category – Variables	Indicators of Warning	Indicators of Escalation	Indicators of De-escalation
Human rights and security			
i. Role of media and freedom of expression.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Media increasingly politicised on ethnic/political lines (pro or anti government). Media reinforcing negative attitudes towards other groups. Limited press freedom (inability to travel/publish without restrictions). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Growing media censorship: No freedom of press, and media sharply divided along ethnic/political lines and acts as propaganda tool (pro or anti government). Media reinforcing negative stereotypes of other groups. Increasing restrictions on media to travel/publish. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encouraging neutral and fair media. Media serving as tool of reconciliation (inter-ethnic television programmes). Strengthening freedom of press (media allowed to publish/travel without restrictions).
ii. Human rights' status.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abusing human rights, particularly along ethnic/political lines (arrests, rapes, disappearances, army brutality). Restrictions on civil rights. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Escalating human rights violations: (political murders, arrests, child-soldiers, rapes, disappearances, landmines, army brutality). Increasing abuse of civil rights and clamp down on civil liberties. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishing Human Rights Committees. Prosecuting war criminals. Implementing laws protecting civil rights.
iii. Militarisation of society.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing power to political decision making. Increase in armed forces (particularly from select ethnic groups). Political leadership sub-servient to military. Increasing number of non-state military actors (armed groups, private militias). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Military controlling political decision-making. Increasing number of armed forces (particularly from select ethnic groups). Increasing number of non-state military actors (armed groups, private militias). Cheaply available small arms and easy flow of arms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Signing military ceasefire. Division of powers between state and military (professional military). Increasing accountability of politicians and military forces. Increasing restrictions to prevent the availability and flow of arms.

Annex B: Conflict Analysis Framework variables (continued)

Category – Variables	Indicators of Warning	Indicators of Escalation	Indicators of De-escalation
Human rights and security continued			
iii. Militarisation of society.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing availability of small arms. Increasing military budgets. Deliberately excluding groups in armed forces. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financing operations via drug trade. Increasing military budget and mobilising military. Army acquiring new, sophisticated arms; and Increasing recruitment to militant groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reducing military expenditures, and falling priority of acquiring new arms. Encouraging ethnic/social diversity in armed forces.
iv. Security of civilians.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sporadic acts of violence (threats to move). Armed robberies on the rise and inability to protect civilians. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing cases of systematic violence (forced expulsion, gender exploitation). Rising number of armed robberies and increasing inability to protect civilians. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Controlling the law and order situation. Increasing determination to protect civilians.

Annex B: Conflict Analysis Framework variables (continued)

Category – Variables	Indicators of Warning	Indicators of Escalation	Indicators of De-escalation
Economic structure and performance (quantitative indicators: data-base being developed)			
i. Economic growth.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Slowing economic growth rates. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Negative or falling economic growth rates. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rising economic growth rates.
ii. Income disparities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disparities along ethnic/regional lines. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing disparities along ethnic/regional lines. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lowering disparities along ethnic/regional lines.
iii. Per capita income changes.	No changes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Falling per capita income. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing income per capita.
iv. Inflationary trends.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inflationary trends. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Uncontrollable inflation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inflation control.
v. External debt management.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing debt. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Uncontrollable debt. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Managing debt.
vi. Reliance on high-value primary commodities exports.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dependence on primary commodities and/or natural resources of high value (diamonds, timber, oil). Primary commodity export finances political activity. Fall in international commodity prices, affects production. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing dependence on primary commodities and/or natural resources of high value (diamonds, timber, oil). Rising competition over primary commodities so as to acquire control of political activity. Fast declining international commodity prices, leading to loss of livelihoods of producers (thus becoming a cause of violence). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lowering dependence on primary commodities and/or natural resources (including primary product exports). Encouraging production of alternate commodities (in place of falling international prices). Settling grievances over falling international commodity prices in a non-violent manner.
vii. Employment and access to productive resources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limitation in access to employment along ethnic/social lines. Exclusion with a mismatch between education and available opportunities. Control of businesses along ethnic/regional lines. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deliberate discrimination with an increasing mismatch between education and available opportunities (especially high unemployment among educated along ethnic lines). Control of businesses along ethnic/regional lines. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reforms so that disadvantaged groups receive equal (and even increased) access to govt. jobs. Demobilisation programmes wherein demobilised combatants have equal access to education and employment (irrespective of the army served in).

Annex B: Conflict Analysis Framework variables (continued)

Category – Variables	Indicators of Warning	Indicators of Escalation	Indicators of De-escalation
Economic structure and performance (quantitative indicators: data-base being developed) continued			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Systematic limitation in access to productive resources such as land, fishing rights. Development programmes (inadvertently) favour one group. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing restriction and inability to access productive resources such as land, fishing rights. Development programmes (inadvertently) favouring one group, leads to resentment and clashes between groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encouraging employers to hire ex-combatants and hire across ethnic lines. Ensuring equal access to productive resources such as land, fishing rights; etc. Development programmes systematically ensure that programmes do not alienate any groups.
viii. Conflict-induced poverty.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Population movements (forced or due to no opportunities to participate in economic life). Disruption of productive activity. Lack of access to markets and loss of means of production. Increases in child malnutrition; and Increases in female-headed households. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rising population movements (expulsion or forced internal displacement or threats to move to avoid killing). Increasing disruption of productive activity and rising lack of opportunities to participate in economic life. Increasing child malnutrition. Increasing number of female-headed households (men at war, widows, gender exploitation). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fostering re-settlement, re-integration. Ensuring the resumption of productive activity and increasing incentives for groups from all sides to participate. Introducing health-care programmes to reduce child malnutrition. Increasing number of programmes to assist victims of war, especially female-headed households.

Annex B: Conflict Analysis Framework variables (continued)

Category – Variables	Indicators of Warning	Indicators of Escalation	Indicators of De-escalation
Environment and natural resources			
i. Availability of natural resources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resource scarcity (land, natural resources such as water, fertile soil) leading to population movements and environmental pressures. Exploitation of resources leading to environmental stress. Deforestation. Rapid population increases. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Worsening resource scarcity (land, natural resources) leading to population movements and environmental pressures. Increasing exploitation of resources (and undervaluing them) leading to worsening environmental stress. Increasing deforestation. Rapid population increases. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing incentives for investment in unfavourable environments to discourage population out-migration; Introducing policies to prevent deforestation and exploitation of resources;
ii. Access to natural resources (including land).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Natural or imposed uneven distribution of land (e.g. land tenure system). Unequal access to natural resources. Existence of high value natural resources (diamonds, oil, timber). Politicisation of resource scarcity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Natural or imposed uneven distribution of land along ethnic lines. Increasing inequality of access to natural resources. Control of high value natural resources along ethnic lines or conflict fault lines. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Creation of interdependencies among actors. Introducing policies for equitable access to natural resources.
iii. In-country and crossborder competition over natural resources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Competition over natural resources by population groups and/or organisations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing conflict over natural resources by population groups and/or organisations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resolving issues of scarce natural resources without resorting to violence.

Annex B: Conflict Analysis Framework variables (continued)

Category – Variables	Indicators of Warning	Indicators of Escalation	Indicators of De-escalation
External factors			
i. Regional conflicts (including territorial, trade, natural resources, disputes).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Volatile neighbourhood with internal conflicts (political and violent) in neighbouring countries. • Contested and unresolved disputes over territory, trade, natural resources. • External alliances. • Refugees from neighbourhood. • Demonstration effect (autonomy for neighbouring area generates frustration and dissatisfaction with present status). • End of violent conflict leads to outflow of drugs and arms to neighbouring areas, i.e. search for new markets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing violent conflict in neighbourhood. • Worsening of unresolved disputes over territory, trade, natural resources. • Military intervention. • External assistance: base, funds, training, arms. • Increasing influx of refugees from neighbourhood, and issues of gender exploitation emerge (prostitution, rape). • Increasing problems created by demonstration effect (autonomy or sovereignty for neighbouring area produces rising aspirations and similar demands). • End of violent conflict in an area breeds increasing violent conflict in neighbourhood, i.e. new havens for criminal activities, criminalisation of conflict with flourishing drug and arms trade. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintaining cordial relations with neighbours and refusing to interfere in internal affairs. • Violent conflicts (over territory, trade, and natural resources) in neighbourhood being resolved. • Regional organisations facilitating resolution and co-operation. • Returning refugees. • Confronting the demonstration effect problem with political negotiations and concessions. • Addressing legitimate problems with sincerity to avoid the entrenchment and spread of drug and arms trade (which are facilitators of conflict).
ii. Role of kindred groups outside the country.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rising political support from kindred groups (similar to government or opposition) in neighbouring countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Growing material and political support from kindred groups (similar to government or opposition) in neighbouring countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kindred groups supporting political, economic (trade), social (cultural), interactions. • Resettling refugees.
iii. Role of Diaspora.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pro- and anti- government Diaspora. • Diaspora increasingly organised with strong networks abroad and close links with native country. • Diaspora politicised on issues of home-country. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rising pro- and anti- government propaganda and political voices abroad. • Increasing funding of conflict. • Diaspora actively raising funds and remitting money to government/rebels to attain political goals (usually, the latter, but caution here since money also sent for legitimate purposes to native country). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing number of associations across ethnic lines committed to peace and reconciliation. • Diaspora reducing funding of activities for political causes (imposed or voluntary). • Diaspora serving as economic and political power-brokers: encouraging investment, political negotiations, and stability.

Annex C: Other indicators for assessing Peace-Building

Indicators for assessing Peace-Building

While stressing that impact indicators are inherently context specific and frequently face the problem of attribution, a review conducted by CDA has outlined the most common types of indicators found in Peace-Building programmes under the following headings:⁶³

- Changed attitudes, communication, relationships.
- Changes in behaviour.
- Peace agreements/covenants/declarations.
- Institutionalisation.
- Satisfaction and demand.
- Increased local capacity for conflict management.
- People value the activity.
- Progress on resettlement/return of refugees.

1. Changed attitudes, communication, relationships

Many of the Peace-Building indicators point to instances of changes in attitudes, beliefs, communication, and relationships as important indicators of impact. That is, people reporting feeling:

- personally transformed;
- changing their minds about the other side;
- forming friendships across conflict lines;
- sharing a common language with former adversaries;
- changing attitudes and relationships among key decision makers; and
- changing popular attitudes ("building a peace constituency" or "building a culture of peace").

Other indicators, outside of those impacts on individuals, include:

- a moderation of the public discourse in the society at large, including increasing emphasis on the future versus obsession with the past; and
- a moderation of the tone of communication in the official peace talks (among key leaders on both sides).

2. Changes in behaviour

Observable changes in the way people behave are another reported type of impact indicator. These include instances of:

- violence calming down;
- people responding differently (non violently) to new provocations;
- powerful agencies changing their policies to address the conflict more directly; and
- other behaviour indicators point to increasing levels of positive social contact among people from both sides (in such settings as markets, football games, bars, buses).

⁶³ Collaborative for Development Action (2001) Measuring Peace: Indicators of Impact for Peace Practice, Collaborative Learning Projects and the Collaborative for Development Action, Inc.

3. Peace agreements/covenants/declarations

Peace agreements, ceasefires, peace covenants, or declarations are also included as indicators of impact. In the reaching of agreements, indicators include peace interventions having:

- played a role;
- made an important contribution; and
- served a useful purpose in securing deeper confidence in the reaching of agreements.

Other scenarios include:

- women peace activists pressured military leaders to join negotiations;
- discussions at unofficial dialogue meetings shaped agreements made officially;
- an agency forged direct agreements among 'the people' of both sides at massive peace meetings; and
- an agency hosted and funded secret peace talks in a neutral location.

4. Institutionalisation

Institutionalisation as an indicator points to changes at the level of the larger society (versus the individual). Examples of indicators in this regard include the establishment, strengthening, or activation of institutions to manage conflicts non-violently as impact indicators.

Instances of institutionalisation alone, however, do not credibly indicate an impact on the conflict overall. More credible indicators of institutionalisation show people actively using these institutions.

5. Satisfaction and demand

Impact indicators in regard to this area include participants reporting 'satisfaction', 'appreciation' or 'desire for more' training, dialogues, joint projects, or other peace-related activities.

Other, more powerful, indicators also include indicators that show people using the processes in ways which advance the overall cause of peace. This includes, for example, using informal gatherings to discuss contentious issues in advance or 'unstick' the formal peace talks.

6. Increased local capacity for conflict management

Indicators in this category point to specific instances of increased local capacity and skills for non-violent conflict management and include, for example:

- Numbers of people trained (in skills for analysing and dealing with conflict).
- The creation of networks of community conciliators and peace mediators.

However, in order to show if such conflict management resources are used, or what difference their use makes to the conflict overall, these indicators are often supplemented with narratives or anecdotes. These include, for example:

- High-level officials reporting that they always used the negotiation training materials from the agency's workshops as preparation for the official peace talks with the other side.
- A newly established local NGO undertaking a programme on majority-minority tensions and succeeding in getting unprecedented interest and participation from the 'hard to reach' minority group.

7. People value the activity

These indicators report a variety of ways of knowing that 'people value the activity' as indicators of impact and include indicators in the following areas:

- Participants gave their time.
- The community or government committed resources.
- Participants replicated the process elsewhere.
- Participants took personal risks to advance the activity. In general, self-reports vary in their credibility and each one needs to be judged in context.
- Participants risking (and sometimes losing) their lives because of their work to promote peace activities or refusing to stop their involvement in these activities.
- Participants claiming ownership of a peace activity.

8. Progress on resettlement/return of refugees

Indicators in this category focus on those activities that measure reconstruction and a return to 'normalcy', including progress on refugee issues.

The Canadian International Development Agency has also provided guidance on sample indicators for Peace-Building programmes. These indicators are developed in accordance with six core objectives that include⁶⁴:

1. increasing domestic capacity and propensity for the peaceful resolution of conflict;
2. supporting the resolution of ongoing conflict and help prevent the emergence or escalation of new conflicts;
3. helping to establish or restore the political, legal, security and civil society structures necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace;
4. assisting in the recovery of the country/region from the damage inflicted by war;
5. enabling women to fully contribute to and benefit from Peace-Building and post-conflict reconstruction; and
6. increasing understanding of and support for Peace-Building at home and abroad.

For each of these objectives, sample indicators are outlined in the following pages:

⁶⁴ Canadian International Development Agency (2002) Programming for Results in Peace-Building – Objectives Tree and Performance Indicators, prepared by Anne-Marie Laprise.

Annex C: Other indicators for assessing Peace-Building

Result	Key strategies	Performance indicators - (*indicators for which gender disaggregated data can/should be collected are marked by a *)
<p>Objective 1: Increase domestic capacity and propensity for the peaceful resolution of conflict</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased trust and reliance as well as capacity to act of local institutions for conflict resolution. • Increased role of regional organisations (ROs) in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. • Demilitarisation of the minds. • Increased integration of women into local institutions and regional organisations involved in conflict resolution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local men and women trained in mediation/negotiation/arbitration/conciliation. • Local trainers trained. • Local institutions for peaceful conflict resolution created, strengthened and/or reformed for increased access and equal representation of all groups, including women. • Conflict prevention and conflict resolution mechanisms for regional security organisations established. • Representatives of regional security organisations trained in principles of peaceful conflict resolution (mediation, negotiation, etc). • Peace education programmes supported. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of conflicts in which local institutions and/or regional security organisations are involved as mediators, negotiators, advisor, etc. • Number of women active in local and regional Institutions involved in conflict resolution; comparative level of influence attached to the positions held by men and women within these institutions; number of conflicts in which local women are involved as mediators, negotiators, advisors, etc. • Mediators/negotiators/arbitrators/conciliators/regional organisations' perceptions of own capacity to intervene effectively to resolve conflict peacefully*. • Acceptance of women as legitimate actors in conflict prevention and resolution; perception that women are capable mediators, negotiators, advisors, etc.*. • Respect for process and outcomes of dispute settlement through these institutions; perception that process and outcomes address the specific needs and interests of both men and women*. • Belief in possibility of obtaining fair treatment and outcome through these institutions*. • Willingness to use as a first recourse for dispute settlement; expressed preference in relying on these institutions as opposed to resorting to violence. • Perception by member states of ROs as legitimate actors in conflict prevention and resolution*. • Perception that violence is not a legitimate means to resolve conflict*. • Delegitimisation of a gun culture; decreased prominence of weapons in all aspects of life.

Annex C: Other indicators for assessing Peace-Building

Result	Key strategies	Performance indicators - (*indicators for which gender disaggregated data can/should be collected are marked by a *)
<p>Objective 2: Support the resolution of ongoing conflicts and help prevent the emergence or escalation of new conflicts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alleviation of ethnic, religious, political, economic and other sources of tension. • Alleviation of youth unrest. • Improved relations between parties to conflict. • Alleviation of destabilising effects of small arms and light weapons. • Promotion of peace process. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace-Building projects are sensitive to sources of tension arising from real and perceived inequalities/“injustices” and seek to promote social, economic and political equality. • Increased access to education, job training and community infrastructures provides productive outlet for youth energy and frustration. • Neutral contact and co-operation between parties is supported, dialogue is promoted and shared interests are created and/or identified. • Dis-armament programmes are designed and implemented. • Funds, advisors, technical support, etc are provided to support negotiations. • Funds, advisors, technical support, etc are provided to support the implementation of peace accords. • Women are actively involved in the establishment of peaceful processes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of conflict-related deaths or injuries*. • Number of riots. • Number of internally displaced people*. • Outflow of refugees; rate and patterns of repatriation*. • Level of tolerance to cultural/political/religious/... differences*. • Level/type of social interaction between groups; level of intermarriage; desegregated education; number of multicultural/cross-cutting social organisations; number of women active in these organisations. • Youth perceive an increased stake in the maintenance of a peaceful society; increased hopes for a productive and peaceful future*. • Number of youths involved in acts of violence*. • Number of youths volunteering for armed services*. • Shared interests are recognised and efforts made to pursue them; parties take initiative for dialogue/communication/co-operation; increased number of joint/cooperative projects; level of women’s participation in these projects. • Dis-mantling of ‘enemy images’; children’s perceptions do not reflect prejudices of older generation. • Decrease in stereotyping in the media; impartial coverage of news. • Increased trust in other side’s commitment to peace. • Decrease in flow/availability/possession of small arms and light weapons. • Imports of conventional weapons. • Number of deaths and injuries caused by small arms and light weapons*.

Annex C: Other indicators for assessing Peace-Building (continued)

Result	Key strategies	Performance indicators - (*indicators for which gender disaggregated data can/should be collected are marked by a *)
<p>Objective 3: Help establish or restore the political, legal, security and civil society structures necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human security is enhanced. • Increased capacity of local leadership to assume responsibility for peace. • Civil society is empowered. • Increased trust in and reliance on as well as capacity to function of political and legal systems, • Society is demilitarised and war economies are converted. • Political, legal, security and civil society structures are equally representative of and responsive to the needs and interests of all groups, including women. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human rights violations are investigated, reported and condemned. • Human rights education programmes are implemented. • Representatives of civil society, political, legal and security structures are trained in human rights: local trainers are trained. • Human rights training and education programmes recognise women's rights as human rights. • Programmes to eradicate corruption are implemented. • Police and security forces (incl. armed forces) are reformed and trained. • Armed forces are demobilised and military expenditures are decreased. • De-mining and mine awareness programmes are implemented. • Physical, legal, material and psychological assistance is provided to victims of violence and human rights abuses. • Electoral/referendum assistance is provided. • Civic education and training programmes are implemented which equally target men and women. • Judicial reform and training programmes are implemented. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military expenditures as a percentage of combined education and health expenditures. • Total armed forces*. • Freedom of the media and of speech, as measured by degree of censorship and incidences of punitive action taken by state in response to spoken/written expressions of dissent. • Presence of multi-communal political parties; percentage of members who are women. • Free and fair elections. • Constitution protection of rights*. • Independent judiciary. • Perceptions of individual and collective security*. • Level of social trust (trust among members of civil society), as measured by perceptions as well as degree of social interaction/willingness to engage in social groups (such as NGOs, community organisations, etc)*. • Level of trust in political, legal and security institutions as measured by perceptions of and reliance on these institutions to perform the functions entrusted to them (reliance can be measured by such indicators as level of political participation (voting, membership in political parties, etc.), number of cases brought before the courts, number of reported crimes/human rights violations vs. estimated number of unreported crimes/human rights violations etc.); interactions between individuals and organs of the state are not pervaded by fear*. • Perceptions and evidence of corruption. • Number of disappearances*.

Annex C: Other indicators for assessing Peace-Building (continued)

Result	Key strategies	Performance indicators - (*indicators for which gender disaggregated data can/should be collected are marked by a *)
	<p>Objective 3: Help establish or restore the political, legal, security and civil society structures necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Judicial, police and security forces training programmes include a gender sensitisation/awareness component. • Freedom of the press is pursued and media development, training and support are offered. • Government and NGO capacity is built. • Local men and women are trained in all spheres of Peace-Building activity: local trainers are trained. • Local men and women are directly involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of Peace-Building initiatives. • Local leaders are provided with physical protection; civic population is protected. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of reported human rights violations; increased percentage of these violations in response to which punitive action is taken* . • Militarised activity. • Popular perceptions that political, legal, security and civil society structures operate with professionalism, efficiency, responsiveness, constitutionality and transparency* . • Sense of local ownership over peace process; over identification of problems and search for solutions* . • Decreased expressed need by leaders and community for outside assistance in managing disputes and developing supporting structures for peace. • Number of locally-initiated and locally-run Peace-Building initiatives; percentage of women involved. • Degree of local input and participation in Canadian Peace-Building initiatives; percentage of women involved.

Annex C: Other indicators for assessing Peace-Building (continued)

Result	Key strategies	Performance indicators - (*indicators for which gender disaggregated data can/should be collected are marked by a *)
<p>Objective 4: Assist in the recovery of the country/region from the damage inflicted by war</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The economy is rehabilitated. • Social infrastructure is rebuilt. • Society is reintegrated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SMEs are rehabilitated or created. • Smallholder agriculture is reactivated. • The export sector is rehabilitated. • Key industries are rehabilitated. • Employment/income-generating skills are upgraded; human resources are developed. • National currency is stabilised. • Financial institutions are re-habilitated. • Major infrastructure (roads, electricity, water,...) is re-habilitated. • Economic reconstruction programmes are designed to allow women's full and equal participation. • War criminals are prosecuted; truth commissions are set up/supported. • Trauma counselling is provided. • Physical rehabilitation provided. • Refugees, displaced populations, ex-combatants, war disabled, widows, orphans, youth and others dislocated by war are re-integrated. • Social services (health, education....) are re-sorted, and recognise women's specific post-conflict needs and role as primary care-giver for the family. • Families are reunified; missing persons are traced. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall unemployment rate*. • Unemployment rate of former refugees, those formerly displaced, ex-combatants, war-disabled, widows, youth and others economically dislocated by war*. • Percentage of refugees, displaced populations, ex-combatants and others physically dislocated by war, who are resettled in a community – whether old or new – and having access to housing, etc.*. • Quality of re-integration within community of war-dislocated populations (refugees, ex-combatants, etc.) – as measured by wider community's tolerance and acceptance of these groups, and by these groups' perceptions of community's tolerance and acceptance of them*. • Percentage of orphans re-integrated into a family setting. • Percentage of population able to meet basic human needs without outside assistance. • Percentage of population having access to social services (health, education...)*. • Level of debt. • Percentage of families dislocated by war with at least one member whose whereabouts remain unknown; • Percentage of food needs met by local production. • Individual perceptions of own ability to lead healthy, peaceful, productive lives; to focus on the future rather than the past; sense of closure on the events and traumas of wartime*. • Pre- vs. post-war export levels.

Annex C: Other indicators for assessing Peace-Building (continued)

Result	Key strategies	Performance indicators - (*indicators for which gender disaggregated data can/should be collected are marked by a *)
<p>Objective 5: Enable women to fully contribute to and benefit from Peace-Building and post-conflict reconstruction</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women's practical needs and strategic interests are addressed and met within all processes of Peace-Building and post-conflict reconstruction. • Women are full and equal participants in all processes of Peace-Building and post-conflict reconstruction. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programming recognises and reflects the changing roles of women as a result of conflict; women as widows, heads of households, combatants/ex-combatants, refugees, displaced, disabled, etc.; and builds on the empowerment which can result from increased participation in social/political/military/economic life during wartime. • Obstacles to women's participation are attacked; legal restrictions on land ownership, legal/societal restrictions on women in the workplace/politics/...; lack of marketable skills, etc. • Women and men are equally targeted as beneficiaries of Peace-Building initiatives. • Women are provided with trauma counselling and physical re-habilitation. • Gender impact assessments are conducted for all Peace-Building projects; special care is taken to ensure that all projects will take into account different needs/interests of men and women (for e.g., judicial training should include training magistrates to deal with special needs of rape victims). • Women are asked/encouraged to participate in all phases of Peace-Building programming (design, implementation, evaluation). • Women are targeted to receive training/education in all spheres of Peace-Building activity; women trainers are trained. • Data collected for evaluation of peace building programming is aggregated by gender where applicable. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women's perceptions of the degree to which their needs and interests are being met by Peace-Building programming. • Women's perceptions of their desired vs. their actual role in the processes of Peace-Building and post conflict reconstruction; women's sense of ownership over peace process, over identification of problems and search for solutions. • Number of Peace-Building initiatives initiated and run by women (solely or with equal responsibility to men). • Degree of women's participation in Canadian peace building initiatives. • Number of reported cases of gender-specific violence vs. estimated number of actual cases; percentage of these cases in response to which punitive action is taken. • Percentage of Peace-Building programming consisting of genderintegrated and WID-specific initiatives. • Number of women active in local institutions related to Peace-Building. • NB: see indicators marketed with * which are listed under other objectives – comparison according to gender of data collected for these indicators should provide evaluators with a good indication of the differential impact of Peace-Building processes on men and women.

Annex C: Other indicators for assessing Peace-Building (continued)

Result	Key strategies	Performance indicators - (*indicators for which gender disaggregated data can/should be collected are marked by a *)
<p>Objective 6: Increase understanding of and support for Peace-Building, at home and abroad</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased knowledge and awareness of Canadian Peace-Building efforts among domestic and foreign constituencies. Increased knowledge and awareness of negative impact of conflict on development among domestic and foreign constituencies. Increased knowledge and awareness of immediate and long-term consequences of failing to resolve/prevent conflicts among domestic and foreign constituencies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Peace-Building education programmes are implemented at home and abroad (through television, internet, provision of materials for schools, lectures, seminars, conferences, etc.). Media is educated about Peace-Building/impact of conflict on development and encouraged to report on such issues (through provision of media kits, grants for travel/research, press releases, special seminars/lectures/conferences, etc). Research into security and development/Peace-Building is supported and results are widely disseminated through publication of reports and articles (popular and academic) etc.; documents relating to security and development/Peace-Building is made available on/hot linked to the CIDA website. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Percentage of domestic and foreign constituents who know what Peace-Building is*. Percentage of domestic and foreign constituents who have some knowledge of Canadian involvement in Peace-Building efforts; extent of this knowledge*. Perceptions of domestic and foreign constituents as to importance of preventing/resolving conflict; opinions of domestic and foreign constituents as to what role of Canada and ODA should be in the process*. Percentage of Peace-Building-related stories appearing in domestic and foreign media; quality of coverage (length/depth of articles, frequency, positive/negative portrayal of Canadian involvement, etc.);breadth of coverage (Number of different media covering the issues, coverage by geographical region, etc.).

Other sample indicators have been included in guidance manuals produced by Search for Common Ground⁶⁵. These are outlined below:

Objective	Weaknesses
Increase trust between the two communities.	50% of men, women and children from each side increase their mobility within the areas controlled by the other side by at least one square kilometre per year.
Increase inter-community collaboration on public policy issues that address common problems.	Expand from twice/year to six times/year the number of public policy debates or forums where all communities contribute interest-based solutions on natural resource management disputes by the end of 2009.

- 25% increase in the level of confidence people have in their ability to circulate safely in all areas in their community by the end of the project.
 - 10% decrease in fear of violence in village D in 6 months.
 - 10% increase in women parliamentarians' belief that their voices are making a difference in decision making.
 - 15% increase in elected women's perception that they are marginalised on decision making.

Criteria to judge the effectiveness of agencies that work on conflict

In addition, criteria to judge the effectiveness of agencies that work on conflict have also been developed by Collaborative for Development Action⁶⁶. These criteria are not exhaustive but have been identified to guide agencies and reflect the implicit and explicit goals of the range of efforts represented. It is held that an effort may be judged to be effective if:

1. It increases the number of people actively working, or speaking out, for peace (or reduces the numbers of people actively engaged in or promoting conflict).
2. It engages people in positions to make or influence formal peace agreements in the process of doing so.
3. It promotes a peace-related activity that, when violence worsens or threats are made, is able to sustain its efforts and maintain its membership.
4. It establishes a link between leadership and the general public by which either the leadership or the general public communicate to the other in ways that encourage their support and involvement to move toward settlement.
5. Specific acts of violence are stopped (when these acts are themselves unjust and breeders of further violence).
6. A specific cause of conflict is solved. This could be either through:
 - addressing injustice (this criterion explicitly relates to the building of a just society on which sustainable peace can be based; the other criteria could promote justice though not necessarily); and
 - addressing the lack of institutions to deal with conflict in non-violent ways.

65 Church, C and Rogers, M. (2005) Designing for Results: Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programmes, Search for Common Ground, Washington

66 Collaborative for Development Action (2001) Effectiveness Criteria, Collaborative Learning Projects and the Collaborative for Development Action, Inc

Annex D: Scales for analysing Social Dialogue approach

Numerical measures and scales for analysing Social Dialogue approach

Symmetrical active participation of the participants: This refers to the extent to which the Jewish and Arab participants take an equally active role in the encounter (talking, suggesting ideas, participating actively in the games) in contrast with a situation in which one group is dominant;

Symmetry-Dominance in Active Participation Scale – Participants

1: Very great dominance of one nationality:	2: Great dominance of one nationality:	3: Medium dominance of one nationality:	4: Slight dominance of one nationality:	5: Symmetrical active participation:
Members of one nationality are clearly dominant while members of the other group show no active participation	Members of one nationality are dominant and active (talk/ participate in the games) while members of the other group show only minimal participation	Members of both nationalities are active, but those of one group are more dominant than the other	There is almost full symmetry, but members of one group are slightly more participatory than the other	Participants of both nationalities are active to a very similar extent

Symmetrical active participation of the facilitators: This refers to the degree that the Jewish and Arab facilitators take equal part in actively facilitating the encounter;

Symmetry-Dominance in Active Participation Scale – Facilitators

1: Very great dominance of one nationality:	2: Great dominance of one nationality:	3: Medium dominance of one nationality:	4: Slight dominance of one nationality:	5: Symmetrical active participation:
Facilitators of one nationality are clearly dominant while facilitators of the other group do not participate in the facilitation	Facilitators of one nationality are dominant and active (talk/ facilitate) while the other facilitators actively participate only minimally (e.g., only engage in translating)	Facilitators of both nationalities are active, but those of one nationality are more dominant than the other	There is almost full symmetry, but facilitators of one nationality are slightly more active in facilitation than the other	Facilitators of both nationalities are active to a very similar extent

Inter-group interaction: This relates to the degree of interaction between the two national groups during the encounter, in contrast with a situation of no interaction;

1: Very little inter-group interaction	2: Little inter-group interaction;	3: Medium inter-group interaction	4: Much inter-group interaction;	5: Very much inter-group interaction
	Little mixing, except for one or two components/ instances of mixing		Maximum mixing, except for one or two components/ instances of not mixing	

Atmosphere: This relates to the degree of positive or negative atmosphere at the encounter (an atmosphere of sympathy and mutual respect rather than indifference or hostility).

Symmetry-Dominance in Active Participation Scale – Facilitators


1 Very negative atmosphere;	2 Rather negative atmosphere;	3 Atmosphere “in the middle”;	4 Rather positive atmosphere;	5 Very positive atmosphere
Complete hostility or apathy	Almost complete hostility, except for one or two positive episodes	Equal negative and positive elements, or a neutral (neither negative nor positive) atmosphere	Positive most of the time, with one or two negative episodes	

Annex E: Application of the Aid for Peace approach at the level of operations.

This paper outlines how the Aid for Peace approach can be practically applied to evaluate funded operations supported under the future PEACE III Programme.

As outlined in this report, the Aid for Peace approach is structured along four key stages. These key stages are outlined in the following figure and this paper details how each of the stages can be applied in turn.

Figure 1: Four key stages of applying the Aid for Peace approach⁶⁷



Stage 1: Peace-Building needs analysis

In implementing Stage 1, each operation would be challenged in the application form or subsequent work plan to analyse the peace context within their region or local area. In particular, operations would be required to articulate the specific Peace-Building needs that proposed intervention is aiming to address. This would involve operations undertaking the following tasks:

- Conducting a socio-economic review of key indicators related to the conflict within their local area/region which the operation aims to target.
- Assessing, within their local area/region, what Peace-Building potential exists.
- Determining what 'problem' that the operation is aiming to address.

Stage 2: Peace-Building relevance assessment

As part of the application form or subsequent work plan, Stage 2 would challenge applicants to articulate the vision and goals of their operation, including the key interim steps to measure progress. Having provided their needs analysis (Stage 1) and outlined their vision and goals, applicants would then be required to outline how their operation aims to promote change within their local area/region and make the transition towards achieving their goals. In this regard, operations would take cognisance of the Theories of Change that are outlined in the PEACE III Programme (the individual change theory and the healthy relationships and operation will contribute towards, as outlined below:


⁶⁷ Paffenholz, T. (2005) Third Generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace approach, <http://www.berghothandbook.net>

- The individual change theory: how will the operation promote change within the local area/region and achieve the operation goals by focusing on attitudes, behaviours and skills of individuals?
- Healthy relationships and connections theory: how will the operation promote change within the local area/region and achieve the operation goals by breaking down isolation, polarisation, division and prejudice between/among groups?

Therefore, by setting how the current environment can be transformed, this provides a basis for assessing whether proposed operations are relevant by examining the extent to which they fit within the overarching analysis provided in the PEACE III Programme framework.


Indeed, by understanding the needs of an area, the goals of an operation and how the proposed actions aim to bring about transformation, operations can be mapped in accordance with the overall goals of the programme. At a minimum, the PEACE III Programme aims to promote greater respect for diversity in Northern Ireland by seeking to address issues such as racism and sectarianism, but on a more ambitious level, the programme also aims to promote progress towards a shared society in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland.

These two goals of the programme can be placed on a continuum or framework for change and operations, depending on the nature of their goals, can be located along this continuum. In mapping operations, this approach also recognises that in light of the specific needs within any given area, operations are likely to be at different stages of development in regard to Peace-Building, as outlined in the following diagram:



Further to this and taking forward the approach set out by Lederach⁶⁹, applicants would be required (in an application form or work plan) to outline at what level of society the operation aims to focus on (community level, mid-range leadership, high level leadership as set out in the following figure). In addition, operations will be required to specifically detail how their operation seeks to connect, or have influence on, the other levels. This analysis will allow SEUPB to have an understanding of the level at which the PEACE III Programme has greatest focus and the extent to which the actions supported by the programme (the majority of which are likely to be at the community level) seek to influence other levels, namely the mid range and high level leadership levels.

68 Lederach J.P., 2005. *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Figure 3: Different levels involved in Peace-Building activity**Stage 3: Conflict risk assessment**

In the application form or subsequent work plan, Stage 3 would challenge applicants to conduct a conflict risk assessment. This would involve the following tasks:

- Outlining how risks related to the conflict could impact on each operation.
- Identifying potential actions or contingency plans to assess risks.

Stage 4: Peace and conflict effects assessment

Before each operation would be launched, operation leaders would be required to submit a work plan which would include indicators that will be used for monitoring and assessment. It is proposed that key indicators will be selected from the menu of programme/priority indicators to ensure direct alignment with the overall PEACE III Programme objectives. These indicators would emerge from the Peace-Building needs analysis (as per Stage 1) and contribute towards the goals of the operation (as per Stage 2) but would also be identified and agreed in a participatory manner by operation leaders and key stakeholders, including a selection of target beneficiaries.

To supplement the performance indicators, operation leaders would be responsible for undertaking self evaluation and producing a common report template to assist in the coordination and aggregation of the findings. Over the course of an operation, a minimum of three evaluation reports would be conducted at the ex-ante (at the outset of an operation to provide base lining information) mid-term and ex-post stages. The self-evaluation reports would focus on the following key tasks that include:

- conducting an analysis of whether the Peace-Building needs of a region/area have changed in light of developments in the external environment (i.e. reviewing and revisiting Stages 1 and 2);
- conducting an analysis of risks (reviewing and revisiting Stage 3); and
- providing an assessment of progress towards the key stages as set out in the operation work plan. This would include an analysis of outputs such as activities supported, participant's involved (cross-community/marginalised groups) and linkages/networks established, and an assessment of results/impacts which would focus on progress towards individual change and building relationships.

Implementing self-evaluation

In implementing the self-evaluation approach, it is anticipated that operation leaders would be provided initial training to assist in developing the required skills in evaluation and understanding the Aid for Peace approach. Further to this, a number of options (or combination of options) can be identified for conducting self-evaluation. These options include the following:

- **Option 1. Evaluation by the Operation Leader.** This would involve the operation leader conducting an analysis of his/her own operation and completing the reporting template accordingly.
- **Option 2: Evaluation by appointed external evaluator.** This would involve operation leaders appointing, but working closely with, an external evaluator who would conduct an assessment of the operation and complete the reporting template.
- **Option 3: Evaluation by a 'shadow' operation leader.** This would involve SEUPB, or another central Implementing Body, appointing twinning arrangements whereby 'similar' type operations would be partnered together to promote the sharing of experience and lessons learned. As part of this approach, operation leaders would conduct an evaluation of the other operation in which they are twinned.

In undertaking the self-evaluations, each operation would follow a similar methodological approach which would include the following key elements:

- Monitoring/evaluation forms to operation beneficiaries (pre and post operation).
- Focus groups/workshops with beneficiaries.

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