


# The Long View of Community Relations in Northern Ireland: 1989-2012

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## ARK Research Report

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## Notes on Authors

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## Chapter 1: The view from Northern Ireland as a whole

### Background

For just over twenty years now surveys in Northern Ireland have been monitoring changing attitudes to equality issues and relations between the two main religious communities during periods of conflict, peace-building and devolution<sup>1</sup>. While these monitoring statistics have provided much needed indicators on how the Northern Ireland public as a whole has perceived the situation on a year by year basis there has been limited analysis of the depth and richness of this dataset. Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland are not monolithic groups yet they are inevitably treated as such in the quest for rigorous measures of change. This report digs deeper into data from the past in order to pull out the individual 'stories' of sections of our population during those years, and to look to the future by providing evidence based recommendations for current policy.


The Life and Times Survey (NILT) and its predecessor the Northern Ireland Social Attitudes (NISA) survey together represent the richest available data source on changing attitudes and approaches in Northern Ireland with an unbroken sequence of twenty years of polling and analysis. This is a unique resource in international terms and the investment made has been substantial. Now that we have such a long time series the opportunity is available to exploit the full value of this data resource for policy purposes.

Time-series survey data is invaluable in measuring and monitoring long-term movement in values across a population – the analogy of 'climate change' is sometimes used to describe this. But inevitably these population level indicators mask nuances within specific groups within the population and the perhaps more volatile year-on-year shifts within those groups. Yet time-series data can also offer insights into these individual 'weather systems' in addition to the picture of climate change. Neighbourhood studies have indicated clearly where community conflict and violence has remained unchanged - or ebbed and flowed in response to specific events. While NILT survey data does not allow us to look at neighbourhood level information it does allow multivariate analyses of demographics such as age, gender, urban/rural, class and educational outcomes against dependent variables such as social distance or attitudes to segregation. While it is impossible to attribute changes in attitudes directly to the impact of key political events, changing attitudes can be mapped against political events and for some smaller groups the datasets can be pooled and changes analysed for specific time-periods.

In May 2013 the Northern Ireland Executive brought forward its new policy to build a shared future entitled Together: Building a United Community (TBUC). Understanding the causes

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<sup>1</sup> Via the Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey (NISA) between 1989 and 1996 and the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (NILT) between 1998 and 2012.



and dynamics of inter-community division will be essential to the success of policy for better inter-community relations. This includes understanding how policy and events impact across different income-groups, age-groups and themes. NILT remains the most comprehensive data base on attitudes across Northern Ireland. This in-depth study allows for the full impact of this data recorded over more than twenty years to be applied to emerging policy.

Community Relations policy remains one of the most hotly-disputed areas of public policy. Data from NILT already provide a direct evidence base for social attitudes. This report interrogates the deeper trends and dynamics at work and identifies emerging issues in particular themes and issues of direct relevance to TBUC and its associated policies of education, children and young peoples' services, employment and learning, community development, anti-poverty and community safety.

This report identifies links, dynamics and trends in attitudes towards inter-community relations and establishes a deeper understanding of their policy implications. This evidence can only be gleaned through a more rigorous analysis of the time-series data available through NILT. Policymakers need the tools to identify appropriate area-based and thematic interventions, including distinguishing useful investment in community capacity and important connections between inter-community divisions and multiple deprivation. In addition this report allows policy-makers embarking on a new policy framework to create appropriate baselines for future measurement and evaluation based on a thorough analysis of trends to date.


## Perceptions of relations

Over the decades since 1989 there is a clear underlying upward trend in the proportion of people in Northern Ireland who think that 'relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were five years ago'. Equally clearly, this upward trend is not a steady one and there have been many ups and downs along the way. Mostly the peaks and troughs are related to political and public events and these will be explored further in later chapters, however it is important to bear in mind that the overall trend is upwards. In terms of current policy though, the recent period from 2007 to 2012 shows a downward trend. There has been no significant improvement in optimism in later years. The long picture is encouraging but the later picture is qualitatively different<sup>2</sup>.

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
<sup>2</sup> Note that the 2012 NILT fieldwork was taking place as Belfast City Council (BCC) took the decision to fly the Union flag only on designated days. Tensions were already high followed a particularly volatile marching season and approximately 20% of interviews were carried out during the resultant flags dispute.

**Figure 1.1: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago**



There is a similar, albeit not as steep, upward trend in optimism about the future where the proportion of people who feel that 'relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in five years time', has risen considerably over the last two decades. Again there are highs and lows throughout the period but the overall trend line is clear. However once again the period from 2007 to 2012 is qualitatively different and that is important for current policy planning. Here there is a distinct downward trend indicating less optimism about future relations.


**Figure 1.2: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future**




## Attitudes to mixing

The proportion of people in Northern Ireland who say that they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood was always high and has risen somewhat over the last two decades. This rise has not been steady and there have been periods where a surge in reluctance to live in such neighbourhoods has emerged. There were two distinct periods of increased desire for mixing but between 2004 and 2010 the trend is largely flat, stabilising at around 80%. Clearly though there has been a drop off in 2012. The desire to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood is a good indicator of the willingness of people to mix but a preference to live in single-religion neighbourhoods may well be prompted more by fear than by sectarian values. Certainly the trends seem again to be influenced by the political and public events of the time. When respondents were asked their preference for mixed-religion or single-religion workplaces the trends almost exactly mirror those for neighbourhoods. An overall upward trend albeit with ups and downs, a more recent flat trend between 2007 and 2010 and a clear downward dip in 2012. Nonetheless both of these measures still show solid public support for mixing both in the workplace and in neighbourhoods.


# The view from Northern Ireland as a whole



**Figure 1.3: Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood**




**Figure 1.4: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace**



Preference for mixed religion schools is different from the previous two measures. There is consistently lower support overall, although the long-term trend is still upwards. Support has never reached more than 70% over the last twenty years and unlike the previous two measures the recent period from 2007 to 2010 is characterised by volatility rather than




# The view from Northern Ireland as a whole



stability. The now characteristic drop in support in 2012 is evident. Public appetite for mixed-religion schools has been ambivalent and remains so in recent years.

**Figure 1.5: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school**




Of course desire for mixing in public settings is rather different from an acceptance of mixed marriages within close family. In some ways the prospect of someone from the ‘other’ religion marrying into the family might appear too alien for those with traditional views. On the other hand it may be that there is more tolerance of mixed marriages as it involves the acceptance of just one person perceived as a complete individual versus the ‘many’ that is sometimes perceived fearfully. Figure 1.6 shows the proportion of people who say that they would ‘mind’ having a close relative marry someone from the other religious community. Clearly there is a distinct downward trend over the last two decades. The proportion of people who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion has dropped around ten percentage points from 30% in 1990 to 18% in 2012. This has not been a steep or dramatic drop but it is relatively steady. There is no apparent dip in 2012 of this underlying value, nonetheless it is still the case that a fifth of the Northern Ireland population continue to dislike the idea of a mixed marriage within their own family.

# The view from Northern Ireland as a whole




**Figure 1.6: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion**



Attitudes towards mixing in terms of family members entering a mixed marriage or the children attending a mixed school is one thing but attitudes towards more of this mixing happening in society in general is slightly different. Nonetheless the same upward trend in support is evident. Figure 1.7 shows the slight increase in support for more mixing in primary schools that has occurred over the decades.

**Figure 1.7: Percentage in favour of more mixing in primary schools**




# The view from Northern Ireland as a whole




This is not a steep increase by any means and is similar to the trend in support for mixing at an older level in secondary and grammar schools (Figure 1.8). Again there is no significant drop in support in 2012 and these questions are perhaps measuring more stable underlying values than attitudinal responses to worrying events.

**Figure 1.8: Percentage in favour of more mixing in secondary and grammar schools**




There is a similar trend with regard to mixing in neighbourhoods. Support has risen slightly over the two decades but not sharply and has been fairly stable with little volatility in response to events. Support for societal mixed marriage (Figure 1.10) shows the steepest rise in support over the time period and again remarkably little volatility. The overall trend is unmistakable even over the last five years when other measures appear to show a period of stagnation or a ceiling being hit in terms of positive attitudes. In 2012 there was a rise in the proportion of people in favour of more societal mixed marriage; this despite events that may have contributed to a pulling back of support in terms of a willingness to lived in mixed neighbourhoods for example.


# The view from Northern Ireland as a whole



**Figure 1.9: Percentage in favour of more mixing where people live**




**Figure 1.10: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages**




In contrast with attitudes towards mixing, the figures relating to contact remain stubbornly stable. Twenty years ago it was the case the people in Northern Ireland had friendships that were solely or largely from within their own religious community and this remains the case today. Unsurprisingly this is also true for neighbours who are all or mostly the same religion as the respondent.

# The view from Northern Ireland as a whole

**Figure 1.11: Percentage saying that all or most of their friends are the same religion as they are**



**Figure 1.12: Percentage saying that all or most of their neighbours are the same religion as they are**




## Identity

Over the last two decades there have been some perceptible shifts in the national identity declared by people living in Northern Ireland. Identity is something that many people believe remains fixed throughout life but either people in Northern Ireland are changing, or new

# The view from Northern Ireland as a whole

generations are coming through with subtly different identities. The proportion of people who hold an 'Ulster' identity has fallen away noticeably since the late 1980s. Similarly the 'British' identity has declined over the same period. In contrast the 'Irish' identity has increased and in particular the 'Northern Irish' identity has increased at the fastest rate - at least up until 2010. Of course it is possible that this simply reflects a faster growth in the Catholic than the Protestant population over the period, but as the analyses in Chapter 2 shows, this does not seem to be the case. However it is noticeable that there is a change in direction in 2012. The use of the 'Northern Irish' identity falls away sharply in 2012 while the British identity shows a slight increase and the Irish identity a more marked increase.

**Figure 1.13: National identity of Respondents**




## Prejudice

Perceived levels of prejudice against both Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland have declined over the period 1989 to 2003 but no data have been collected since 2003 so the trend-line is based only on the earlier data. For this reason this measure will not be reported in subsequent chapters. Figure 1.14 shows that the proportion of people saying that there was a lot of prejudice against Catholics in Northern Ireland fell from about a third in 1989 to less than a fifth in 2003.


# The view from Northern Ireland as a whole

**Figure 1.14: Percentage saying that there is a lot of prejudice against Catholics**



As Figure 1.15 indicates, the proportion of people saying that there is a lot of prejudice against Protestants fell from 23% to 13% over the fourteen years. The decline is more gradual, albeit starting from a lower base. Because data have not been collected since 2003 and there may well have been a change in opinion over the later years we have not continued analysis with this measure.


**Figure 1.15: Percentage saying that there is a lot of prejudice against Protestants**



# The view from Northern Ireland as a whole

In contrast with the decline in perceived prejudice against Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, the trend in self-reported prejudice against people from minority ethnic communities shows a marked rise between 1994 and 2010. In 1994 only 11% of people described themselves as 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of minority ethnic communities, however by 2007 this appeared to have stabilised at around 33%. The first drop in levels of self-reported prejudice since 2007 is apparent in 2012 when 27% of respondents reported that they were prejudiced. Much more analyses is needed of this specific issue in community relations and while the rest of this document continues to report trends in this area we recognise the need to address this issue separately.

**Figure 1.16: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of minority ethnic communities**







## Chapter 2: The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories

### Perceptions of Community Relations

People in Northern Ireland look to politics as their primary measure of progress in community relations. Optimism among the general public about the future of community relations and perceptions of change from the past are more clearly related to political events than to any of the other measures of the health of community relations. Since 1989 there has been a measurable upward trend in the number of people who believe that community relations have improved from the situation five years ago. In 1989 only around 30% of people observed an upward trend. By 2010, 60% of Protestants and almost 70% of Catholics were of this view. In general Protestants have been slower to persuade but there has been a clear upward trend since 2001.


This broader improvement in expectations masks a clear connection of attitudes to specific events, and it is clear that particular events have impacted differently. The most dramatic improvement in expectations occurred between 1993 and 1995 around the time of paramilitary ceasefires. This was particularly evident among Catholic respondents. The Agreement of 1998 had a similar if less dramatic effect. However, during periods when there were difficulties in the peace process, particularly between 2000 and 2005, there were marked declines in optimism, which only recovered when talks towards the restoration of devolution appeared to gain momentum. Since 2007, optimism has appeared to remain buoyed by the stability of government. The pattern of Protestant attitudes shows a similar impact from political events in general, but a different relationship to specific events. This is perhaps unsurprising given the zero-sum prism within which agreements are often viewed.

The Belfast Agreement produced no improvement in Protestant expectations. Indeed the gap between Protestant and Catholic expectations was greatest between 1998 and 2001. Furthermore, in the light of the Holy Cross dispute in 2001, Protestant attitudes appeared to be more pessimistic than at any time during the entire survey period. Perhaps surprisingly, Protestant experience of improvement appears to have been most dramatically changed following the collapse of devolution and the period when negotiations for restoration began. The year 2007 marked a high point in Protestant perceptions of community relations possibly reflecting the gradual engagement of the whole Protestant community through the DUP.

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories



**Figure 2.1: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago**



Perhaps more surprisingly, the trend since 2007 has been of gradual decline in confidence, particularly between 2010 and 2012. 2012 was a mixed year in terms of community relations, and has been described as 'a game of two halves'. The political and social situation for the earlier part of the year was relatively stable and peaceful. Notable events include the handshake between Queen Elizabeth and Martin McGuinness, and the announcement of the 2013 G8 summit in Fermanagh. However the 2012 marching season was more volatile than in recent years and contention over marching bands opened up new tensions<sup>3</sup>. Furthermore, on 3 December, Belfast City Council took the decision to restrict flying of Union flag on Belfast City Hall to 18 days per year. This led to a series of protests and demonstrations during a time that part of the NILT fieldwork was taking place.

Although there is also a gentle upward trend in the proportion of Protestants who believe that community relations will be better in 5 years, there is a clear and consistent disparity between Protestants and Catholics in their optimism for the future. The gap in 1995 was 78% versus 52%, in 1998 it was 75%-53%. The gap narrowed in 2004 largely as a result of evident Catholic disillusion in 2004 to 52%-48% and has since widened to 63%-45% in 2012.

Five periods appear to be identifiable. The pre ceasefire period from 1989 to 1994 was marked by steady but very low Protestant optimism. A post ceasefire rise in optimism was followed by a volatile period when optimism fluctuated during negotiations to a high in 1998 with the signing of the Agreement.


<sup>3</sup> See pages 82-84 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Peace Monitoring Report <http://www.community-relations.org.uk/fs/doc/ni-peace-monitoring-report-2013-layout-1.pdf>

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories



What is noticeable is that assessments about improvements over the past five years are not matched by expectation for future improvement. In 2010, expectations about future improvement were lower among Protestants than they were in 1995. Furthermore, Protestant expectations remain markedly less optimistic than Catholic expectations over the period. Serious worries followed over the following period and optimism fell to a low in 2001. Optimism then thrived over the years 2002 to 2007. Since that period levels appear to be falling. However the public events of 2012 are not reflected in a drop in optimism about the future. Levels are largely the same in 2012 as in 2010, even slightly upwards for Catholics, and while there is clearly a sense that relations have been damaged (from the previous graph) there does not seem to be a sense that they are therefore on an irretrievable downward trajectory.

**Figure 2.2: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future**




## Attitudes to mixing

Whereas assessments of improvement about wider community relations are extremely sensitive to politics, personal attitudes to mixing appear to be more consistent. The most significant change has been the gradual increase in the number of Protestants who now want shared neighbourhoods to the point that the numbers of Protestant supporting mixed-religion neighbourhoods is now similar to the numbers of Catholics. Catholic opinion started from an initially higher base which supported shared neighbourhoods and this has remained fairly high overall.

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories



**Figure 2.3: Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood**




What used to be a picture of 80% of Catholics and 70% of Protestants preferring mixed neighbourhoods finally converged at around 80% in 2010. The 2001 dip in optimism was reproduced here, especially among Protestants, but the evidence of volatility to events which is clear in the perceptions of community relations graphs is otherwise absent until 2012. Preference for sharing dropped among Protestants in the period 1996 to 2001 only to begin a steady upward climb to 2007 with stability up until 2012. In 2012 there was a marked dip in the proportion of both Catholics and Protestants who said that they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood. The fear engendered by a summer of tension and the subsequent flag dispute would seem to have taken its toll.

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories




**Figure 2.4: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace**



Preference for a mixed-religion workplace has always been high among both communities and had stabilised around 90% up until 2012. There was increasing support from 1989 to 1995 while the period from 1996 to 2001 showed a distinct falling off especially among Protestants. Once again 2001 stands out as a low period indicating slight retrenchment among Protestants only to be replaced by a steady increase in support to 2010. 2012 shows a noticeable withdrawal of confidence very similar to the pattern for preference for mixed religion neighbourhoods.

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories

**Figure 2.5: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school**




While support for mixed religion workplaces is consistently above 80%, the preference for mixed religion schools is lower and shows a much more volatile pattern than other preferences. In 1999, 57% of Protestants and 72% of Catholics supported mixed religion schooling. However in 2010 these figures were reversed with 72% of Protestants and 59% of Catholic supporting mixed religion schooling. Catholics had a higher level of preference in 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2009, Protestants a higher level of preference in 2000, 2006, 2007 and 2010 with virtually identical results in 2004, 2005 and 2008. Since 1996 the lowest level of preference recorded have been 52% among Catholics in 1998 and 2000 and 52% among Protestants in 2002 and highest at 72% among Catholics in 1999 and 72% among Protestants in 2010. 2012 shows a dip in support in both communities. Where there is variation between Protestant and Catholics in the desire for mixing in general, Catholics tend to be slightly more favourable - until it comes to mixed schools.

Attitudes to single religion schools are distinct, however, from attitudes towards the mixing of children in general while in school. When asked about more mixing in primary and secondary schools, more than 80% of both Catholics and Protestants are now in favour, a trend which has been steadily upward since 2007. This suggests that the proportion of people who are content to see the emergence of opportunities for sharing and mixing exceeds those who wish to see shared institutions by around 20-25%, and that the single integrated model may be less popular than models which allow for more engagement but do not require single institutions.


# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories



**Figure 2.6: Percentage in favour of more mixing in primary schools**



**Figure 2.7: Percentage in favour of more mixing in secondary and grammar schools**




Other social distance indicators show steady and consistent downward trends in the proportion of Catholics who would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion, falling from 16% in 1989 to 12% over the period. Protestant opinion was, and still is, more wary of mixed marriage nonetheless the trend is identical and fell from 44% in 1989 to

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories



28% in 2012. There is little evidence of linkage to political events and this may indicate more of a slow underlying value change than an attitudinal trend. There is only a slight convergence between Protestant and Catholic levels of approval.

**Figure 2.8: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion**




When it comes to general attitudes to mixed neighbourhoods, Catholics are again more likely on average to approve. Protestants continue to be more wary but there is a clear and consistent majority among both Catholics and Protestants for mixing and an overall gentle upward trend among Protestants, consistent with personal attitudes to living in a mixed religion neighbourhood. The trend for Protestants is now converging on the Catholic line and in 2012 81% favoured more mixing compared with 67% in 1989.



# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories



**Figure 2.9: Percentage in favour of more mixing where people live**




Tolerance for mixed marriages has gradually increased over time, again consistent with personal views on mixed marriages within the family reported above. Catholics are consistently more in favour than Protestants here and there is only slight convergence over time. Levels of changes are from 36% in 1996 among Protestants to 63% in 2012. The change among Catholics is 59% in 1996 to 78% in 2012. Importantly though, this has become the established majority position in both communities. Interestingly, while support for mixing where people live may have dropped slightly in 2012, support for more mixing in people's marriages has risen. The former may well reflect fear of raised tensions given the public circumstances of the time but the latter indicates more support, if anything, for a particular type of society and this may be one perceived way forward.

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories



**Figure 2.10: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages**




## Contact

Actual levels of contact and mixing have fewer readings over time and so the trends are more difficult to identify. However in terms of the proportion of both Protestants and Catholics who say that all or most of their friends are the same religion as they are the trends are almost completely flat. Historically Catholics have tended to have more mixed friendships but this has converged now to about 2/3 of people in both communities report that all or most of their friends are the same religion.

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories




**Figure 2.11: Percentage saying that all or most of their friends are the same religion as they are**



\*some interpolated gaps

The trend in terms of the proportion of people who say that all or most of their neighbours are the same religion as they are is also fairly unchanging.

**Figure 2.12: Percentage saying that all or most of their neighbours are the same religion as they are**



\*some interpolated gaps


# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories



## Identity

Trends in terms of identity show distinct changes over time. While Protestant 'Unionist' identity shows a slight decrease in strength, the correlation between Catholic and Nationalist has varied much more. Two distinct trends are clear. The first is a clear rise from a low of 40% in 1989 (when to describe someone as 'Nationalist' may have had implications of republicanism) to a high of 69% in 1999 when the wording and structures of the Agreement probably made the term Nationalist more main-stream and in the eyes of many people functionally equivalent to 'Catholic'. In fact the level in 1999 was the only time that 'Catholic and Nationalist' reached the level of 'Protestant and Unionist'. However since 1999 Catholic identification with 'Nationalist' has been on a clear downward trajectory.

**Figure 2.13: Percentage of Protestants describing themselves as Unionist and Catholics describing themselves as Nationalist**




The unrest in 2012 does not appear to have disturbed this downward trend and there is no surge in support for 'Unionism' or 'Nationalism' in fact the reverse if anything is true.

While Catholics may have briefly embraced the 'Nationalist' label only for it to fall in popularity (along with the preference for a United Ireland), the proportion who feel Irish has been largely stable albeit with discernible peaks post-Agreement and again in 2012. An overall sense of 'Irishness' remains fairly steady. A similarly stable proportion of Catholics has always felt themselves to be British (around a quarter) and this has also shown little change over time. The 2012 figures however do indicate a shift towards Irishness and away from the 'Northern Irish' identity.

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories




**Figure 2.14: Catholic national identity**



Protestant national identity, in contrast with 'Unionist' identity has shown some very clear shifts over the last twenty years. Much more volatile and responsive to events than the Unionist identity the 'British' national identity has shown a slight downward trend since 1989. The 'Ulster' identity has likewise faded over the years from 16% in 1991 to 2% in 2012. In contrast, the rise of the 'Northern Irish' identity has been quite marked from 16% in 1989 to 32% in 2008 though with a falling away since then to 24% in 2012. In 2012 there is a noticeable rise in 'Britishness' and drop in Northern Irish though the long-term trends remain the same.

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories

**Figure 2.15: Protestant national identity**




## Attitudes towards people from Minority Ethnic Groups

Trends in self-reported prejudice towards people from minority ethnic communities has clearly increased among both the Protestant and Catholic communities since this was first measured in 1994. However Protestant self-reported prejudice began, and remains, at a significantly higher level. Overall around a third of people in Northern Ireland report that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic groups but this figure has been closer to 40% among the Protestant community until 2012. There are a number of possible explanations for this finding. Actual levels of prejudice may be similar but Catholics may be more sensitive to the social acceptability of declaring prejudice. Or actual levels of prejudice may indeed be different. This could be linked to housing patterns where people from minority ethnic communities tend to take up residence in predominantly Protestant areas leading to increased sensitivities or a backlash in those areas. Alternatively low levels of Catholic prejudice could be linked to theories of minority identification where people who perceive themselves as part of a minority group with associated prejudices identify with other minority groups and their experience of associated prejudices.



**Figure 2.16: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities**




## Constitutional Preferences

Trends in constitutional preferences are of interest not just as background data to community relations but also because of the publicity and general interest in these figures that has built up in recent times.

Over the last twenty years Protestant belief that the best long-term future for Northern Ireland is within the United Kingdom has been high and stable. There was a decline in the years 1989 to 2001 when some uncertainty may have crept in around the time of the Agreement and the 2001 low period. However between 2001 and 2012 levels increased close to their pre-ceasefire peak. The variation is small compared with the overall picture of strong support and stability. From 2007 the question wording allowed respondents to state whether they preferred to remain in the UK under direct rule or with devolved government.

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories

**Figure 2.17: Constitutional preferences of Protestants**



It is important to note that up until 2007 the question only suggested two answers ie remain in the UK or unify with Ireland. However from 2007 a third option was listed which was to remain in the UK but with devolved government.

While support for remaining within the United Kingdom is strong, a large and consistent majority of Protestants support devolution over direct rule. This suggests that the majority do not regard devolution as weakening their allegiance to or participation in the state as a whole.


In contrast, Catholics have changed their views about the best long-term future for Northern Ireland over the last 20 years with a clear downward trend in the proportion choosing a united Ireland as the preferred option over remaining in the UK. This trend will have been affected by the emergent third choice of remaining in the UK with devolved government while in the early years no such option existed (and the question asked of respondents reflects this). Alongside the option of devolution (and the state of the Irish economy in recession) preferences for a United Ireland fell from 56% in 2006 to 32% in 2010 and 2012. In 2010 the option of remaining in the UK with devolved government was more popular than that of reunification with Ireland (at 46% and 32% respectively). Substantial minorities of both communities in 2012 (14% of Protestants and 17% of Catholics) said that they did not know what was in the best interests of Northern Ireland's long-term future.



# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories



**Figure 2.18: Constitutional preferences of Catholics**



It is important to note that up until 2007 the question only suggested two answers ie remain in the UK or unify with Ireland. However from 2007 a third option was listed which was to remain in the UK but with devolved government.



## Summary and conclusions

1. Expectations and confidence about the improvement or deterioration in relations between Catholics and Protestants are extremely sensitive to political events and behaviour.
2. There has been an overall upward trend over the last twenty years in the numbers in both communities believing that relations have improved and that relations will improve over the next five years, however since 2007 and more especially since 2010 there is some evidence of a reversal in this trend. Catholics have been consistently more optimistic than Protestants, although Protestant confidence grew between 2001 and 2007.
3. Protestants and Catholics react to specific events differently in assessing the state of relationships. Where there is disquiet within their own community about events, people tend to become pessimistic about the general state of relationships.
4. The number of people saying that they wish to share mixed religion neighbourhoods and workplaces has been extremely consistent over time up until 2012 when the fear engendered by a summer of tension and the subsequent flag dispute would seem to have taken its toll.
5. While historically Protestants would have been more reticent about mixed neighbourhoods and workplaces, views have now converged with the Catholic community.
6. Over 90% of people supported mixed religion workplaces in 2010 and 80% supported a preference for mixed religion neighbourhoods. In 2012 these figures had dropped to 80% and 70% respectively.
7. Between 50% and 70% of both Catholics and Protestants support mixed religion schools. While representing a majority of respondents, this reflects less enthusiasm than for mixed-religion neighbourhoods or workplaces. Whereas previously more Catholics than Protestants supported mixed-religion schools, this position has now reversed.
8. Whereas there is some ambivalence about mixed schools there is strong enthusiasm for more mixing between young people while at school at both primary and secondary level. Support for mixing among children has risen consistently over the period and elicits slightly greater support among Catholics than Protestants. This may suggest that proposals for shared as opposed to integrated education could command a wider base of support.
9. Although the number of people objecting to inter-community marriage within their own family has declined measurably over the period, it remains a substantial issue among Protestants, where concerns are markedly more widespread than among Catholics.

# The 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' stories



10. Support for mixed marriage in society in general has risen over the period, but is stronger among Catholics than Protestants.
11. The number of Protestants describing themselves as Unionists has declined slightly over the period. However over two thirds of Protestants continue to make this association.
12. The number of Catholics describing themselves as Nationalists has risen slightly over the period but shows two distinct trends. The decade from 1989 and 1999 showed a sharp rise while since then there has been a falling away from this identity.
13. Very few Catholics describe themselves as British and very few Protestants describe themselves as Irish. If anything the trends in this have strengthened.
14. Long-term trends indicate a fall in the percentage of Protestants describing themselves as British and a rise in the percentage of Protestants describing themselves as Northern Irish. However the stark changes measured between 2010 and 2012 in all communities also suggest that this is sensitive to ongoing political stability.
15. There has been little change in Catholic national identity over twenty years, and relatively little volatility, though 2012 shows a marked rise in Irish identity and a decline in 'Northern Irish'.
16. Close to 90% of Protestants wish to remain within the United Kingdom. This has changed little over the last twenty years. A stable majority of 70% also support devolution in preference to Direct Rule.
17. The number of Catholics stating a preference for a United Ireland has declined steadily since 1989. Whereas previously over half of Catholics surveyed expressed this preference, this has now fallen to just below a third.
18. Levels of social distance between Catholics and Protestants remain consistently high over two decades as measured by reported friendship and neighbourhood relations.
19. About a third of Protestants and a fifth of Catholics currently describe themselves as either very or a little prejudiced against ethnic minorities. There is a consistent gap between reported Protestant attitudes and those of Catholics. Levels of prejudice rose markedly since 1994, reaching a height in 2007 and have fallen slightly since then.




## Chapter 3: Change and differences among Protestants

### Young Protestants

*Young Protestants (aged 18 to 30) have historically been more upbeat about future community relations than the norm but in recent years optimism has plummeted – more so within this group than the Protestant community in general. Alongside this there has been a historical and consistent wariness of mixed neighbourhoods. However this reticence about sharing neighbourhoods is not matched by a resistance to mixed marriages as young Protestants are significantly more accepting of mixed marriages than are Protestants in general. They have also had a distinctive journey in terms of identity being now less likely to see themselves as Unionist and much more likely to see themselves as Northern Irish, though 2012 marked something of a return to old identities in this respect.*

In the past, young Protestants tended to be more optimistic than most others – often seeing relations as better than five years previously. After the low of Protestant optimism in 2001, young Protestants regained their more optimistic stance until 2007. However following that period, there has been a sharp downward trend in optimism and in 2010 and 2012 they are markedly less optimistic than average. The size of the collapse (73%-48% between 2007 and 2012) is very substantial and appears to be a four year trend in direction. In 2012, less than half feel relations are better than in the past.


**Figure 3.1: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Young Protestants)**



# Change and differences among Protestants

In terms of optimism about the future the results are consistent with the view that young Protestants generally perceive a worse situation in recent years than do most Protestants. In the past optimism was broadly in line with the Protestant community in general but now we are seeing much lower levels. Only 35% expect better relations in five years in 2012. This is the lowest level since 2003 and sits within a sharp downward trend from a high in 2006/7 (61%).


**Figure 3.2: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Young Protestants)**



In terms of mixing, young Protestants are visibly less keen than Protestants in general to live in mixed religion neighbourhoods.


# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.3: Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Young Protestants)**



The trends match the overall trend but lags behind in positivity by about 5 to 10 percentage points. Young people are clearly not less concerned about sectarianism according to these figures. The desire to live in mixed areas took a particular dive between 2007 and 2008 before returning to levels around 67%-77%.


**Figure 3.4: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Young Protestants)**



# Change and differences among Protestants

The desire for a mixed religion workplace is high among all and has been increasing over the last 10 years. However where the figures for young Protestants do deviate from the norm, again they tend to be less universally positive about mixing. Attitudes are also more volatile but the underlying upward trend between 2001 and 2010 is clear. Equally clear is the drop in preference for mixed workplaces in 2012 though it is too early to say if this marks a new trend. The lowest level of support was in 2001 at 64%. In 2010 support was above 90% before falling back to 79%.

**Figure 3.5: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Young Protestants)**




Young Protestants follow the views of the norm in terms of mixed schooling but again where they deviate it tends to be in a more reticent direction. Attitudes continue to be slightly more volatile compared to community norm. The upward trend goes from 49% in 2001 and 2003 to 73% in 2007 but then falls away.

While young Protestants are generally more pessimistic about the state of community relations and more wary about mixed religion neighbourhoods they are rather more accepting of mixed marriages than the community norm. Young Protestants are consistently less likely to mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion.


# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.6: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Young Protestants)**



A particularly significant drop in objections was recorded in 2009 and 2010. Overall the fall is from 40% in 1998 to 17% in 2010. Young Protestants are also more positive about societal intermarriage or 'more mixing in people's marriages' which continues on an upward trend since 2005.

**Figure 3.7: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Young Protestants)**






# Change and differences among Protestants



In terms of their friends and neighbours however, young Protestants are not discernibly more likely to have more friends or neighbours of a different religion. It is in terms of identity that the Young Protestant story is quite markedly different from the community norm.


**Figure 3.8: Percentage of Protestants describing themselves as Unionist (Young Protestants)**



Young Protestants are significantly less likely than most to make the connection between Protestant and Unionist and by 2010 the proportion of young Protestants who would describe themselves as Unionist fell below 50% for the first time. In terms of national identity the decline in ‘Britishness’ and the rise in a Northern Ireland identity is very marked. In 1998 there is no difference between the ‘Britishness’ of young Protestants compared with the community norm but thereafter there is a marked difference, albeit with 2012 marking a particular retrenchment back to the old national identities.


# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.9: Protestant national identity (Young Protestants)**



Young Protestants are little different from the norm in terms of their self-reported prejudice towards people of minority ethnic groups. Levels of prejudice reached 47% among this group in 2008 but 2012 marks the lowest levels of self-reported prejudice in this group since 2004.

**Figure 3.10: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of other ethnic minority communities (Young Protestants)**



# Change and differences among Protestants




## Protestant pensioners

*Protestant pensioners (aged 65 or over) were historically more pessimistic than the community norm and continue to be less likely to believe that community relations are better than before. They show a similar trend to all Protestants insofar as tolerance to mixed marriages in the family is increasing over time. However the speed of acceptance is slower among the older group and there is still visibly greater resistance overall to relatives marrying someone of a different religion. Interestingly though, attitudes towards mixed marriages in society more generally have moved into alignment with the community norm in recent years – from less tolerance to more acceptance. The identity of older Protestants is emphatically Unionist and has always been so. Consistent with this, older Protestants are more likely to retain their British identity and much less likely to have moved towards a Northern Irish identity over time. 2012 marks a slight dip in the ‘Unionist’ identity but a corresponding rise in ‘Britishness’.*


Protestant pensioners are different to Young Protestants. They tend to have been historically more pessimistic than the community norm in terms of feeling that community relations are better than before and have continued this trend in recent years. The only exception to this is that they might have been very slightly more impressed by the Agreement. The pattern is very similar to the average with a low base in 1990-1994 (25-30%), a leap in expectations following the ceasefires only to decline 2001/02 following the collapse of the institutions and Holy Cross. There is a clear rise to new hope in 2007 and the trend is largely declining since then. The ceasefires clearly had a huge effect while the Post Agreement period was very difficult within the Protestant community in general.

**Figure 3.11: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Protestant pensioners)**




# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.12: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Protestant pensioners)**



While older Protestants are harder to persuade that things are better than before, their optimism about the future has been a more mixed picture. There were periods when the views of older Protestants matched the average and distinct time periods when it was different. 1996 was an extremely pessimistic year for older Protestants and the post Agreement period was similarly low despite the fact that the previous figures suggest a sense that at least things were better than before. Since 2004 older Protestants have been consistently slightly more pessimistic than others in their community.


**Figure 3.13: Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Protestant pensioners)**



# Change and differences among Protestants

Pensioner Protestants were more cautious than others about a preference for mixed religion neighbourhoods between the ceasefires and the run up to the Agreement. However in recent years there are no distinctive differences from the community norm with the same upward trend in preference for mixing from 2001 to 2010. However the dive in confidence characteristic of 2012 is repeated within the pensioner community. Mixed religion workplaces are fairly uncontested, though again there was a slight reticence among older Protestants in the years before the Agreement was signed. Once again 2012 marks a falling away from the enthusiasm for mixing.


**Figure 3.14: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Protestant pensioners)**



The familiar pattern repeats itself in relation to mixed schools with older Protestants being more wary about endorsing mixed schooling in the years post ceasefire until the Agreement was signed. Between 2002 and 2006 it was a similar pattern with Pensioner Protestants once again more reluctant to commit to this. This was the period following Holy Cross and before the Protestant DUP engagement in 2007 which does seem to have marked a turning point in Protestant confidence overall. The overall broad time trend is certainly one of increasing support despite the downturn in 2012.


# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.15: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Protestant pensioners)**



Pensioner Protestants show a similar trend to all Protestants insofar as tolerance to mixed marriages in the family is increasing over time. However the speed of acceptance is slower among the older group and there is still a greater resistance overall to relatives marrying someone of a different religion.


**Figure 3.16: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Protestant pensioners)**



# Change and differences among Protestants

This reluctance is also apparent when respondents are asked about mixed marriages in general. Older Protestants are much less in favour of mixed marriages, although the overall trend over time is still clearly in an upward direction. The 2010 reading closed the gap slightly with the Protestant norm and 2012 appears to have affirmed this change towards more approval of intermarriage.


**Figure 3.17: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Protestant pensioners)**



The identity of older Protestants is emphatically Unionist and has always been so. While there may be the same very slight loss of strength over time that there is throughout the Protestant community (particularly in 2012) it is slight. What is most visible is the more solid sense of being a Unionist that is apparent among this group.

# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.18: Percentage of Protestants describing themselves as Unionist (Protestant pensioners)**




In contrast with the young, older Protestants have not adopted the ‘Northern Irish’ identity to the same great extent. In the early 90s both older Protestants and Protestants in general showed the same level of affiliation to the Northern Irish identity. However while this has increased substantially among the general Protestant population it has lagged behind for the older group – still increasing but much less quickly and hovering around 20%. Older Protestants are more likely to retain their British identity – consistent with their Unionist identity in the previous graph. While 2012 marks a drop in the ‘Unionist’ identity among this group – there is though a corresponding rise in their ‘Britishness’.




# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.19: Protestant national identity (Protestant pensioners)**



In terms of attitudes to minority ethnic groups there is a tendency for less self-reported prejudice among older Protestants than is the case for the community norm though the trend is clearly upwards until 2010. The reversal in 2012 of less prejudice among the Protestant community in general is not reflected in this group of older Protestants.

**Figure 3.20: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of minority ethnic communities (Protestant pensioners)**




# Change and differences among Protestants

## Churchgoing Protestants

Churchgoing Protestants (who attend church at least once a week) mirror the community norm in many key measures of attitudes. Slightly quicker than most Protestants to voice a desire for mixed religion neighbourhoods and workplaces though more mixed in support for mixed religion schools. Where churchgoing Protestants tend to pull away from the community norm is in a reluctance to accept marrying outside the fold. Acceptance is increasing over the decades but not at the same speed as is the case for the Protestant community in general. Churchgoing Protestants have been slightly more Unionist historically but 2012 marked the first year where the proportion willing to call themselves Unionist fell below the community norm. While there have been periods when a 'British' identity has waned and a 'Northern Irish' identity has taken its place. The years since 2008 indicate a return to Britishness away from Northern Irish.

The first part of the story of churchgoing Protestants is that there is no story. In terms of perceptions of community relations now compared with five years ago, churchgoing Protestants **are** the community norm. Fractionally more pessimistic than others in 2004, 2005 and 2009 but otherwise mirroring the average very closely.


**Figure 3.21: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Churchgoing Protestants)**



In terms of future relations, the picture is again very close to the community norm. Slightly more pessimistic around 2005 and in the last couple of years but otherwise following the main community trend line.

# Change and differences among Protestants


**Figure 3.22: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Churchgoing Protestants)**



Interesting aspects of this group emerge when looking at attitudes to mixing. Churchgoing Protestants tend to have been significantly more in favour than most of living in a mixed religion neighbourhood during the post Agreement period and up until 2007. While Catholics greeted the Agreement with a swell of optimism so too did churchgoing Protestants. Protestants in general only began to present strong support for mixing after the landmark year of 2002 and it was only after 2007 (perhaps with the engagement of the Protestant community behind the DUP) that the rest of the Protestant community had caught up with churchgoing Protestants in terms of their attitudes to mixed housing.


# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.23: Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Churchgoing Protestants)**



The percentage of churchgoing Protestants who would prefer mixed religion workplaces has been above 80% since 1999 with no significant sensitivity to political events. The trend is very close to the community norm except for the period post Agreement to 2004 when support for mixed workplaces was stronger among this group as it is in 2012.


**Figure 3.24: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Churchgoing Protestants)**



# Change and differences among Protestants

However the desire to send their children to mixed religion schools has varied amongst churchgoing Protestants and support in general is a little more volatile. The period 2004 to 2007 is one where churchgoing Protestants retreated from this notion – in contrast with the community norm.


**Figure 3.25: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Churchgoing Protestants)**



But where churchgoing Protestants really tend to pull away from the community norm is in a reluctance to accept marrying outside the fold. Churchgoers are consistently more likely to mind if a close relative were to marry someone of a different religion. Trends are volatile but the gap in attitudes is clearly visible. Nonetheless objections are on a downward trend overall.

# Change and differences among Protestants


**Figure 3.26: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Churchgoing Protestants)**



In line with personal views on mixed marriage in the family, attitudes to mixed marriage in general are equally distinctive for churchgoing Protestants. Churchgoers' views are similar to that of older Protestants and there is a clear mismatch with the community norm. Again acceptance is on an upward trend but while churchgoers tend to be more in favour of mixed neighbourhoods and workplaces than most Protestants, many draw the line at mixed marriages. Interestingly though, as with older Protestants, 2012 sees the closest to convergence with the community norm. The events of 2012 may have led to an affirmation of a belief that mixing is ultimately the way forward, even though fear may lead to suppressed preference among some groups for living in mixed religion neighbourhoods.


# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.27: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Churchgoing Protestants)**




Churchgoing Protestants have historically had a slightly stronger Unionist identity than the community norm, and especially so over the period 2004 to 2007. In recent years there has been a slight downward trend throughout and 2012 was the first year since recording of attitudes began that church-going Protestants were less likely to name themselves as Unionist than the average.

**Figure 3.28: Percentage of Protestants describing themselves as Unionist (Churchgoing Protestants)**



# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.29: Protestant national identity (Churchgoing Protestants)**




The national identity of churchgoing Protestants largely mirrors the community norm until 2004/5 when the popularity of a British national identity takes a steep dive and the Northern Irish identity gathers momentum to reach a peak in 2008. Thereafter identity returns to mirror that of Protestants in general. The same downward trend in Britishness and upward trend in Northern Irish identity is evident over the 20 year period until 2009 when there is a retreat from Northern Irish and a return to Britishness.

Two decades ago Protestant Churchgoers expressed slightly less prejudice towards minority ethnic groups but in later years their views largely reflect the community norm and show the same upward trajectory until 2010 since when views have become less prejudiced.



# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.30: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of minority ethnic communities (Churchgoing Protestants)**



## Protestants with no educational qualifications


*Protestants with no educational qualifications are quite a distinctive group. Since 2004 they have been particularly pessimistic about community relations. Consistently less likely to want mixed religion neighbourhoods, they were historically also less likely to want mixed religion workplaces and schools, although this been mixed in recent years. There is still an upward trend in the desire for mixed religion neighbourhoods against this overall background of wariness. Protestants with no educational qualifications are more likely to dislike mixed marriages although again the gap between them and the community norm narrowed in 2010 only to widen again in 2012. The underlying trend is one of increased acceptance of mixed marriages. Protestants with no qualifications tend to be more Unionist, more British and less Northern Irish.*

Because of the fact that many older people left school in the days when formal qualifications were not the norm there are always a substantial number of older people included in any group with little apparent education. It might then be expected that the story for this group would be similar to the story for pensioner Protestants. In fact it is different in some interesting and quite distinctive ways.


In terms of perceptions of community relations compared with the past, Protestants with no qualifications are fairly similar to Pensioner Protestants in levels of pessimism, particularly since 2004. However they are markedly pessimistic about the next five years and this consistent pattern contrasts with Protestant pensioners where the picture is much more mixed.

# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.31: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Protestants - no ed quals)**



**Figure 3.32: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Protestants - no ed quals)**




This group is persistently more pessimistic than the average within the community. There is a particular dip in 2006 that is not replicated in another groups. There was also a distinctive decrease in optimism between 1998 and 2001 from 48% to 21% (more than half).

# Change and differences among Protestants

Pensioner Protestants were more cautious than others about a preference for mixed religion neighbourhoods between the ceasefires and the run up to the Agreement. However in recent years there have been no distinctive differences from the community norm with the same upward trend in preference for mixing from 2001 to 2010. However the picture for Protestants with no educational qualifications is unequivocal. There is a more marked reluctance for mixing in this group that persists across the 20 years without exception. Nonetheless the underlying trend is still a steady rise in the desire for mixing since 2001 to reach a solid majority view in 2010. While the rhetoric around mixing might indicate otherwise, it does not seem to be the case that only the middle classes want mixed neighbourhoods. This desire is increasing among people with little or no education albeit at consistently lower levels.


**Figure 3.33: Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Protestants - no ed quals)**



The universality of the desire for mixed workplaces is striking. Protestants with no educational qualifications were a little less likely to want mixed workplaces during the post Agreement years 1998 to 2004 but recent years have shown an equalising of preferences.


# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.34: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Protestants - no ed quals)**



Protestants with no educational qualifications have traditionally been significantly more reluctant to support shared schooling, particularly in the period post Holy Cross from 2001 to 2005. Between 2007 and 2010 the gap closed considerably. This may be politically related as this change begins to occur in 2006 and 2007. However 2012 figures reveal a move away from mixed schools once again for this group.


**Figure 3.35: % saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Protestants - no ed quals)**



# Change and differences among Protestants

Tolerance to mixed marriages in the family is increasing over time but there have been lower levels of tolerance within this group over the period since 1989. In recent years this group still appears more likely to dislike mixed marriage in the family but again the gap appeared to be closing up until 2012.


**Figure 3.36: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Protestants - no ed quals)**



General attitudes to mixed marriages reflects the same pattern. Historically there has been more of a reluctance to support mixed marriages in society but the gap has become less in recent years, at least up until 2012. In common with all, support is increasing over time and converging with the community norm in 2010. This is again a different trend from Pensioner Protestants where there is not the same convergence with the community norm. The biggest change is a doubling in support from 26% in 1996 to 59% in 2010.


# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.37: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Protestants - no ed quals)**



Protestants with no educational qualifications feel more strongly Unionist than the average. Perhaps not as much as Pensioner Protestants but the pattern is similar. The only difference is that there is closer convergence in 2010 whereas Protestant Pensioners show even more divergence at that time.


**Figure 3.38: Percentage of Protestants describing themselves as Unionist (Protestants - no ed quals)**



# Change and differences among Protestants

Consistent with feeling more Unionist is feeling more British and there is no evidence of convergence here. Over the two decades the underlying trend in Britishness is a slight rise. The Northern Irish identity is increasing over time very slowly and lagging behind the speed of change of the Protestant average. The year 2012 showed a sharp upward turn towards Britishness and away from Northern Irish.


**Figure 3.39: Protestant national identity (Protestants - no ed quals)**



Protestants with no educational qualifications are, in common with the community norm, less prejudiced against people from minority ethnic groups in recent years. Following a high of 45% of this group expressing prejudice this has dropped to below the community norm in 2012 (27%).

# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.40: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of minority ethnic communities (Protestants - no ed quals)**



## Rural Protestants

More pessimistic than average about the state of community relations, rural Protestants<sup>4</sup> have interesting patterns of identity. With the demise of the 'Ulster' identity overall, for rural Protestants 'Britishness' has also diminished from a very high base and the 'Northern Irish' identity grown from a very low base – at least up until 2010. The 'Northern Irish' identity had clearly grown in acceptance for this rural population. However in 2012 a dramatic retrenchment back to old identities is evident. Not back to the heights of 2000 in terms of Britishness but extremely marked nonetheless. Attitudes to mixed-religion schools have historically been distinctly less positive for rural than other Protestants. That is until 2009/10 when the attitudes of rural Protestants began to converge with the community norm for all Protestants only to fall away again in 2012. Attitudes to mixed marriage are also more wary. Rural Protestants are consistently and significantly more reluctant to accept mixed marriage within their families and rural Protestants harbour doubts about mixed marriages in general.

Rural Protestants are another group that tend to be more pessimistic than average about the current state of community relations compared with 5 years ago. However a variable measuring urban or rural background of respondents was only introduced into NILT in 1998 and so more historical data are not available. From 1998 to 2006 rural Protestants were less confident about community relations than other Protestants. In 2007 and 2008 with the engagement of the DUP the situation was more positive but fell away slightly in 2009 and 2010 only to converge again in 2012. Note that the numbers can be small year on year for the rural Protestant community and trends will be volatile for that reason. Year on year change


<sup>4</sup> Rural Protestants are those who describe the place where they live as a farm or home in the country.



# Change and differences among Protestants

should be treated with caution but longer term trends are probably fairly stable. However it is noticeable that the situation in 2001 (at the time of the Holy Cross dispute) was fairly dire with only 13% of Rural Protestants believing that relations were better.


**Figure 3.41: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Rural Protestants)**




Rural Protestants frequently display less optimism about the future than the community norm and again optimism was extremely low in 2001 and 2002 when only a fifth believed that relations would be better in the future. The trend was upward until 2007 but again it has not increased after that year and optimism levels have fallen since then.

# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.42: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Rural Protestants )**



**Figure 3.43 : Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Rural Protestants)**




The small numbers of rural Protestants in some survey years probably accounts for much of the volatility in attitudes to mixed religion neighbourhoods. Attitudes seem to have fluctuated over time and there is no discernible pattern. In 2010 the desire for mixed religion neighbourhoods was higher than the community norm at 87% - it's highest. The underlying

# Change and differences among Protestants

trend-line for rural community preference for shared living seems to be becoming more positive.

Rural attitudes to mixed-religion workplaces are no different from other Protestants and have shown the same kind of increase over the last decade albeit with the 2012 dip in support.


**Figure 3.44: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Rural Protestants)**



In contrast, attitudes to mixed-religion schools have historically been distinctly less positive than other Protestants. That is until 2009 and 2010 when the attitudes of rural Protestants began to converge with the community norm for all Protestants only to retreat sharply again in 2012.


# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.45: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Rural Protestants)**



Attitudes to mixed marriage are also more wary. Rural Protestants are consistently and significantly more reluctant to accept mixed marriage within their families. Rurality does seem to play a role here.


**Figure 3.46: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Rural Protestants)**



# Change and differences among Protestants


Attitudes to mixed marriage in society are consistent insofar as rural Protestants harbour doubts about mixed marriages in general.

**Figure 3.47: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Rural Protestants)**



It is the identity patterns that are particularly interesting in the rural Protestant story. While this is a group that consistently has felt more Unionist than the norm, it is also a group where 'Britishness' has diminished from a particularly high base and where the 'Northern Irish' identity has grown from a very low base up until 2010.


**Figure 3.48: Percentage of Protestants describing themselves as Unionist (Rural Protestants)**



# Change and differences among Protestants

The 'Britishness' fall from 85% to 55% between 2000 and 2010 was very steep and the rise in Northern Irish identity from 7% to 36% is also a remarkably quick change. However in 2012 a dramatic retrenchment back to old identities is evident. Not back to the heights of 2000 in terms of Britishness but extremely marked nonetheless.

**Figure 3.49: Protestant national identity (Rural Protestants)**




Levels of self-reported prejudice against people of minority ethnic communities were perhaps slightly lower than the norm up until 2009 and 2010 when they stabilised at the average level for this community. 2012 sees a drop in levels of prejudice overall and even more so for the rural community of Protestants.

# Change and differences among Protestants



**Figure 3.50: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of minority ethnic communities (Rural Protestants)**




## Urban Protestants

Urban Protestants<sup>5</sup> appear to be particularly sensitive to events and periods of optimism about community relations are interspersed with periods of pessimism. However they are clearly much more resistant to mixed religion neighbourhoods than most others in the wider Protestant community. Although the trend is upwards in terms of preference for mixing it never quite reaches 75% even at its highest point. After a brief period of increasing support for mixed neighbourhoods around the time of the Holy Cross dispute urban Protestants retreated emphatically towards a desire for single religion neighbourhoods, perhaps feeling that this represented safety or simply wanting to be surrounded by only their own. By 2012 only half of urban Protestants said that they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood. Over time there have been clear periods when Urban Protestants were also particularly likely to pull back from mixed-religion workplaces - especially 2003 and 2012. Interestingly, the time of the Holy Cross dispute is one of the few occasions where urban Protestants outweigh the community norm in their preference for mixed schools – quite possibly a sense that this would prevent such situations. The underlying preference for mixed religion schools remains upwards. Urban Protestants have had a unique journey in terms of trends in National identity. While they showed the same decrease in British identity and increasing acceptance of a Northern Irish identity that was common to the Protestant community up until 2008, this has been followed by a period through 2009 and 2010 when the Northern Irish identity began to diminish and the British identity began to gain the ascendance again. 2012 marks a convergence with the community norm. Urban Protestants show a pattern of rapidly increasing levels of self-reported prejudice towards people from

<sup>5</sup> Urban Protestants are those who describe the place where they live as a big city.


# Change and differences among Protestants



minority ethnic communities up until a peak in 2008 when 60% of urban Protestants reported a degree of prejudice. Levels of prejudice fell sharply only to rise again in 2012 ahead of the community norm.

Urban Protestants approved of devolution and were much more positive about the Agreement. Their levels of pessimism and optimism appear to be more volatile and event-affected (for example by Holy Cross) and show the greatest range. The 80% point in 2007 is the highest single optimism point to date among the Protestant wider community. Clearly there was an enormous change between 2003 (21%) and 2007 (80%) with the engagement of the Protestant community behind the DUP and events of Holy Cross in the past. Devolution however does not seem to have delivered much post 2007. However the numbers of urban Protestants (living in ‘a big city’) can be small in some years and this will contribute to the volatility of the figures. The sharp rise in 2012 runs counter to the sentiment amongst other Protestants but given the attitudes expressed on other questions it is possible that this represents a bitter view that a state of relations where tensions are upfront and visible is a good thing.

**Figure 3.51: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Urban Protestants)**




Impressions of relations in the future are again highly volatile but very similar to the previous chart. Peak to trough 1998 to 2001 was 58% to 22% and from 2001 to 2007 it was 22% to 74%. Optimism has fallen away markedly since (74% down to 41%). The size of this drop since 2007 (33%) is very similar to the drop after the Agreement although from a higher point. Urban Protestants appear to be particularly sensitive to events. Again however, sentiment in 2012 runs sharply counter to the community norm.



# Change and differences among Protestants


**Figure 3.52: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Urban Protestants )**



Urban Protestants are much more resistant to mixed religion neighbourhoods than most others in the wider Protestant community. Although the trend is upwards in terms of preference for mixing it never quite reaches 75% even at its highest point. At the time of Holy Cross when pessimism was the order of the day among most other groups there was a rise in the proportion of Urban Protestants who wanted mixed-religion neighbourhoods. Although this fell away again sharply to reach an all time low in 2003 it is interesting to speculate on the reasons for this high. Urban Catholics also show increased support for mixed neighbourhoods during 2001 and 2002. It may be that the urban reaction to Holy Cross was particularly specific and the thought at the time was that mixed urban neighbourhoods would prevent events like this. However post Holy Cross urban Protestants retreated emphatically in the other direction, perhaps feeling that there was safety in single religion neighbourhoods or simply wanting to be surrounded by only their own. By 2012 only half of urban Protestants said that they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood.

# Change and differences among Protestants


**Figure 3.53 : Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Urban Protestants)**



Over time there have been clear periods when Urban Protestants were particularly likely to pull back from mixed-religion workplaces. This includes the period 2003 to 2006 with a particular low in 2003. Attitudes converged in the three years 2007-2010 and plummeted again in 2012. The size of the sample may contribute to the volatility here but nonetheless 2003 and 2012 have been bad years for urban Protestants. Since 2003 there was an upward trend in preference for mixing from 58% to over 90% in 2010. It may be that issues in the workplace are most likely emerge in the cities and have something to do with the type of employment and workplace.


# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.54: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Urban Protestants)**



Attitudes to mixed schooling are again volatile though with an underlying upward trend towards more preference. Only 38% are in favour in 1998 rising to 72% in 2007 though not rising thereafter. The time of the Holy Cross dispute is one of the few occasions where Urban Protestants outweigh the community norm in their preference for mixed schools. Again it seems possible that this is a reaction to the Holy Cross dispute.


**Figure 3.55: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Urban Protestants)**



# Change and differences among Protestants


Attitudes to mixed marriage within the family are again volatile with low tolerance in 2003, 2006 and 2012. A sustained period of increasing tolerance was apparent between 2006 and 2010 (only 13% felt that they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion). However given the volatility of these figures it is unsurprising that 2012 marks another sharp rise in a rejection of intermarriage.

**Figure 3.56: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Urban Protestants)**



Attitudes towards societal mixed marriage are also volatile with a counter-intuitive rise in support between 2010 and 2012.


**Figure 3.57: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Urban Protestants)**




# Change and differences among Protestants

Urban Protestants appear to be significantly more segregated than their rural cousins. Small numbers may again affect the figures but the overall trend is that urban Protestants have fewer friends, neighbours and relatives who are of a different religion.

**Figure 3.58: Percentage saying that all or most of their friends are the same religion as they are (Urban Protestants)**




**Figure 3.59: Percentage saying that all or most of their neighbours are the same religion as they are (Urban Protestants )**



# Change and differences among Protestants

Urban Protestants are little different from the community norm in terms of their Unionist identity but in recent years they have started to diverge from others in terms of their national identity.


**Figure 3.60: Percentage of Protestants describing themselves as Unionist (Urban Protestants)**



British and Northern Irish identities hovered around the community average until around 2008 when the Northern Irish identity began to diminish and the British identity began to gain the ascendance again. Prior to this the Northern Irish identity has been on an upward trend and the British identity was decreasing. However 2012 marks a convergence for the present.


# Change and differences among Protestants

**Figure 3.61: Protestant national identity (Urban Protestants)**



Urban Protestants show a pattern of rapidly increasing levels of self-reported prejudice towards people from minority ethnic communities up until a peak in 2008 when 60% of urban Protestants reported a degree of prejudice. Since then (and subsequent to the episode where members of the Roma community were forced to flee their homes in 2009) levels of prejudice fell sharply only to rise again in 2012 ahead of the community norm.

**Figure 3.62: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of minority ethnic communities (Urban Protestants)**





## Summary and conclusions

1. Young Protestants have become markedly more pessimistic about inter-community relations in recent years. In 2008, 72% said relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago. By 2012 this had fallen to 48% (fall of 33%). This compares with a much less dramatic decline among Protestants in general from 63% to 54% over the same period.
2. In 2008 61% of young Protestants said relations between Protestants and Catholics would be better in the future. In 2012 only 35% said the same. The decline among the general Protestant population was much less pronounced (from 61% to 45%).
3. Young Protestants are 5-10% less likely than the general Protestant population to see mixed neighbourhoods as desirable. There has been a steep rise in wariness around this issue between 2010 and 2012 reversing a general slow upward trend over decades.
4. Support for mixed workplaces in 2012 remains at 80% but this too represents a marked drop in enthusiasm since 2010 and is the lowest since devolution. Young people are only slightly below the general average for Protestants.
5. Support for mixed schooling also fell in 2010-12 back to levels last seen in 1998 and reversing the general trend in growth between 2004 and 2010.
6. Young Protestants are also more positive about societal intermarriage or 'more mixing in people's marriages' which continues on an upward trend since 2005. A particularly significant drop in objections to a relative entering a mixed marriage was recorded in 2009 and 2010. Overall the fall in objections to mixed marriage among Protestants is from 40% in 1998 to 17% in 2010.
7. Following a steep decline in the number of young Protestants describing themselves as Unionist between 2006 and 2010, NILT recorded a new jump in 2010-12. However over a 20 year period the numbers have strayed from 43% (in 2010) to 70% (in 1998) and have returned to 54%. So we can say that 45% are firmly Unionist while a further 20-25% of young Protestants may describe themselves as Unionist under different circumstances. Unionist identity seems to be very affected by political events, becoming more important between 1991-93, 1995-98, 2000-03 and 2010-12 and declining markedly between 1998-2000 and between 2008-10.
8. In 1998, 18% of Protestants described themselves as 'Northern Irish'. By 2010 this had risen to 47%. The percentage describing themselves as British fell from 69% to 43% over the same period. Between 2010 and 2012 this went into marked reverse where 60% described themselves as British and 35% described themselves as Northern Irish. In both cases the movements are more extreme among young people than among the Protestant population in general.




## Change and differences among Protestants



9. The percentage of Protestants saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of other ethnic minority communities has varied between 30% and 50% since 2008 although it appears to have fallen in more recent years 2008-2012.
10. The years 2010-12 have seen a sharp decline in optimism about progress over the last five years in community relations and optimism about the next five years among pensioners.
11. There has been a gentle decline in those considering themselves Unionist among Protestant pensioners from 85% in 1990 to 73% in 2012. National identity is almost static with 73% declaring themselves British in 2012, a return to the position in 2002. A Northern Irish identity is less prominent among the over 65s. A rise from 14% in 2002 to 32% in 2008 fell back to 24% in 2012.
12. Prejudice against ethnic minorities runs between 35% and 42% among older Protestants since 2006.
13. Churchgoing Protestants mirror the community norm in many key measures of attitudes. They are slightly quicker than most Protestants to voice a desire for mixed religion neighbourhoods and mixed workplaces though less enthusiastic in support for mixed religion schools. Where churchgoing Protestants tend to pull away from the community norm is in a reluctance to accept marrying outside the fold. Acceptance is increasing over the decades but not at the same speed as is the case for the Protestant community in general.
14. Churchgoing Protestants have been slightly more Unionist historically but 2012 marked the first year where the proportion willing to call themselves Unionist fell below the community norm. While there have been periods when a 'British' identity has waned and a 'Northern Irish' identity has taken its place, the years since 2008 indicate a return to Britishness away from Northern Irish.
15. Between 32% and 42% of churchgoing Protestants described themselves as 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of minority ethnic communities between 2006 and 2012. This is fairly reflective of the community norm.
16. Having no qualifications is not a significant factor in determining attitudes in the Protestant community compared to the impact of age. Young people are more likely to have concerns in relation to community relations issues and the over 65s have more distinct views on issues of identity and nationality.
17. Between 27% and 45% of Protestants with no qualifications admit to being 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of minority ethnic communities.
18. Rural Protestants matched the views and trends of the Protestant community in general on community relations issues. The most notable variation is in attitudes to mixed marriage where a markedly higher percentage said that they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion.

## Change and differences among Protestants



19. In 2010 55% of rural Protestants said they were British and 36% described themselves as Northern Irish. In 2012, the equivalent figures were 77% and 12% reversing a trend that had been persistent from 2000.
20. Among rural Protestants the percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of minority ethnic communities varied from 29% in 2012 to 43% in 2008. This broadly mirrors a community average.
21. Overall, attitudes to mixed marriage, living and schooling are common across the community and do not appear to be radically affected by social subgroup.
22. Pessimism about community relations has increased in 2010-12 in all groups, but very strongly among young people. By comparison, the level of educational qualification appears to have a much less pronounced influence on attitudes.
23. Attitudes to identity changed considerably among young people and among Protestants in rural areas between 2010 and 2012, reversing trends. Attitudes to mixed marriage have softened considerably in the past decade among Protestants.
24. There is worrying evidence of deterioration in attitudes to community relations and sharing among Urban Protestants since 2010 including a stark drop in the proportion of people saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace from 91% to 56% in 2012 and the proportion saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school falling from 72% to 56% in the same period.
25. The percentage of urban protestants saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people of minority ethnic communities reached 60% in 2008. Although it has since fallen back, it remains at 44% in 2012. This is well above both the Northern Ireland and the average of Protestants in general.



## Chapter 4: Change and differences among Catholics

### Young Catholics


*Catholic young people (aged between 18 and 30) really believed in the Agreement and the fall in optimism about community relations after this period appears sharper because of it. In common with young Protestants there has been a fall in confidence since 2007. Although the proportions of all Catholics advocating mixed religion neighbourhoods has always been high, since 2003 young Catholics appear to be pulling away from this. Attitudes to mixed marriage in the family are equally as tolerant as they are within the Catholic community as a whole. Only 8% of young Catholics recorded an objection in 2012. Young Catholics appear to be increasingly more segregated than their older counterparts – at least in terms of friends. Like most Catholics the ‘Nationalist’ identity had its peak in the 1998/99 period and has been falling since then. Young Catholics have also been discernibly more reluctant than others to embrace that identity, falling to a particular low of 35% in 2012. In terms of national identity young Catholics have not embraced the Northern Irish identity in the way that young Protestants have. On the contrary the underlying trend is a slowly increasing Irish identity and away from a Northern Irish identity. This has by no means translated into increased support for a United Ireland. Following the ceasefires in 1994 70% of young Catholics felt that the best long-term future for Northern Ireland was in a united Ireland. However since then, in common with most Catholics, this view has lost strength. While young Catholics may feel increasingly Irish they do not necessarily feel that a united Ireland is the best option for Northern Ireland.*

Young Catholics display the same pattern as the overall Catholic population insofar as a belief that relations were improving increased from 1993 through the ceasefire period to the signing of the Agreement. A fall in confidence occurred after that, culminating in a low at the time of Holy Cross and then a slow climb upwards until 2008. Recent years have seen another fall in confidence. However there are some small distinctive differences within the young Catholic community. Catholic young people really believed in the Agreement and the fall in belief after this period appears sharper because of it. Also, while young people tended to have slightly more belief than the community norm in the early years, this has not been the case post Holy Cross. Although the belief that community relations are improving has been growing within this group it has not regained the faith displayed in 1999. Since 2007 young Catholic belief in better community relations has diminished more sharply than the norm. There is clear evidence in these charts that the impact of political developments is not always the same. The ceasefires had impact on both communities, the Agreement was very popular among young Catholics but there was deep depression among rural Protestants after the Agreement. There has been a general improvement to 2007, particularly marked in the Protestant community. Since 2007 young people in both communities have shown a fall in confidence about community relations, most marked in the Protestant community.

# Change and differences among Catholics



**Figure 4.1: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Young Catholics)**




Young Catholic pessimism and disillusion since devolution is very marked falling to around 30% (the belief that relations will improve) at the time of the Holy Cross dispute in 2001. The proportion expecting better relations in the future was lower in 2010 (45%) than in 2002, which is when Protestant optimism rose. The high points of young Catholic optimism in 1995 and 1998 have not been reached since. Relations are so bad in 2012 that many Catholics seem to believe things can only get better. However, young Catholics remain less optimistic than average.


# Change and differences among Catholics



**Figure 4.2: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Young Catholics)**



**Figure 4.3: % saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Young Catholics)**




Although the proportions of Catholics advocating mixed religion neighbourhoods has always been high, since 2003 young Catholics have been pulling away from shared neighbourhoods. The figures now lag behind those of young Protestants who themselves have also tended to be less committed to mixed neighbourhoods.

# Change and differences among Catholics




**Figure 4.4: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Young Catholics)**



The proportion of young Catholics supporting mixed workplaces did not fall below 80% until 2012 however there has been increasing reticence since 2008 and occasional dips below the community average since 2003.

**Figure 4.5: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Young Catholics)**




# Change and differences among Catholics



The preference of young Catholics for mixed schools follows the broad trends but drops sharply in 2009 when only 43% wanted shared schools. This is lower than any figure in the Protestant tables, however preferences are back to the community norm by 2010 and 2012.

Attitudes to mixed marriage in the family are equally as tolerant as they are within the Catholic community as a whole. Only 8% of young Catholics recorded an objection in 2012. Support for mixed marriages in general is not substantially different from the community norm. While young Protestants appear as more liberal than their community norm this is not the case for young Catholics. However Catholics are more tolerant in general than Protestants.


**Figure 4.6: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Young Catholics)**



# Change and differences among Catholics




**Figure 4.7: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Young Catholics)**



Young Catholics appear to be increasingly more segregated than their older counterparts – at least in terms of friends if not neighbours. Since 2005 young Catholics are increasingly likely to report that all or most of their friends are of the same religion as themselves.

**Figure 4.8: Percentage saying that all or most of their friends are the same religion as they are (Young Catholics)**






# Change and differences among Catholics




**Figure 4.9: Percentage saying that all or most of their neighbours are the same religion as they are (Young Catholics)**



Like most Catholics the ‘Nationalist’ identity had its peak in the 1998/99 period for young Catholics and has been falling since then. Young Catholics have also been discernibly more reluctant than others to embrace that identity, falling to a particular low of 35% in 2012.

**Figure 4.10: Percentage of Catholics describing themselves as Nationalist (Young Catholics)**




# Change and differences among Catholics



In terms of national identity young Catholics have not embraced the Northern Irish identity in the way that young Protestants have. On the contrary the underlying trend is a slowly increasing Irish and away from a Northern Irish identity. In 1996 Catholic young people identified equally as Irish and Northern Irish but this appears to have been a one year phenomenon in the statistics.

**Figure 4.11: Catholic national identity (Young Catholics)**




Following the ceasefires in 1994 70% of young Catholics felt that the best long-term future for Northern Ireland was in a united Ireland. However since then, in common with most Catholics, this view has lost strength. While young Catholics may feel increasingly Irish they do not necessarily feel that a united Ireland is the best option for Northern Ireland.

Between 2007 and 2009 young Catholics showed increasing support for the devolution option but by 2012 this had fallen away to only 27% with a further 27% saying that they didn't know what was the best long-term future for Northern Ireland. This suggests that confronted with questions of constitutional preference, many Catholics continue to be influenced by events and pragmatic judgement rather than fundamental loyalties and may suggest that support for devolution has been adversely affected by divisive disputes over flags.

# Change and differences among Catholics




**Figure 4.12: Constitutional preferences of Catholics (Young Catholics)**



Levels of self-reported prejudice against people of minority ethnic groups tend to be slightly lower for young Catholics until 2009 when they peak at around 35%. Possibly there was some lack of sympathy with the Roma community after the dispute in the summer. However levels have since fallen back sharply to below the community norm.

**Figure 4.13: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities (Young Catholics)**



# Change and differences among Catholics




## Catholic pensioners

Up until the signing of the Agreement, older Catholics (aged 65 or over) were distinctly more wary of mixed religion neighbourhoods, but since 1999 levels have been similar to the community norm. The contrast with young Catholics in more recent years is quite stark. However, against a pattern of generally increasing tolerance, older Catholics stand out in their frequent dislike of mixed marriages in the family which shows a slight rise since first measured in 1989. Over time, older Catholics have been consistently more likely than the community average to describe themselves as 'Nationalist'. There has also been a greater stability among this group in terms of a preference for a united Ireland – at least up until 2012. Forty five per cent of Catholic pensioners in 2010 would still have preferred to see a United Ireland. In 2012 preferences had converged on the community norm.

Older Catholics were fairly average in terms of their optimism that things were getting better – up until the Agreement. Since then levels of optimism have been largely below the community norm. A sharp rise in optimism between 2008 and 2009 was not sustained and 2012 levels are once again slightly lower than the norm. Optimism about the future broadly mirrors that of the community in general although views among older Catholics in 2012 were rather more bleak.


**Figure 4.14: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Catholic pensioners)**



# Change and differences among Catholics




**Figure 4.15: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Catholic pensioners)**



Up until the signing of the Agreement, older Catholics were distinctly more wary of mixed religion neighbourhoods, but since 1999 levels have been similar to the community norm and mostly above 85% from 2006 to 2010. During this period older Catholics appear generally more committed to this than the community average and the contrast with young Catholics is stark.

**Figure 4.16: Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Catholic pensioners)**




# Change and differences among Catholics



The preference for mixed-religion workplaces is parallel to the wider community and highly stable at above 90% until the sharp drop in 2012.

**Figure 4.17: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Catholic pensioners)**




The preference for mixed-religion schools among pensioner Catholics is slowly increasing parallel to the community norm but, on average, at slightly lower levels. Overall there is greater Catholic reticence when it comes to mixed schools and older Catholics are sometimes more against this than the average for this community.

# Change and differences among Catholics




**Figure 4.18: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Catholic pensioners)**



Against a pattern of general tolerance, older Catholics stand out in their dislike of mixed marriages in the family. This is volatile over time but shows a slight rise since first measured in 1989 going counter to the generally increasing tolerance within the Catholic community. Levels in 2012 though are close to the community norm.

**Figure 4.19: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Catholic pensioners)**




# Change and differences among Catholics



There is also a significant gap between tolerance of most Catholics towards increasing societal intermarriage and the views of pensioner Catholics. However here there is a distinct upwards trend in tolerance in recent years and levels in favour of mixed marriage in society have risen from 41% in 2005 to 71% in 2012.

**Figure 4.20: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Catholic pensioners)**




In other social contacts Catholic pensioners are generally more likely to report friends from other communities than the community average. There are few differences with regard to neighbours.




# Change and differences among Catholics



**Figure 4.21: Percentage saying that all or most of their friends are the same religion as they are (Catholic pensioners)**




**Figure 4.22: Percentage saying that all or most of their neighbours are the same religion as they are (Catholic pensioners)**



Over time, older Catholics have been consistently more likely than the community average to describe themselves as ‘Nationalist’. Only in 2001 and 2003 did they drop below the norm. Again this peaked just after the Agreement in 1999 when the label may have been in most common usage.


# Change and differences among Catholics

**Figure 4.23: Percentage of Catholics describing themselves as Nationalist (Catholic pensioners)**



However there are few variations from the norm in terms of national identity and the trend-lines for older Catholics are largely flat with a characteristic rise in Irishness and drop in Northern Irishness in 2012.


**Figure 4.24: Catholic national identity (Catholic pensioners)**



# Change and differences among Catholics

Interestingly there was greater stability among this group in terms of a preference for a united Ireland up until 2012. While the long-term trend for Catholics overall is a slow ebbing of support, older Catholics have delayed in falling away. Forty five per cent of Catholic pensioners in 2010 would still have preferred to see a United Ireland. In 2012 preferences had converged on the community norm. In contrast to attitudes among young people, support for devolution among older Catholics appears to have steadily risen and by 2012 was the most popular single long term constitutional solution.

**Figure 4.25: Constitutional preferences of Catholics (Catholic pensioners)**




Self-reported prejudice among Catholic pensioners against people from minority ethnic groups increased markedly between 1994 and 2007 to above the community norm. However between 2007 and 2012 it dropped below average. This is against a background of lower levels of reported prejudice among the Catholic community than the Protestant community.

# Change and differences among Catholics



**Figure 4.26: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities (Catholic pensioners)**



## Churchgoing Catholics

*Churchgoing Catholics (who attend church at least once a week) are remarkably representative of their community as a whole on a wide variety of measures. This is exemplified in both optimism that community relations are better than in the past (between 2001 and 2010) and will be better in the future. From 2001 onwards the level of optimism about the future is very slightly greater among churchgoing Catholics than the norm but otherwise it is marked how closely churchgoers mirror the broader community. Similarly, the desire for mixed-religion neighbourhoods and workplaces are high, consistent over time and the attitudes of churchgoers are remarkably similar to those of the community as a whole. Constitutional preferences also largely mirror the general trend among Catholics.*


*Where churchgoers diverge is perhaps unsurprisingly in their desire for mixed-religion schools. Churchgoers are noticeably less enthusiastic about their children attending mixed schools. This is particularly apparent in later years. And although objections to mixed marriages within the Catholic community as a whole are very low, churchgoers have historically been slightly more likely to express their doubts. Like the rest of the Northern Ireland population they have become less disapproving over time but the speed of change is not as fast as that for the Catholic average. Interestingly, disapproval by Catholic churchgoers is not as marked as that of Catholic pensioners. Consistent with this is a lack of enthusiasm for societal intermarriage although here the approval trend since 2005 shows quite a steep rise for this group and some conversion by 2012. Churchgoing Catholics are also markedly more likely to consider themselves as Nationalists. In 2010 a full two thirds of churchgoing Catholics considered themselves to be Nationalists.*

# Change and differences among Catholics



Despite the decrease in church attendance over the last decade and increasing secularisation, it is still the case that religious Catholics are extremely representative of their community as a whole. This is exemplified in both optimism that community relations are better than in the past (in the years from 2001 to 2010) and will be better in the future. The characteristic dip in optimism between 2010 and 2012 is evident.

**Figure 4.27: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Churchgoing Catholics)**




From 2001 onwards the level of optimism about the future is very slightly greater among churchgoing Catholics than the norm at least up until 2012 when it drops lower for almost the first time - but otherwise it is marked how closely churchgoers mirror the broader community.

# Change and differences among Catholics




**Figure 4.28: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Churchgoing Catholics)**



Similarly, the desire for mixed-religion neighbourhoods and workplaces is high, consistent over time with little volatility and the attitudes of churchgoers are remarkably similar to those of the community as a whole.


**Figure 4.29: Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Churchgoing Catholics)**



# Change and differences among Catholics




**Figure 4.30: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Churchgoing Catholics)**



Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is in the desire for mixed-religion schools where the Catholic religious diverge from the community average. Although subject to approximately the same peaks and troughs, churchgoers are visibly less enthusiastic about mixed schools. This is particularly noticeable in later years and 2010-2012 may signal a further trend away.

**Figure 4.31: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Churchgoing Catholics)**




# Change and differences among Catholics



Although objections to mixed marriages within the Catholic community as a whole are very low, churchgoers have historically been slightly more likely to express their doubts. Like the rest of the Northern Ireland population they have become less disapproving over time but the speed of change is not as fast as that for the Catholic average, although there is a convergence of opinion in 2012. Interestingly, disapproval by Catholic churchgoers is not as marked as that of Catholic pensioners.

**Figure 4.32: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Churchgoing Catholics)**




Consistent with this is attitudes to societal intermarriage. Clearly Catholic churchgoers show a visible lack of enthusiasm compared with the community norm. However, here the approval trend since 2005 shows quite a steep rise for this group and some conversion by 2012.




# Change and differences among Catholics

**Figure 4.33: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Churchgoing Catholics)**



Churchgoing Catholics are, however, markedly more likely to consider themselves as Nationalists. The embracing of this identity rises to a peak following the Agreement in 1999 and falls off thereafter until 2009, but for Churchgoing Catholics this is not at the same pace as for Catholics in general and levels remain high during 2009-2012. In 2010 a full two thirds of churchgoing Catholics considered themselves to be Nationalists.

**Figure 4.34: Percentage of Catholics describing themselves as Nationalist (Churchgoing Catholics)**




# Change and differences among Catholics



National identity, in contrast, is not particularly different from patterns for Catholics in general. There have been periods of time when an Irish identity has been favoured more than average but this is not marked. The rise in Irish identity characteristic of 2012 is even more pronounced among the Catholic church-going population.


**Figure 4.35: Catholic national identity (Churchgoing Catholics)**



Similarly, constitutional preferences for this group largely mirror the general trend among Catholics with a slightly higher preference for a United Ireland in some recent years but not significantly so.


# Change and differences among Catholics

**Figure 4.36: Constitutional preferences of Catholics (Churchgoing Catholics)**



Attitudes to people from minority ethnic groups are largely the same for churchgoing Catholics as they are for the general trend. The trend is one of increasing self-reported prejudice but no more and no less than other Catholics.

**Figure 4.37: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities (Churchgoing Catholics)**





## Catholics with no educational qualifications


*Unlike Protestants with no educational qualifications, Catholics in this group do not hold especially distinctive attitudes. In terms of optimism that things are better than they were five years ago there is no doubt that those with no qualifications are less optimistic in general. Over time there is evidence that Catholics with no qualifications were slightly less inclined to favour mixed-religion neighbourhoods than the community norm and 2012 shows a dive in both the desire for mixed-religion neighbourhoods and workplaces. Qualifications, or the lack of them, appeared to play almost no role in the debate over mixed schooling until 2012 which marks a notable pulling away of support. There is a noticeable effect of educational level in terms of tolerance of mixed marriage in the family. Catholics with little education are more likely to dislike mixed marriage and the trend here is flat compared with the downward trend in this attitude for the Catholic population as a whole. Nonetheless disapproval levels are not especially high with a peak of around 21%. Catholics with no educational qualifications are more likely to self-identify as 'Nationalist' although the popularity of this identity has waxed and waned in parallel with that of the Catholic population in general. Consistent with this is a slight preference for an Irish identity and less favouring of the Northern Irish identity again with 2012 marking a shift towards Irishness and away from Northern Irish. There is little variation in constitutional preferences for this group versus the community norm though over the last decade this group has been slightly less likely to relinquish a preference for a United Ireland. However this preference is nonetheless on a downward trend since 2007 albeit with a slight increase in support in 2012.*

There is no doubt that those with no qualifications are less optimistic in general than the wider population. This is true in the Catholic community as well as the Protestant community. In terms of optimism for the future there also appears to be slightly more pessimism among the less qualified but not so marked as among Protestants. However note that while most Catholics in 2012 feel that things will get better (albeit because they maybe feel they can't get worse) Catholics with no qualifications do not share this sentiment. This may be because the 2010 reading was a 'blip' but it is nonetheless worth noting.


# Change and differences among Catholics



**Figure 4.38: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Catholics - no ed quals)**



**Figure 4.39: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Catholics - no ed quals)**




Over time there is evidence that Catholics with no qualifications were slightly less inclined to favour mixed-religion neighbourhoods than the community norm. Although 2010 may have been a blip against this trend the 2012 figures show a dive in the desire for mixed-religion neighbourhoods.

# Change and differences among Catholics




**Figure 4.40: Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Catholics - no ed quals)**



There is also clearly some reticence about mixed-religion workplaces among this group with a noticeable plummeting of support in 2012.


**Figure 4.41: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Catholics - no ed quals)**



Interestingly, qualifications or the lack of them appear to play almost no role in the debate over mixed schooling until 2012. The attitudes of those with little education were highly similar to those of all Catholics in general. 2012 marks a notable pulling away of support.


# Change and differences among Catholics

**Figure 4.42: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Catholics - no ed quals)**



In contrast, there is an effect of educational level in terms of tolerance of mixed marriage in the family. Catholics with little education are more likely to dislike mixed marriage and the trend in this respect is flat. Nonetheless disapproval levels are not especially high with a peak of around 21%.

**Figure 4.43: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Catholics - no ed quals)**




# Change and differences among Catholics



Consistent with the above is a lack of enthusiasm over intermarriage in society more generally. Those Catholics with little education are markedly less in favour of mixing. There is more of an upward trend in approval on this measure than on the previous one but this group is still much slower to embrace societal intermarriage

**Figure 4.44: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Catholics - no ed quals)**




There is very little difference (according to educational level) in segregation with regard to friends and family.




# Change and differences among Catholics

**Figure 4.45: Percentage saying that all or most of their friends are the same religion as they are (Catholics - no ed quals)**




**Figure 4.46: Percentage saying that all or most of their neighbours are the same religion as they are (Catholics - no ed quals)**



However there are quite consistent (though not large) differences in relation to identity measures for this group. Catholics with no educational qualifications are more likely to self-identify as 'Nationalist' although the popularity of this identity has waxed and waned in parallel with that of the Catholic population in general.


# Change and differences among Catholics

**Figure 4.47: Percentage of Catholics describing themselves as Nationalist (Catholics - no ed quals)**



Consistent with this is a slight preference for an Irish identity and less favouring of the Northern Irish identity though again these differences have not been large. 2012 again marks a move away from Northern Irish towards an Irish identity.


**Figure 4.48: Catholic national identity (Catholics - no ed quals)**



# Change and differences among Catholics

There is little variation in constitutional preferences for this group versus the community norm until some divergence around 2003. From this point in time, Catholics with no qualifications have been slightly less likely to relinquish a preference for a United Ireland. However this preference is nonetheless on a downward trend since 2007 albeit with some slight increase in support in 2012. Perhaps surprisingly, the increase in support for devolution appears to have been most strongly reflected among this group rather than any other. This may interact with traditionally strong support for Sinn Féin in working class and deprived communities.


**Figure 4.49: Constitutional preferences of Catholics (Catholics - no ed quals)**



In terms of attitudes towards minority ethnic groups, Catholics with no qualifications are little different to the community norm. There was a little more reported prejudice in 2005 and 2007 but since then if anything prejudice levels are lower among Catholics with few qualifications.

# Change and differences among Catholics

**Figure 4.50: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities (Catholics - no ed quals)**



## Rural Catholics

Rural Catholics<sup>6</sup> do not stand out as a particularly visible group within the Catholic community. Over the time period rural Catholics are sometimes more optimistic than the general community trend, believing (especially in recent years) that relations have improved. This is in contrast with rural Protestants who are distinctly less optimistic than their community trend. There is a particularly steep rise in optimism since 2001 perhaps indicating that rural Catholics appear to like devolution more than other Catholics. Optimism about the future has been varied over the time-period but overall not very different from the community norm.

Preference for mixed religion neighbourhoods is somewhat volatile (as in the figures for rural Protestants) but there have been periods where rural Catholics appeared markedly more in favour of mixed –religion neighbourhoods. The five years from 2000 to 2005 being one of them. In 2005, 92% of rural Catholics said that they wanted shared living. The drop in the preference for mixed living and workplaces in 2012 which is characteristic of Catholics in general is not evident for rural Catholics. Otherwise, preference for mixed religion workplaces and schools is not very different from the trend (although small numbers make for some volatility).

In general there are more objections among rural Catholics to mixed marriages in the family, but this is not consistently the case. The same downward trend in disapproval is clear.

<sup>6</sup> Rural Catholics are those who describe the place where they live as a farm or home in the country.

# Change and differences among Catholics




Consistent with this is slightly higher levels of disapproval for societal intermarriage although the underlying trend is one of increasing support.

There is a tendency for rural Catholics to be more willing to describe themselves as Nationalist but equally there is a slight rise in the 'Northern Irish' identity in recent years. Constitutional preferences among rural Catholics were almost identical to the community norm in the decade from 2000 to 2010. However rural Catholics along with Catholics with no educational qualification are the two groups where preference for a United Ireland rose most between 2010 and 2012.

The number of rural Catholics in the sample can be small year on year and therefore short-term trends are likely to be less reliable. This is true to some extent for most of the categories defining the kind of place that respondents lived in.

Over the time period rural Catholics are sometimes more optimistic than the general community trend, believing that relations have got better, whereas rural Protestants are distinctly less optimistic than their community norm. For example the period 2005/6. However trends are not that different from the norm with a distinct rise in optimism since 2001 perhaps indicating that rural Catholics appear to like devolution more than other Catholics.


**Figure 4.51 : Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Rural Catholics )**



Optimism about the future has been varied over the time-period. Not very different from the norm but periods of higher optimism and a distinct period of gloom following the Agreement in 1998 up until devolution in 2001.


# Change and differences among Catholics

**Figure 4.52: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Rural Catholics )**



Preference for mixed religion neighbourhoods is somewhat volatile (as are the figures for rural Protestants) but there have been periods where rural Catholics appeared markedly more in favour of mixed – religion neighbourhoods. The five years from 2000 to 2005 being one of them. In 2005, 92% of rural Catholics said that they wanted shared living. The drop in the preference for mixed living in 2012 which is characteristic of Catholics in general is not evident for rural Catholics.

**Figure 4.53: Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Rural Catholics)**




# Change and differences among Catholics




Preference for mixed religion workplaces is not very different from the trend. The dip in 1999 will be because exceptionally low numbers in that category make the estimates unreliable. Once again rural Catholics seem to be immune to the fear or reticence that most Catholics in 2012 felt about working in mixed workplaces.

**Figure 4.54: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Rural Catholics)**



Preference for mixed religion schools does not appear to be highly connected to politics and small numbers may explain the volatility around the overall trend.

**Figure 4.55: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Rural Catholics)**




# Change and differences among Catholics




In general there is more objection among rural Catholics to mixed marriage in the family, but this is not consistently the case. The same downward trend in disapproval is clear.

**Figure 4.56: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Rural Catholics)**



Consistent with this is slightly higher levels of disapproval for societal intermarriage but with the caveat that numbers tend to be small year on year. Again the trend is one of increasing support for intermarriage.

**Figure 4.57: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Rural Catholics)**






# Change and differences among Catholics




Again small numbers make measures of identity less reliable but nonetheless there is a tendency for rural Catholics to be more willing to describe themselves as Nationalist. The very high peak in 1999 reflects exceptionally small numbers that year.

**Figure 4.58: Percentage of Catholics describing themselves as Nationalist (Rural Catholics )**



Since 2006 there has been a rise in the 'Northern Irish' identity although 'Irish' also reached a peak in 2007 only to decline since then. 2012 marked a move away from the Northern Irish identity.


**Figure 4.59: Catholic national identity (Rural Catholics)**



# Change and differences among Catholics

Constitutional preferences among rural Catholics were almost identical to the community norm in the decade from 2000 to 2010. However rural Catholics along with Catholics with no educational qualification are the two groups where preference for a United Ireland rose most between 2010 and 2012. Perhaps more surprisingly, there the survey has picked up a sharp decline in support for devolution since 2009 with a strong downward trend. If this trend were to continue, or if attitudes were to spread across the whole community, Catholic disaffection from devolution may become an important political factor.

**Figure 4.60: Constitutional preferences of Rural Catholics**




There are no marked differences between the attitudes of rural Catholics and other Catholics in their self-reported prejudice towards people from minority ethnic communities.

# Change and differences among Catholics



**Figure 4.61: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities (Rural Catholics)**



## Urban Catholics

Urban Catholics<sup>7</sup> are a distinctive group. Indeed urban location appears to differentiate Catholic expectation, attitude and opinion much more clearly than any other single variable. There is much more pessimism about community relations and as a group urban Catholics appear unimpressed by devolution. They are notably more likely than other Catholics to retain a preference for a United Ireland.

Historically, urban Catholics were much less likely than other Catholics to want to live in mixed-religion areas. This preference softened over the last decade reaching convergence with the norm in 2010. However the 2012 reading indicates a massive withdrawal of support for mixed living. The underlying trend remains upward however. Preferences for a mixed-religion workplace were also below average among the urban Catholic population though again there was a strong upward trend between 2001 and 2010 until 2012 marked again a time of retrenchment. Preference for mixed schooling again shows that fears are probably greater in the urban area. Urban Catholics tend to be more reluctant than the community norm to support mixed schools but again views had converged around 2007. Since then support has fallen away. The trend remains very slightly upwards overall.

In common with most Catholics, there is very little objection to mixed marriage in the family from urban Catholics. Again attitudes show volatility but there is no pattern of consistently more objection. Urban Catholics have had very slightly more objections to societal intermarriage in the past than did Catholics in general but the differences are small and the

<sup>7</sup> Urban Catholics are those who describe the place where they live as a big city.

## Change and differences among Catholics



*same upward trend in favourability is clear. It is worth noting that urban Catholics tend to have particularly segregated friendship and family patterns.*

*Although urban Catholics are historically much more likely to consider themselves as Nationalists than are other Catholics, this identity appears to have slipped somewhat in 2012. Like their Protestant counterparts, Urban Catholics are markedly less Northern Irish than general trend with a marked decline since 2001. 'Irishness' rose after 1998 and has remained very dominant. In 2012 81% of urban Catholics described themselves as Irish compared with 68% of all Catholics. In the past they have been notably more likely than other Catholics to retain a preference for a United Ireland but this has declined markedly in recent years. Despite the surge in Irishness, the 2012 drop in those wanting to call themselves Nationalist and the accompanying falling away of support for a United Ireland indicates a complex picture among this group almost certainly tied up with a response to the political events of 2012.*


It is urban Catholics who most strongly retained a preference for a united Ireland as the best long-term future for Northern Ireland. The same downward trend is apparent but there was perhaps more reluctance within this community to settle for devolution. Forty two per cent of urban Catholics in 2010 stated their preference for a united Ireland compared with 32% of all Catholics. However most notable in 2012 is that despite the surge in Irishness, the drop in those wanting to call themselves Nationalist and the falling away of support for a United Ireland indicates a complex picture among this group almost certainly tied up with a response to the political events of 2012.

In contrast with rural Catholics, urban Catholics have distinct views. Optimism is lower in terms of the numbers who feel that relations are better than five years ago. Again there are volatile figures reflecting small numbers on occasion, but the general picture is of a group of Catholics who are less optimistic and appear unimpressed by devolution. The main significant peak is in 1998 with the signing of the Agreement. A similar peak of optimism occurred in 1998 in relation to the proportion of urban Catholics who felt that things would be better again in the future. However since then, views have been more pessimistic than the norm apart from a sudden upturn in 2010.


# Change and differences among Catholics



**Figure 4.62: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (Urban Catholics)**



**Figure 4.63 : Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future (Urban Catholics )**




Historically, urban Catholics were starkly less likely than other Catholics to want to live in mixed-religion areas, but the change over time in this figure has been very marked indeed and attitudes softened almost reaching convergence with the norm in 2010. The contrast with rural Catholics is marked. At its lowest in 2000 only 45% of urban Catholics said that they would prefer to live in a mixed religion area. By 2009 and 2010 this figure had risen to

# Change and differences among Catholics



76%. However the preference for mixed living and indeed mixed workplaces effectively fell off a cliff in 2012.

**Figure 4.64 : Percentage saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood (Urban Catholics)**




Historically, preferences for a mixed-religion workplace were also below average among the urban Catholic population. Again a volatile indicator, which either reflects small numbers in some years or illustrated that fears are possibly more related to events in the urban area. Nonetheless it is notable that preference for mixed-religion workplaces among urban Catholics was on a distinct upward trend in the decade 2001 to 2010 peaking at 90% but this has fallen back drastically in 2012 to 62%.

# Change and differences among Catholics




**Figure 4.65: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace (Urban Catholics)**



Preference for mixed schooling again shows that fears are probably greater in the urban area. Urban Catholics tend to be more reluctant than the community norm to support mixed schools but again views had converged around 2007. Since then support has fallen away. The trend remains very slightly upwards overall.


**Figure 4.66: Percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion school (Urban Catholics)**



# Change and differences among Catholics


In common with most Catholics, there is very little objection to mixed marriage in the family from urban Catholics. Again attitudes show volatility but there is perhaps a rise in objections since 2008.

**Figure 4.67: Percentage saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion (Urban Catholics)**



Urban Catholics have had very slightly more objections to societal intermarriage in the past than did Catholics in general but the differences are small and the same upward trend in favourability is clear.

**Figure 4.68: Percentage in favour of more mixing in people's marriages (Urban Catholics)**






# Change and differences among Catholics




It is worth noting that urban Catholics tend to have particularly segregated friendship and family patterns. Here the volatility in what tends to be a very stable measure is almost certainly because of small numbers in particular survey years.

**Figure 4.69: Percentage saying that all or most of their friends are the same religion as they are (Urban Catholics)**



**Figure 4.70: Percentage saying that all or most of their neighbours are the same religion as they are (Urban Catholics)**




# Change and differences among Catholics



Urban Catholics are more likely to consider themselves as Nationalists than are other Catholics. The now familiar peak in this identity post-Agreement is clear with 79% of urban Catholics self-defining as Nationalists. Although the same falling off in favour of this identity has occurred to some extent it is noticeable that there was a rise for urban Catholics in 2004 somewhat against the trend. In 2010 73% of urban Catholics described themselves as Nationalists compared with 54% of all Catholics. In 2012 this identity has fallen away for Urban Catholics in common with the community norm.

**Figure 4.71: Percentage of Catholics describing themselves as Nationalist (Urban Catholics )**




Like their Protestant counterparts, Urban Catholics are markedly less Northern Irish than general trend with a distinct decline since 2001. 'Irishness' rose after 1998 and has remained largely stable. By 2012 81% of urban Catholics described themselves as Irish compared with 68% of all Catholics.

# Change and differences among Catholics



**Figure 4.72: Catholic national identity (Urban Catholics)**



It is urban Catholics who most strongly retained a preference for a united Ireland as the best long-term future for Northern Ireland. The same downward trend is apparent but there was perhaps more reluctance within this community to settle for devolution. Forty two per cent of urban Catholics in 2010 stated their preference for a united Ireland compared with 32% of all Catholics. However most notable in 2012 is that despite the surge in Irishness, the drop in those wanting to call themselves Nationalist and the falling away of support for a United Ireland indicates a complex picture among this group almost certainly tied up with a response to the political events of 2012.

Interestingly, a fall in support for a United Ireland is not necessarily complemented by a rise in support for the devolved settlement. Indeed there is some evidence that many Catholics may be becoming disaffected with devolution in the light of its failure to resolve community relations tensions.

# Change and differences among Catholics




**Figure 4.73: Constitutional preferences of Urban Catholics**



There are no obvious consistent differences in attitudes of urban Catholics to people from minority ethnic communities.

**Figure 4.74: Percentage saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities (Urban Catholics )**





## Summary and conclusions

1. Catholic young people really believed in the Agreement and the fall in the assessment of progress in community relations after this period appears sharper because of this (from 70% in 1998 to 49% in 2012). Belief in progress collapsed between 1998 and 2001, recovered slowly but persistently until 2007. In common with young Protestants, there has been a fall in confidence since 2007, but a less dramatic shift between 2010 and 2012 than is the case among Protestants. However, young Catholics are becoming more pessimistic and more separate at a faster rate than any other group in their community.
2. The percentage of young Catholics saying that relations between Protestants and Catholics have improved over the past five years has fallen back in 2012 to the same level last seen in 2002. While hopes of improvement in the future have not changed to the same degree between 2010 and 2012 there is a marked difference according to age. In 2012 63% of all Catholics believed that relations would be better in 5 years' time, a view shared by only 50% of Catholic young people.
3. There has been a marked trend decline in the percentage of young Catholics favouring mixed neighbourhoods since 2003. Two thirds continue to do so, the rate of decline among young people has been marked.
4. In 2008, 98% of young Catholics favoured mixed workplaces. By 2012 this had fallen to 73%. This fall was sharper among young people than among Catholics in general.
5. Between 50% and 60% of Catholics say that they would prefer a mixed-religion school. Young people reflect the community mainstream.
6. Since 2005, there has been a marked increase in the number of young Catholics saying that all or most of their friends are the same religion as they are. Not only has the percentage increased (from 63% in 2005 to 77% in 2012) but this trend is NOT reflected in the community as a whole where the proportion has stayed static at 63%
7. Attitudes to mixed marriage in the family are equally as tolerant as they are within the Catholic community as a whole. Only 8% of young Catholics recorded an objection in 2012.
8. Among young Catholics the 'Nationalist' identity hit a peak in the 1998/99 (68%) period and has been falling persistently since then, falling to a particular low of 35% in 2012. While this mirrors a general trend within the Catholic community, the speed of this drop has been persistently faster among young people.
9. In terms of national identity, young Catholics have not embraced the Northern Irish identity in the way that young Protestants have. Young people are slightly more likely than the general Catholic population to describe themselves as Irish and less as Northern Irish. Between 2010 and 2012, this trend was particularly marked.

## Change and differences among Catholics



10. This has by no means translated into increased support for a United Ireland. Following the ceasefires in 1994 70% of young Catholics felt that the best long-term future for Northern Ireland was in a united Ireland. By 2012 this had fallen to 31%. While young Catholics may feel increasingly Irish they do not appear to feel that a united Ireland is the best option for Northern Ireland. There is no particular association of this trend with age.
11. The percentage of young Catholics saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities has varied from 12% in 2005 to 35% in 2009, but is usually lower than the community average.
12. Attitudes to community relations among older people have generally mirrored community norms. Assessment of progress among this group rose to a new high of 72% in 2010 but fell sharply in 2012 to 52% and is now lower than at any time since devolution.
13. The number of over 65s saying relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in the future is profoundly shaped by constitutional progress. Optimism between 1994 and 2000 gave way to profound pessimism in 2001 which recovered to 2007. In 2007 72% of this cohort believed that relations would improve. In 2012 this had fallen to 52%.
14. Catholic Pensioners generally reflect community attitudes to mixed neighbourhoods, workplaces and schooling, although slightly more than average do not support mixed schools.
15. By 2006 the percentage of older Catholics seeing their constitutional future in a United Ireland had risen to 59%. By 2012 this had fallen away to 31% in line with broader community trends.
16. Older Catholics are only marginally more likely to admit prejudice towards ethnic minorities than others. Between 2005 and the present the proportion saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities varied from 17%-26%.
17. Churchgoing Catholics are remarkably representative of their community as a whole on a wide variety of measures. However, church-goers are noticeably less enthusiastic about their children attending mixed schools.
18. Churchgoers are persistently more likely to describe themselves as Nationalist than non-churchgoers. In 2012 58% of churchgoers described themselves as such, as against 49% of the community as a whole. They are also more Irish (76%-68% in 2012). However constitutional preferences match the community average very closely.
19. Churchgoers are consistently less likely to say that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities than others in the community.



20. A lack of qualifications seems to have a greater impact on attitudes among Catholics than among Protestants. Catholics with no qualifications are more pessimistic about relationships, and less enthusiastic about mixing than the community average. This has been particularly marked in attitudes to future relations, and especially noticeable since 2007. In 2012 63% of the catholic community were optimistic about the next 5 years but only 49% of those with no qualifications. There has been a persistent and sharp decline in attitudes to mixing since 2007 in this group, with particular evidence of change between 2010 and 2012.
21. There is no evidence of greater constitutional certainty in attitudes to identity. Nationalism and constitutional preference match community trend among those with no qualifications.
22. In 2007, the proportion saying that they are 'very' or 'a little' prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities among those Catholics with no qualifications was slightly above the community average at 27%. By 2012, however this had fallen away steeply and since 2009 it has been below the community average. In 2012 only 14% said they were prejudiced as against 21% among the community in general.
23. The most significant division among Catholics appears to be urban and rural Catholics. Since 2005 rural Catholics have generally been more optimistic in their expectations of the future and assessment of progress. This is particularly marked in 2012, perhaps indicating that rural Catholics appear to like devolution more than other Catholics. Urban Catholics are markedly more pessimistic than the community average.
24. Catholics in rural areas are slightly more likely than the average to see their constitutional future in Ireland in 2012. Although the trend follows the wider average, the decline in preference is less marked: 56%-39% (2006-12) as opposed to 56%-32% among Catholics in general.
25. There has been a very sharp decline in the proportion of urban Catholics saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood between 2010 and 2012 (76%-51%). The 2012 value is the lowest value recorded since 2000. Urban Catholics are more likely to have a majority of same-religion friends and live separately and the trend has accelerated in recent years.
26. Among urban Catholics, the percentage saying they would prefer a mixed-religion workplace fell to a new all time low in 2012 of 62%, having been above 80% in every year since 2002-2010 and 91% in 2010. This is a very stark figure. Support for shared schooling has also fallen below 50% in 2012.
27. The trend to an Irish identity is very powerful, but the number of people expressing a preference for a United Ireland has collapsed among urban Catholics from 73% in 2001 to only 23% in 2012.

## Change and differences among Catholics



28. Support for devolved government on the current model among Catholics has generally consolidated. However there is evidence that it remains fragile and vulnerable to progress, reflected in measurable disaffection with devolution among many Catholics between 2010 and 2012.
29. A stronger Irish identity coexists with a broader acceptance of the current constitutional status and a wider reluctance to describe oneself as Nationalist.
30. Prejudice against ethnic minorities is much less expressed among Catholics than Protestants. However among urban Catholics it reached 31% in 2007, declining to 21% in 2012.





## Chapter 5: Sharing the future?

In this chapter we look more closely at the factors associated with a dislike of mixed neighbourhoods and mixed marriages in order to explore concerns about a ‘shared future’. While it is impossible to tease out causality in such analyses it is helpful to look at which variables are most associated with a dislike or wariness of increased mixing. It is possible that for some people the rejection of shared neighbourhood and mixed marriage is a reflection of an ideological objection to the ‘other’. It is also possible that a reluctance to mixing is a response to fear of the consequences, whether in terms of culture or the possibility of instability. It is also helpful to consider the importance of disadvantage as a mediating variable in the reluctance to mix across communities. For the purposes of this exploratory analysis the survey datasets were combined into five time-periods or cohorts:


- Pre ceasefire years 1989-1993
- Post ceasefire and up to the Agreement 1995-1998
- On-off devolution 1999-2006
- Settled devolution 2007-2010
- Flags dispute onward 2012 -

A series of logistic regressions were carried out, nine among respondents who classified themselves as Catholic and nine among respondents who classified themselves as Protestants. The first set models a preference for single religion neighbourhoods and the second models a dislike of mixed marriage in the family. The results are shown in the tables below with significant factors ordered by the size of the change in the model if the term is removed. Demographic variables are shown in red, identity variables in black and religiosity variables in green. The models include variables which were available in all survey datasets and do not include urban/rural variables which were not included on the survey until 1998. Appendix 1 gives full details of the models.

**Table 5.1: Variables that predict Protestants preferring single religion neighbourhoods (in order of importance)**

	89-93	95-98	99-06	07-10	12-
Significant	Unionist ID Econ activity National ID Mixed school Age	National ID Unionist ID Tenure Age Education Mixed school	Unionist ID National ID Age Tenure Education Mixed school Econ activity	Unionist ID Age Tenure National ID Men Education	Unionist ID Tenure National ID Women Mixed school

# Sharing the future?



The relative importance of each of these variables is more easily seen from the ‘word clouds’ below where words are given prominence depending on their relative importance to the model. The words which have most weight visually are the ones that have most weight in the model itself and contribute the greatest explanatory value<sup>8</sup>.

**Figure 5.1: Factors that predict Protestants preferring single religion neighbourhoods during five time-periods**



<sup>8</sup> Using advanced wordle.net where the weight used is the size of the change in the model if the term is removed.

# Sharing the future?



Single identity neighbourhoods reflect both the wish to reinforce/promote a specific identity and a fear of the consequences of mixing. The association between political preferences and the rejection of mixed religion neighbourhoods is striking. Respondents who reject a mixed social setting seem to connect it to the defence of or support for a particular constitutional or national identity. The cause and effect relationship between these two cannot be finally decided through this association: ie are Protestant separatists likely to be Unionists or is it that Unionist partisans promote Protestant separatism?

Back in the pre-ceasefire years from 1989 to 1993 the biggest predictors of Protestants preferring single religion neighbourhoods was national/political identity and being unemployed. The political identity was a self-defined 'Unionist' and the national identity 'Ulster' or 'British', with the former more strongly associated. Being young and not having attended a mixed school were also significantly associated. In that period of time, low income, lack of qualifications and living on an estate (NIHE home) were not independently associated with the desire for single-religion neighbourhoods. This does not seem to have been a period of time when attitudes were driven by deprivation. Unemployment was important but not other measures of deprivation. Clearly identity emerges as highly associated with these attitudes. Given that the numbers of people attending mixed schools is very small<sup>9</sup> it is interesting (not least in policy terms) that this variable emerges as important and indeed often appears throughout these analyses.

Following the ceasefires and in the years up to and including the Agreement, Protestant attitudes to single religion neighbourhoods were clearly and strongly associated with identity. This appears to have been particularly true in housing estates. Tenure began to emerge as important in this period of time, perhaps more as a measure of affluence than any neighbourhood effect of living on an estate. Owner occupiers are significantly less likely to want single religion neighbourhoods than are both people living in NIHE homes and others including private renters. Again young people are significantly more likely to prefer single religion neighbourhoods as are those with no qualifications. Those who had been to a mixed school are significantly less likely to have that preference. In this period of time identity continues to dominate but other proxy measure of deprivation appear. However level of income continues to be unimportant independent of the other variables and the proxy variables that are important are specifically lack of education and renting rather than owning your own home.

From the previous analyses we know that there were significant concerns among Protestants about progress and sustainability of inter-community relations in the period from 1999 to 2006 and a sense that the Agreement had not resolved community relations issues. In this period, attitudes associated with a desire for single religion neighbourhoods were similar to those of the preceding period of time, most importantly with the dominance of measures of identity. Fears of mixing appear to be greatest among those in social housing, among young

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<sup>9</sup> This measures does not just include integrated schools but also schools which were 'fairly mixed'.



people and among those with no qualifications or unemployed. Those who attended a mixed school are significantly more likely not to hold this view. What is unclear, however is whether mixing is rejected because people in these cohorts hold a particularly strong identity or because fear of the consequences are greatest among these cohorts.

The settled devolution years show a change in the pattern for Protestants. Although a Unionist identity continues to be the most important predictor of a desire for single-religion neighbourhoods, national identity overall has fallen in importance. Having an 'Ulster' identity is still strongly associated as a predictor but we know from the previous analyses that by this time the 'Ulster' identity was adopted by increasingly smaller numbers. In the period 2007 to 2010 it is clear that age continues to be an important predictor but in this time period it includes people in their middle years as well as the young. It is older people who emerge as stronger in their desire for mixed religion neighbourhoods. Tenure is important – again insofar as people living on estates are much more worried about mixed religion neighbourhoods than owner occupiers. Having no qualifications again emerges as a significant predictor and for the first time we see the emergence of men as being more strongly associated with a desire for single religion neighbourhoods. This may suggest that progress towards mixed housing implies addressing the fears of young people, those in social housing and those with no qualifications.

The fifth cohort includes 2012 which was a year marked by tensions during the summer marching season and a bitter flags dispute towards the end of the year (coinciding with the end of the NILT fieldwork). The pattern is perhaps slightly different from previous years. Identity variables remain important, however tenure emerges as the second most significant variable and in this case it appears to be respondents living in NIHE homes who are drawing back from mixed religion neighbourhoods. This may reflect the significant risk of violence in interface areas. People who have attended mixed schools are again more likely to want mixed religion neighbourhoods, but for the first time women emerge as particularly concerned about living in mixed religion neighbourhoods. Educational level is only of borderline significance and age does not emerge as an important predictor in 2012.

The persistence of a connection between Unionist identity and mixed neighbourhoods suggests that some Protestants are concerned about the consequences of mixing for their cultural and constitutional future and that this fear is most keenly felt among those with no qualifications, those in social housing and those with no qualifications or no job.

Overall the models for Catholic respondents look different from those for Protestants. There is not the same dominance of identity although it is still a strong predictor of a preference for single religion neighbourhoods. Mixed schooling tends to emerge again as do many of the demographic variables identified in the models for Protestant respondents. However low income does sometimes emerge as a predictor for Catholics and this is not the case for Protestants.



**Table 5.2: Variables that predict Catholics preferring single religion neighbourhoods (in order of importance)**

	89-93	95-98	99-06	07-10	12-
Significant	Age Nationalist ID Education National ID Econ activity Mixed school Income	Nationalist ID National ID Tenure Econ activity Education Income	National ID Tenure Nationalist ID Mixed school Education Age Econ activity Income	Age Nationalist ID National ID Mixed school Econ activity Tenure Education	National ID Tenure Nationalist ID Education Women

The relative importance of each of these variables is more easily seen from the ‘word clouds’ below where words are given prominence depending on their relative importance to the model. The words which have most weight visually are the ones that have most weight in the model itself and contribute the greatest explanatory value.

# Sharing the future?



Figure 5.2: Factors that predict Catholics preferring single religion neighbourhoods during five time-periods



In the pre-ceasefire years, being a young Catholic was a much stronger predictor of preferring single religion neighbourhoods than was having a Nationalist identity. Having no qualifications was also very important followed by having an Irish identity. Catholics who were economically inactive (looking after the home, students, sick, retired) rather than unemployed were also more likely to prefer single religion neighbourhoods over those who were in work. Mixed schooling was an important predictor of positive attitudes and low income a predictor of negative attitudes. This may suggest that young people and people in housing estates



associate mixing with antagonism that is prominent in youth culture and working class communities rather than a specific fear that nationalism would be compromised by mixing. For the post-ceasefire years and up to and including the Agreement, young Catholics temporarily disappeared from the model and preference for single religion neighbourhoods was most strongly associated with a Nationalist and Irish identity and those living in NIHE homes. This may suggest an important influence of the ceasefires on young people in general and a concentration of residual fear among those with a stronger political identity and those in areas of social housing. Some way behind (in terms of predictive value) was the economically inactive and those with low income. Education was of less importance, although graduates had a significantly more positive attitude towards mixing in neighbourhoods.

Following the Agreement, the nature of the relationship, between national identity and attitudes towards living in a shared neighbourhood, changes. An 'Irish' identity is associated with a preference for single-religion neighbourhoods but Catholics who rejected the 'Northern Irish' identity and said that they didn't know what their identity was (or gave some other answer) are much more likely to have positive attitudes towards mixing at the neighbourhood level. Few though these are in numbers, the effect is noticeable. Living in an NIHE home is important here and more so than having a Nationalist identity. Having gone to a mixed school is quite strongly related to a preference for mixed neighbourhoods while having no qualifications, being young and unemployed and low income are significant but of somewhat less importance.

The period following the restoration of devolution in 2007 sees a return to the pre-ceasefire years and age is a better predictor of negative attitudes than being a 'Nationalist'. However in this case it is Catholics (65+) who have positive attitudes compared with both young and middle-aged Catholics. Irishness appears to be important, which suggests that the model of national identity inherent in Irishness requires separate living for some. As ever, having gone to a mixed school emerges as an important predictor of enthusiasm about mixed neighbourhoods, although it is impossible to be certain whether this reflects the ideological position of those attending mixed schools or whether going to a mixed school in itself reduces hostility to mixed neighbourhoods. Catholics who are working are less likely to have negative attitudes than both the unemployed and the economically inactive, which again suggests that the fear of mixing is greatest among the poorest. In these years it may be that affluence is protective against fear as much as deprivation driving increased fear. Likewise, there may be more of a 'protective' value in being older, owning your own home and having a university degree. If you are not these things then concerns are reflected in negative attitudes towards mixing. Low income is not important over and above other variables.

The period beginning in 2012 indicates suggests that concerns about mixing have grown most prominently in areas of social housing, suggesting that there is something about this form of living which generates a resistance to mixing. As in the unstable post-Agreement period – and in common with Protestants in 2012 – living in an NIHE home predicts a withdrawal from a desire for mixed religion neighbourhoods. Also in common with Protestants



in 2012 is that women emerge as more likely to prefer single-religion neighbourhoods. Possibly 2012 is characterised by a considerable fear factor against the background of community tensions in the latter part of the year.

The factors associated with a preference for single religion neighbourhoods may be distinct from those associated with an intolerance of mixed marriages in the immediate family. The former will involve everyday business and social contact with many members of the other community while the latter involves a closer intimate relationship of kinship and belonging.

**Table 5.3: Variables that predict whether Protestants would mind having a close relative of another religion (in order of importance)**


	89-93	95-98	99-06	07-10	12-
Significant	Unionist ID Churchgoing National ID	Unionist ID Churchgoing National ID Men Age Education	Unionist ID National ID Churchgoing Education Age Tenure Mixed school	Unionist ID Churchgoing National ID Education Men	Unionist ID National ID Churchgoing

Significantly, as Table 5.3 shows, religiosity as (measured by church attendance) is a persistently important factor associated with a reluctance to accept a mixed marriage, in contrast to attitudes to mixed neighbourhoods where no association between religiosity and separatism was found. Significantly, however, religiosity is only second in importance to identity when it comes to concerns about inter-marriage. This pattern is consistent across the last twenty years. At the same time, there is no association of housing tenure or economic activity with opposition to mixed marriage. This suggests that the opposition to mixed neighbourhoods in these areas may have less to do with ideology than with practical concerns.





Figure 5.3: Factors that predict Protestant dislike of mixed marriage in the family during five time-periods



In the pre-ceasefire years variables measuring deprivation did not emerge as significantly associated with a reluctance to accept mixed marriages in the family. Although it should be noted that numbers are small here as the mixed marriage variable was only available on one year's survey. Having a Unionist identity was the most important factor, approximately twice as important as churchgoing habits. However in the years leading up to the Agreement other demographic variables began to emerge as important. The most important variables were the same (Unionist identity, churchgoing and national identity) with a Unionist identity again being

# Sharing the future?



at least twice as important as religiosity. However men and young people appear as reluctant to accept mixed marriages during these years. Those with no qualifications are also less likely to accept mixing in this way but the strength of this relationship is relatively weak.

The post-Agreement years and the on/off devolution was a difficult time for Protestants. Although the most important variables associated with an intolerance of mixed marriages stayed the same the importance of a Unionist identity increased further such that this was almost three times more important than churchgoing habits in predicting attitudes. Having no educational qualifications was not far behind churchgoing in importance while being young, living on an estate and not having been to a mixed school were less strong predictors although still significant, suggesting that the impact of instability was greatest among the most deprived.

The pattern changes slightly in the settled devolution period from 2007 to 2010. The primary predictors remain the same and having no educational qualifications remains important but age and tenure disappear from the equation. It is interesting to note that men appear in the model for the first time – just as is the case in the 2007-2010 model relating to mixed neighbourhoods.

In 2012 the pattern remains stable and while attitudes to living in mixed religion neighbourhoods may well have been affected by the tensions of the time, predictors of this underlying value remain consistent among the Protestant community. Numbers are fairly small as only a single year is included in this analysis, nonetheless identity and religiosity remain the key predictors.

Catholic reluctance for mixed marriages is subtly different. Above all, it is important to note that objections to mixed marriage are generally extremely low. Political identity is important but a Nationalist identity does not have the predominance within the Catholic community that a Unionist identity has in the Protestant community.

**Table 5.4: Variables that predict whether Catholics would mind having a close relative of another religion (in order of importance)**

	89-93	95-98	99-06	07-10	12-
Significant	Nationalist ID	National ID Income Tenure Churchgoing Men	Tenure Nationalist ID National ID Age Mixed schl Churchgoing	Nationalist ID Churchgoing National ID Education Age Men Income Mixed schl	National ID Tenure Nationalist ID



Figure 5.4: Factors that predict Catholic dislike of mixed marriage in the family during five time-periods



The only variable of importance in the pre-ceasefire years in terms of predicting a dislike of mixed marriage is having a Nationalist identity. However, the numbers are small in this time period and that will have affected the chances of obtaining a good model. In the following post-ceasefire period having a Nationalist identity completely disappears from the model. This was the time-period when it perhaps became more acceptable for Catholics to identify themselves as Nationalists (see earlier charts showing patterns of identity) and thus


## Sharing the future?



Catholics with very positive attitudes towards mixing might well have identified themselves as Nationalists. National identity becomes the best predictor overall. Tenure is important but only insofar as owner occupiers are more tolerant than private renters and others (not NIHE particularly). Just as with the Protestant community religiosity is important in attitudes towards mixed marriages.

In the post Agreement years, the rise of tenure as a predictor of concerns around mixed marriage is interesting, suggesting that the politics of the period were impacting specifically on people living on housing estates across Northern Ireland. However, the settled devolution years saw a reassertion of the importance of a Nationalist identity in predicting dislike of mixed marriages. Churchgoing is almost as important. No qualifications, being older and being male are also associated with this attitude. Interestingly this is the first time that sex has appeared as an important variable in relation to the Catholic community. Like the Protestant community, it is men who have emerged most recently as retaining attitudes of intolerance that may have somewhat diminished among the female population. Those with a low income and those who did not attend mixed schools are also more likely to have concerns mixed marriages within the family. It is important to re-emphasise that the levels of this concern are relatively low.

The 2012 period however sees a shift in the pattern of predictors of concern around mixed marriage. For the first time churchgoing disappears as a significant predictor of an intolerance of mixed marriage in the family. Identity remains important and in 2012, living in an NIHE home is a fairly strong predictor of a dislike of mixed marriage in the family.



## Summary and conclusions

1. Attitudes to sharing neighbourhoods and mixed marriage differ across the communities. However they also differ within communities. What is clear is that, among Protestants, by far the most important predictor of an objection to mixed neighbourhoods is identity – both Unionist identity and national identity (Ulster or British). The drive to separation is political and cultural and other demographic and deprivation variables are clearly secondary.
2. Attending a mixed religion school is consistently associated with support for mixed neighbourhoods. It is not possible to establish the causal direction of this association, but we might speculate that those going to mixed schools object to ideas of strict separation in principle.
3. Religiosity has a clear influence on attitudes to mixed marriage (kinship and exogamy) but does not appear to have such strong connections to attitudes towards shared neighbourhoods.
4. Young Catholics appear to have greater concern about shared neighbourhoods. This either suggests that young Catholics are becoming more radically separationist or, more likely, that young people have ongoing fears around shared neighbourhoods.
5. Owner occupiers support mixed religion neighbourhoods but those living in NIHE homes are often more reluctant. Again, this may be because the nature of social housing estates in Northern Ireland is connected to protection against fears.
6. There is some association between a lack of education and greater fears about mixed religion neighbourhoods. However, this is considerably weaker than the associations of political and constitutional identity, age and housing tenure.
7. Concerns about mixed neighbourhoods appear to join people of similar national and political outlook rather than create differences along class lines. Class and economic activity appears to be relatively unimportant in relation to attitudes towards mixed marriage.

# What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?




## Chapter 6: What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?

Previous chapters have looked at the individual journeys in attitudes of particular groups of people living in Northern Ireland during the last two decades and also at those groups of people who do not appear to share aspirations for a shared future. This chapter looks more closely at particular events and policies that appear to have had an impact over the last 20 years before moving on in the next chapter to make recommendations for future policies. However it is worth first recapping on the overall movement in attitudes and values of people in Northern Ireland over the last period of our history. Time-series survey data is invaluable in measuring and monitoring this long-term movement in values across a population – the analogy of ‘climate change’ is sometimes used to describe this - before focusing in on the ‘weather systems’ that individual events and policies have created.

Over the decades since 1989 there is a clear underlying upward trend in the proportion of people in Northern Ireland who think that ‘relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were five years ago’. There is a similar upward trend in optimism about the future where the proportion of people who feel that ‘relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in five years time’ has risen considerably over the last two decades. The proportion of people in Northern Ireland who say that they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood was always high and has risen somewhat over the last two decades. When respondents were asked their preference for mixed-religion or single-religion workplaces the trends almost exactly mirror those for neighbourhoods. Preference for mixed religion schools is different from the previous two measures. There is consistently lower support overall, although the long-term trend is still upwards. There is a clear downward trend over the last two decades in the proportion of people who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion and there is a clear increase in support for mixed marriage in society more generally. Support for mixed neighbourhoods in general has also risen slightly over the period. In contrast with attitudes towards mixing, the figures relating to actual contact remain stubbornly stable. Twenty years ago it was the case the people in Northern Ireland had friendships that were solely or largely from within their own religious community and this remains the case today. Unsurprisingly this is also true for neighbours who are all or mostly the same religion as the respondent. Over the last two decades there have been some perceptible shifts in the national identity declared by people living in Northern Ireland. Identity is something that many people believe remains fixed throughout life but either people in Northern Ireland are changing, or new generations are coming through with subtly different identities. The proportion of people who hold an ‘Ulster’ identity has fallen away noticeably since the late 1980s. Similarly the ‘British’ identity has declined over the same period. In contrast the ‘Irish’ identity has increased and in particular the ‘Northern Irish’ identity has increased at the fastest rate - at least up until 2010. Perceived levels of prejudice against both Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland have declined over the period

# What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?



1989 to 2003 but no data have been collected since 2003 so the trend-line is based only on the earlier data.

## Political events and changing attitudes to community relations

Although we can speak of a gradual improvement in community relations over the past twenty years, this assessment has to be tempered by an understanding of the degree to which attitudes towards improvement and deterioration in community relations are related to continuing political progress. Indeed, there is some evidence that people treat questions about change in community relations as a proxy measure for their assessment of the sustainability of political co-operation and the absence or threat of violence.

Our analysis of twenty years of data confirms that hopes raised in one period are vulnerable to concerns created by the re-emergence of tension. Four watershed events between 1990 and 2010 allow us to divide the decade into four periods each of which a single event created a distinct break with expectations and concerns in the previous period:

- The paramilitary ceasefires of 1994
- The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of 1998
- The Holy Cross dispute and its aftermath in 2001
- The establishment of devolved government in 2007

It is possible, but not yet certain, that events in 2012-13 may have had a similarly significant effect.

In each case, however, the consequences and implications of these events were experienced differently across the community divide.

While the ceasefires changed attitudes across the board, their effect was markedly more dramatic on Catholic attitudes even though the percentage of Protestants saying relations between Protestants and Catholics were better than they were 5 years previously rose from a mere 26% in 1994 to 51% in 1995. Whereas in 1994, Catholics were equally pessimistic, in 1995 62% believed that relationships had improved over the previous five years. Expectations of improvement in the future reflected a similar pattern. Among Protestants, the percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics would be better in the future rose from 30% in 1994 to 52% in 1995. However, the impact on Catholics was electric, raising expectations in a single year of future improvement from 36% to 78%. Among Catholics, expectations of better relationships in the future have never again been so high or so dramatically changed by a single event.

In practice, the complexities of negotiation towards the Agreement reduced the levels of euphoria. Importantly, the Belfast Agreement itself appears to have had little or no measurable impact on attitudes in the Protestant community, probably reflecting divisions in Unionism in

## What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?



relation to the Agreement itself which continued to divide the Unionist Party for many years. Between 1996 and 1999, the percentage of Protestants saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago actually reduced from 43% to 42%. Indeed between 1998 and 1999, the percentage of Protestants expecting a better future declined from 53% to 46%. In contrast, Catholics reacted positively to the signing of a new Agreement. Whereas in 1996, only 47% detected improvement in community relations, this rose to 60% in 1998 and 1999. Likewise, hopes for the future rose from 48% in 1996 to 75% in 1998.

In spite of political agreement, however, the fragility of the underlying situation is immediately apparent in the data as the emergence of serious sectarian division and street protest around the Holy Cross dispute had a profound and measurable effect on attitudes towards community relations. Among Catholics, the assessment of community relations improvement returned to pessimistic levels not seen since before the ceasefires in 1995. By 2001, only 34% believed that community relations had improved over the previous five years and only 40% were convinced that they would improve in the five years to come. Put another way, whereas two-thirds of Catholics were optimistic in 1999, only one third remained so in 2001. Although the decline was less steep from a lower point of departure in 1999, Protestant opinion was even more pessimistic, with only 24% perceiving progress over the previous five years in 2001 and only 27% expecting improvement within five years. Indeed, Protestant opinion in 2001 was even more pessimistic than it had been in 1993 before the ceasefires.

In the following years, expectations initially returned only gradually. However, as negotiations finally bore fruit in the return of devolved government in 2007, Protestant confidence in community relations reached its highest recorded level as 64% acknowledged progress over the previous five years and 61% hoped to see this trend continue over the next five. Devolution also restored Catholic faith in improving community relations with 68% confirming the improvement in the past five years and over 70% hoping for better to come.

In reality, devolution has not yet marked a fundamental change in underlying concerns with evidence that the optimism of 2007 has slowly but continuously reduced. Although it has not returned to the depths seen before the ceasefires, the percentage of Protestants believing that community relations have improved has reduced from 63% in 2007 to 54% in 2012 with only 45% expecting them to improve in the future and much more dramatic falls in expectation measured among young people. In this case, similarly slow and gradual drops in Catholic optimism are also evident in recent years.

At first sight, then, it appears that attitudes towards community relations are driven by political and social events rather than the other way around. However the relationship between community relations and politics may, in reality, be more complex. For although the assessment of how much progress has been made and may be made in the near future is evidently very sensitive to events, there is also considerable evidence that public commitment to sharing and mixing in important areas of life has remained noticeably constant and



# What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?



relatively unchanged in the face of deeply destabilising events.

In every year, since the question was first asked in 1995, between 60% to 80% of Protestants and 70% to 85% of Catholics have expressed a preference to live in a mixed area. While the events of 2001 had a negative impact on both Catholic and Protestant preference, the fundamental preference for the principle of mixed living has remained intact. More worryingly, the events of 2012 have resulted in a sharper fall between 2010 and 2012 than at any time in the history of the survey. The pattern is repeated in responses to questions over mixing in the workplace. Since 1995 between 70% and 90% of Protestants and 80% and 95% of Catholics have indicated a preference for mixed-religion workplace with the same potentially significant caveat that support has declined most sharply in the last two years. Surveys have likewise recorded that 50% to 70% of both Protestants and Catholics prefer a mixed-religion school. Since 2001, the percentage of Protestants saying they would mind if a close relative married someone of a different religion has slowly but persistently declined from around 40% to less than 30%, while the number of Catholics objecting has fallen from 18% to 12%.

It appears from the data that the commitment to important elements and underlying values in community relations, including the desirability of shared workplaces, schools and residential areas has remained largely constant over many years of changing political and social circumstances. This suggests that community relations issues have a semi-permanent currency in the undergrowth of Northern Ireland public attitudes. At the same time, the effectiveness and progress of community relations is ultimately measured by the establishment of a stable and peaceful political environment, implying both that specific issues act to destabilise the relationship between communities in sharply different ways and the underlying threat to stability and tranquillity will remain a matter of concern until some of these issues have been addressed in practice and policy.

## **Policies that appear to have had impact**

By far the most important drivers of the public assessment of progress in community relations have been the levels of inter-community violence and contention and evidence of effective political co-operation. Improvement or deterioration in political events in the present directly impacts on the assessment of underlying progress and of hopes for the future. The dominance of high profile public and political events makes it difficult to see (from the main trend data) whether individual policies are having a more subtle effect except where, as already noted, there is a clear increase in the social consensus around shared goals and values.

However it is possible to look at public perceptions about some of these policies via other survey questions that addressed these more directly. We cannot infer whether these policies affected community relations directly but we can see whether people thought that the policies themselves were making a difference.

# What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?



Following the Fair Employment Act 1989 and up until 1996 there was a clear and significant improvement in the perceptions of the Catholic population of equality of job opportunity. There was no accompanying rise in the perceptions of Protestants that Catholics were being unfairly advantaged. It was still the case in 1996 though that 45% of Catholics felt that Protestants were unfairly advantaged.

**Table 6.1: Percentage who think that Protestants and Catholics don't have the same chance of getting a job and who is more likely to get a job**

	1989 %	1991 %	1993 %	1994 %	1995 %	1996 %
Catholics saying 'Protestants'	59	58	50	51	45	45
Protestants saying 'Catholics'	15	18	17	18	20	16

In the years to follow and with the Fair Employment and Treatment Order 1998, attitudes on employment equality continued to change. Note that the question wording was different in these survey years from years 1989 to 1996 and therefore the results are presented separately.


**Table 6.2: Percentage who thinks that one group is treated better in terms of job opportunities.**

	1998 %	1999 %	2000 %	2003 %
Catholics saying 'Protestants'	30	33	27	14
Protestants saying 'Catholics'	13	13	13	11

By 2003 only 14% of Catholics felt that Protestants were treated better than Catholics in terms of jobs opportunities. This contrasts with the 59% of Catholics in 1989 who felt that Protestants and Catholics did not have the same chance of getting a job and that Protestants were more likely to get a job.

Other areas of improvement in Catholic perceptions (at least up to 2003) included housing, expression of culture, treatment by the police and educational opportunities.

# What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?



**Table 6.3** Percentage of Catholics who say that Protestants are treated better in terms of...

	1998 %	1999 %	2000 %	2003 %
Job opportunities	30	33	27	14
Housing	12	17	14	7
Expressing their own culture	18	20	19	9
Treatment by the police	27	31	27	17
Educational opportunities	7	11	10	3

During these years there was no obvious backlash among the Protestant community in terms of a rising belief that Catholics were being treated better at the expense of Protestants.

**Table 6.4:** Percentage of Protestants who say that Catholics are treated better in terms of...

	1998 %	1999 %	2000 %	2003 %
Job opportunities	13	13	13	11
Housing	8	10	9	6
Expressing their own culture	12	11	13	9
Treatment by the police	3	4	5	3
Educational opportunities	7	6	8	4

Other results confirm these findings. By 2001, just over 80% of Catholics believed that Protestants and Catholics were treated equally by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive compared with around two thirds in the preceding five years.

# What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?



**Table 6.5: Perceptions of equality in housing**

What about the Northern Ireland Housing Executive – how does it treat Catholics and Protestants who apply for a home?

	1989	1991	1993	1994	1995	1998	2001
% saying both treated equally	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Protestant	64	63	58	65	62	66	62
Catholic	71	63	67	67	64	67	81
All	67	64	61	65	63	67	71

Survey questions that measure attitudes towards the police have varied over the years and not always used exactly the same wording. Table 6.6 summarises the overall perception that Catholics and Protestants are treated equally. Perceptions among the Protestant community have remained remarkably steady between 1989 and 2001 with around 71% believing that both communities are treated equally. Among the Catholic community, the proportion rose significantly to 55% in 2001. This is barely a majority, but still a marked rise on the years prior to this.

**Table 6.6: Proportions who believe that Catholics and Protestants are treated equally by the police.**

	1989	1991	1993	1998	1999	2000	2001
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Protestant	71	71	71	70	73	73	71
Catholic	38	39	41	36	33	34	55
All	56	57	59	55	57	59	63

In terms of education policies, the proportion of the population who attended a mixed or integrated school remains small and the increase in the number of integrated schools has not yet shown up in the overall adult figures relating to mixed schooling. However at a more detailed level there are signs reflecting the increase in the integrated sector insofar as the balance between ‘mixed’ and ‘integrated’ schools has shifted. Of those who said that they had attended a mixed school there is an increasing number who said that this was a formally integrated school. In 1998 14% of those who said that they had attended a mixed school said that it was a formally integrated school and by 2012 this figure had risen to 29%.

# What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?



**Table 6.7: Proportion who attended a formally integrated school (of those who attended a mixed school of any kind)**

1998	14
1999	8
2000	14
2001	17
2002	15
2003	13
2004	16
2005	18
2006	21
2007	17
2008	20
2009	25
2010	26
2012	29

## Perceptions of equality in general

The raft of legislation addressed at particular policy areas are also likely to impact on a more general sense of equality among people living in Northern Ireland during these years. This is clearly of direct interest for policymakers in the area of Good Relations. Between the signing of the Agreement in 1998 and 2003 Catholic perceptions that Protestants were ‘in general’ treated better, fell from a height of 42% in 1999 to 23% in 2003 four years later. By 2003 there had been no accompanying rise in the proportion of Protestants who felt that Catholics were treated better, this remaining at a steady 18%.

**Table 6.8: General perceptions of equality**

	1998	1999	2000	2003
	%	%	%	%
Catholics saying ‘Protestants treated better’	37	42	34	23
Protestants saying ‘Catholics treated better’	17	17	18	18

Other questions provide further evidence that while Catholic perceptions of treatment improved in the years following the Agreement, Protestant perceptions of their own treatment

# What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?




did not worsen in tandem. Between 2003 and 2012 a question was asked of respondents whether people felt that each of a number of different groups in the population (largely the section 75 groups) were generally treated better than they were five years ago, worse, or the same. In the early years (2001 and 2003) many Protestant and Catholic respondents felt that Catholics were now treated better than before. In 2012 this figure dropped considerably for Protestant respondents and somewhat less for Catholic respondents – in this case the treatment of Catholics would have been compared to 2007 while in the early years it would have been compared with the situation pre-Agreement. For Protestants there is a sense among many in the early years that they were treated worse than in the pre-Agreement years, but by 2012 only 13% of Protestant respondents felt that Protestants in general were treated worse than five years ago.

**Table 6.9: Perception of the treatment of Protestants and Catholics compared with five years ago**

	2001 %	2003 %	2012 %
<b>Catholic respondents</b>			
Protestants are			
treated better than five years ago	16	23	<b>32</b>
treated worse than five years ago	2	2	4
treated the same as five years ago	77	69	59
Catholics are			
treated better than five years ago	<b>40</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>41</b>
treated worse than five years ago	4	3	6
treated the same as five years ago	53	45	49
<b>Protestant respondents</b>			
Protestants are			
treated better than five years ago	8	10	<b>30</b>
treated worse than five years ago	39	25	13
treated the same as five years ago	48	60	54
Catholics are			
treated better than five years ago	64	66	<b>32</b>
treated worse than five years ago	0	0	4
treated the same as five years ago	30	29	59

## What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?



So while there is consensus that things improved for Catholics in the immediate post-Agreement period there is also a sense among Protestants that they were now being treated worse. There is no obvious sense that things have continued to worsen but in 2003 certainly a quarter of the Protestant population felt that things were worse in general for Protestants than they were five years before. Set against this, there is no clear sense of a problem in specific policy areas such as policing, employment or even culture. This appears to be a generalised feeling of loss that occurred around the time of the Agreement and which certainly has been publicly noted and debated over the last decade.

# What policies and events have had an impact over the last 20 years?



## Summary and conclusions

1. Over twenty years the assessment of progress in the past and expectations of progress in the future in relation to community relations have proved to be closely tied to the absence or presence of social tension and violence and the perception that there has been political advance. Effectiveness in community relations is ultimately measured against these outcomes in popular opinion. This implies that the defining elements of community relations are strongly dependent on political agreement and the elimination of violence. Policy change may add or subtract from this wider perception but is ultimately judged against this wider threshold.
2. Measurement of progress as a result of a specific initiative may be differentially perceived in different parts of the community and not always shared. In the past two decades, different groups have reacted differently to different events. Catholic opinion regarding improved community relations changed most profoundly in the light of the ceasefires of 1994 and the Belfast Agreement in 1998. They also improved, although more gradually, in the face of the restoration of devolution in 2007. Protestant opinion also changed as a result of the ceasefires of 1994 but did not improve in 1998. The restoration of devolution in 2007 was the most significant event in changing Protestant assessments of community relations in twenty years. The implicit definition of applied to any assessment of progress is therefore also tied to the assessment of the value of any given political change rather than to any in depth assessment of changing relationships.
3. Events which improve expectations do not have a sustained effect unless they result in substantive change or where they do not succeed in eliminating inter-community tension. Thus opinion in 2001 following the Holy Cross dispute reflected deep pessimism about progress. Since 2007, and more especially since 2010, there has also been a decrease in the level of public optimism.
4. Commitment to key community relations values and goals - such as shared housing, mixed workplaces and mixed marriage- has generally increased and grown over 20 years and has not proved susceptible to volatile political events. In each case, support for these issues has now reliably reached over 70% of both Catholics and Protestants. Since 2010 there is some evidence that support for these values may have weakened for the first time in many years.
5. There is considerable evidence of Catholic recognition of more equal treatment over time. In 2012 less than 6% of Catholics believed that Catholics were now treated worse in general than compared with 5 years previously. Over time this may be important in eroding any residual sense of grievance.
6. There is little evidence of substantial Protestant grievance around equality. While 13% of Protestant respondents believed that Protestants were treated worse than 5 years previously, 30% believed they were treated better. Furthermore, there was no significant evidence of resentment of better treatment of Catholics.





## Chapter 7: Observations and recommendations

### A. Issues of ongoing or emergent significance

#### i. **Perceptions and fears around community relations remain vulnerable to political and social turmoil.**

Over twenty years, evidence from the Life and Times Survey suggests that the underlying 'climate' of approval for greater inter-community engagement and tolerance in Northern Ireland has gradually improved. This does not however imply that significant events do not and cannot set relationships back, and sustainable progress remains vulnerable to immediate political events. Over the last 20 years, by far the most negative period in public attitudes took place in the period following the Good Friday Agreement and was symbolised in the Holy Cross dispute and its aftermath, the collapse of devolved institutions and polarisation over decommissioning. Since then, attitudes and confidence have demonstrably returned in both communities, especially as a result of the restoration of devolution in 2007. However, it is clear that community relations and perceptions of relations are not independent of the perception of progress in achieving a deeper political stability. The early evidence of deterioration in the perception of community relationships between 2010 and 2012 suggests that progress depends on a plausible holistic commitment to building a shared society that requires attention and cannot be taken for granted.

#### ii. **Perceptions of improvement in community relations will accelerate fastest if there is widespread confidence that the threat of violence has ended and that threats to culture and identity have reduced.**

Improvements in perceptions of community relations have occurred where violence is seen to recede (ceasefires of 1994) or where an accommodation has been successfully achieved (devolution in 2007). Where one side perceives progress which is not sufficiently shared (Agreement in 1998), community relations remain unstable. Where sectarian violence returns (Holy Cross 2001 and potentially in the violence of 2012-13) perceptions of community relations fall sharply. Political effort to find resolutions to cultural issues and to matters relating to safety and the rule of law are therefore paramount.

#### iii. **Attitudes to mixing have softened since 1990 and have remained consistent. Attitudes do not of themselves enable change in behaviour and require a change in policy.**

The public continues to accept the desirability of plural solutions and to approve



of efforts to achieve mixed workplaces, shared neighbourhoods and more sharing between children and young people. Objections to mixed marriage have reduced in both communities and in all social groups in the past twenty years. A majority have continued to support integrated schools for twenty years. However consistent attitudes have only led to behavioural change where there has been policy to promote and protect those taking action. Thus change has been most evident where action has been supported by institutional protection, as in the case of workplace and integrated schools. There has been less willingness to intervene in neighbourhoods.

#### **iv. Young people are particularly vulnerable to a rise in fear and antagonism**

Over twenty years young people have proved more responsive to changes, both positive and negative in perceptions of community relations. Furthermore, they have often been more reticent to support mixed religion neighbourhoods while supportive of shared schooling, mixed marriage and shared workplaces. This suggests that the obstacles lie in real fears and the risks which some young people run in relation to violence. Of particular concern has been the sharp decline in the perceptions and attitudes of young people towards improving community relations in recent years suggesting an increase in anxiety and antagonism in youth culture, dashing hopes that the peace process would liberate young people from the fears of the past. Prioritising community relations policy to address the obstacles faced by young people should be a priority.

#### **v. Perceptions of an improvement in community relations have been less marked in urban areas than in rural communities.**

The evidence of gradual improvement evident in rural communities has not been reproduced in urban areas in recent years. This may suggest both that policy in each context may need to be refined and that issues around interfaces, urban space and cultural disputes require greater attention. We can suggest a number of reasons for this. Firstly, territorial disputes in rural areas are less marked than in some of the inner city parts of Belfast. Disputes over housing and parading have been focused in Belfast rather than in rural areas in the last few years, with the exception of Rasharkin in County Antrim. Secondly, violence in many rural areas was dominated by conflict between the security forces and republicans rather than involving loyalist paramilitaries. There have been real and lasting changes in the police and army in recent decades and major change in IRA activity since 2005. Thirdly, the concept of 'rural' may simplify a very complex and locally variable picture which does not accurately reflect the threats to stability for specific communities. What is not clear is whether this is a permanent change, as there is evidence from press reports that local events can make a rapid and significant difference.



- vi. **Prejudice against ethnic minorities is extensive and runs at an unacceptably high level across Northern Ireland. Attitudes among Protestants in urban areas are particularly hostile.**

Evidence gathered by the Life and Times Survey since 2005 suggests that prejudice against ethnic minorities is widespread and sustained. Although there is a clear association with economic change, this does not account for the level or spread of prejudice over time. There is evidence that prejudice extends into all communities, but is greatest where interaction has been closest, among urban Protestants. Attitudes to ethnic minorities are markedly more hostile among Protestants than among Catholics and appear to be affected less by educational qualification and age than by location. Action to tackle this at a cultural and educational level should be prioritised.

- vii. **Questions of identity and constitutional preferences are partially malleable, with new and complex results.**

Political and national identity has been subject to a number of changes over twenty years. The most constant evidence is that very few Protestants consider to be Irish while few Catholics describe themselves as British. However, the numbers describing themselves as 'Northern Irish' have varied over time, and appear to be affected by changes in political events. At the same time, however, attitudes to constitutional outcomes have changed dramatically among Catholics with a drop of 50% among those believing that the best long-term future for Northern Ireland was in a United Ireland. This too may reflect changing political and economic circumstances or it may reflect increasing willingness and ability among those identifying themselves as Irish to realise this within the setting of Northern Ireland.

- viii. **The driving force of separation is political, cultural and national rather than economic. However the fear generated by poor relations reinforces the suspicion of sharing.**

The evidence of the Life and Times survey over twenty years is that opposition and resistance to sharing is greatest among those with a strong political, cultural and national identity. This is particularly evident among Protestants. Among Catholics national identity and political hostility account for the greatest proportion of those hostile or opposed to shared neighbourhoods although it is evident that concerns are greatest in areas of social housing, among the young and in urban areas. Opposition to mixed marriage is mostly strongly correlated with national identity although there is evidence that churchgoers also hold greater reservations. This suggests that issues of social and economic importance are secondary to concerns of cultural and religious importance and to questions of safety.



## B. Evidence of successful or failed previous policy

### i. **Devolution and Agreement**

Evidence from the Life and Times survey demonstrates that Agreement and Devolution are vital to perceptions of community relations and the potential for improvement. However it also demonstrates that while Agreement and Devolution are necessary, they are insufficient in themselves to prevent the re-emergence of antagonism unless they are sustained and widely supported and develop policy responses to difficult issues.

### ii. **Equality Policy**

The limited evidence of the Life and Times survey suggests that improvements in Catholic perceptions of discrimination have not resulted in equivalent increases in Protestant fears.

### iii. **Workplace policy**

Attitudes towards mixed workplaces have remained remarkably positive over 20 years. The first evidence of any change in this occurred between 2010 and 2012.

### iv. **Education**

The evidence of the Life and Times Survey is of sustained majority support for integrated education. However there is some evidence that this has softened in recent years among Catholics and that support for 'more sharing' among young people is considerably greater among both Protestant and Catholic respondents is significantly greater. This may suggest that greater consensus could be achieved through a combined approach to shared education in coming years.

### v. **Urban Issues**

There is clear evidence from the Life and Times Survey that attitudes to community relations have remained more volatile and more suspicious in urban rather than rural areas. This may have to do with the persistence of interfaces, the concentration of a number of cultural disputes into specific locations and the persistence of inter-community violence at youth level. However the survey suggests that particular emphasis should be paid to the urban dimensions of community relations policy.

### vi. **Sharing and Separation**

There is very little evidence of more sharing or greater inter-community friendship as a result of political progress to date. However neither Protestants nor Catholics are openly hostile to mixed marriage. Support for mixed neighbourhoods is consistent and constant but has not been matched by change on the ground. This suggests that a combination of fear and inertia continues to prevent progress.



## vii. Race equality and inter-ethnic relations

The evidence for ongoing hostility to ethnic minorities is consistent and concerning. There is very little evidence that policy has acted to improve this. As hostility is greatest among urban Protestants where the interface is most common, there is a need to ensure that this does not translate into intimidation and harassment and that action is taken to reduce hostility where it is found.

## C. Deprivation and its relation to sectarianism

### i. Connections and Disconnections

The Life and Times Survey suggests that attitudes towards community relations, divisions over nationality and politics and hostility to sharing with others are not defined by poverty, educational attainment or social housing. Indeed it is clear that core issues such as national identity, attitudes to mixed marriage and living in shared neighbourhoods and perceptions of progress or otherwise vary only in their intensity in any given social sub section. Over twenty years the Life and Times Survey has not identified any social cohort in which questions of separation and sharing do not arise. Furthermore, at the most intimate level, in attitudes to mixed marriage or to people from another ethnic group, there is very little evidence that educational attainment, age or housing tenancy is decisive. However, it is clear that young people in urban environments and in areas of concentrated social housing are particularly vulnerable to issues of fear and threat issues which impact on attitudes to some degree in relation to questions of sharing neighbourhood and friendship. The Survey suggests that deprivation may therefore be understood as an important aggravating factor in the impact and intensity of sectarianism which creates greater risks to community relations and to the perceptions of and possibilities for sustainable progress.

### ii. Policy implications

Policy towards sectarianism will therefore have to include a significant element targeted at dealing with deprivation. However, policy to tackle poverty and deprivation will only impact on sectarianism and racism if it also addresses issues of fear and safety, reduces all incidence of discrimination in social goods, loosens cultural and territorial control, enables and fosters relationships beyond the group of origin and deals with areas of cultural contention. Any successful economic policy is likely to increase in-migration and require ongoing attention to inter-cultural issues as illustrated in the evidence of emergence of hostility to ethnic minorities since 2005.



## D. Priority areas for potential intervention

The Life and Times survey suggests:

- That progress has been made in improving inter-community relationships,
- That values in relation to sharing are remarkably constant and
- That nationality and constitutional issues may now allow for complex rather than simple solutions.

However it also suggests that community relations in Northern Ireland remain extremely fragile and vulnerable to events and political changes.

In this context, a number of priorities seem outstanding:

1. Efforts to sustain political agreement, cultural pluralism and community co-operation.
2. Development of mechanisms to tackle flashpoints and manage trigger events.
3. New policy to address issues of threat and safety, especially for young people and in urban areas.
4. Policy to promote cultural and national accommodation to promote interaction and to address fears.
5. Policy to promote greater sharing and integration in education.
6. Policies to address issues of territorialism and fears of sharing in areas of social housing.
7. Policy to tackle racism and to reduce hostility to those from ethnic minorities.
8. Policy to promote improved relationships between young people.



## Appendix 1: Logistic Regression models

**Table A1.1: Protestants cohort 1 who prefer single religion neighbourhoods**


Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .12

### Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 6 <sup>a</sup>	age			7.478	2	.024		7.363
	age(1)	.526	.224	5.492	1	.019	1.692	
	age(2)	.119	.183	.428	1	.513	1.127	
	identity			40.241	2	.000		46.372
	identity(1)	1.030	.162	40.241	1	.000	2.801	
	identity(2)	-19.144	21583.164	.000	1	.999	.000	
	natid			19.114	4	.001		21.588
	natid(1)	.594	.211	7.919	1	.005	1.812	
	natid(2)	.044	.524	.007	1	.933	1.045	
	natid(3)	.849	.251	11.401	1	.001	2.336	
	natid(4)	-.629	.505	1.548	1	.213	.533	
	econ			22.664	2	.000		22.500
	econ(1)	1.098	.231	22.576	1	.000	3.000	
	econ(2)	.207	.150	1.908	1	.167	1.230	
	mixedS(1)	-.539	.168	10.303	1	.001	.584	10.933
Constant	-2.461	.309	63.423	1	.000	.085		

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: rsex, age, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, chattnd2.

# Appendix 1:



**Table A1.2: Protestants cohort 2 who prefer single religion neighbourhoods**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .13

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 5 <sup>a</sup>	age			18.353	2	.000		17.998
	age(1)	.496	.183	7.397	1	.007	1.643	
	age(2)	-.129	.142	.832	1	.362	.879	
	identity			38.960	2	.000		43.911
	identity(1)	.924	.149	38.392	1	.000	2.520	
	identity(2)	1.346	.851	2.498	1	.114	3.840	
	natid			32.815	4	.000		44.326
	natid(1)	.681	.174	15.319	1	.000	1.976	
	natid(2)	-1.431	.622	5.298	1	.021	.239	
	natid(3)	.889	.219	16.416	1	.000	2.432	
	natid(4)	-.340	.595	.328	1	.567	.711	
	tenure			19.962	2	.000		19.615
	tenure(1)	.571	.138	17.207	1	.000	1.769	
	tenure(2)	.510	.218	5.465	1	.019	1.665	
	hied			8.880	2	.012		8.962
	hied(1)	-.535	.226	5.620	1	.018	.586	
	hied(2)	-.326	.128	6.444	1	.011	.722	
	mixedS(1)	-.456	.168	7.377	1	.007	.634	7.859
	Constant	-2.403	.241	99.436	1	.000	.090	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, age, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS.





**Table A1.3: Protestants cohort 3 who prefer single religion neighbourhoods**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .18

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 3 <sup>a</sup>	chattnd2			42.852	2	.000		
	chattnd2(1)	.416	.072	33.078	1	.000	1.516	
	chattnd2(2)	.524	.091	33.060	1	.000	1.688	
	age			96.901	2	.000		95.712
	age(1)	.839	.114	54.660	1	.000	2.315	
	age(2)	.018	.088	.044	1	.834	1.019	
	identity			155.672	2	.000		174.251
	identity(1)	.998	.080	154.723	1	.000	2.712	
	identity(2)	.253	.464	.298	1	.585	1.288	
	natid			135.610	4	.000		157.321
	natid(1)	.781	.097	64.580	1	.000	2.184	
	natid(2)	-1.012	.384	6.936	1	.008	.363	
	natid(3)	1.353	.136	99.434	1	.000	3.870	
	natid(4)	-.321	.333	.928	1	.335	.725	
	tenure			72.731	2	.000		71.441
	tenure(1)	.686	.081	72.513	1	.000	1.986	
	tenure(2)	.129	.117	1.208	1	.272	1.137	
	econ			7.582	2	.023		7.478
	econ(1)	.286	.130	4.889	1	.027	1.332	
	econ(2)	-.073	.074	.972	1	.324	.929	
	hied			54.640	2	.000		58.331
	hied(1)	-.884	.128	47.668	1	.000	.413	
	hied(2)	-.351	.072	23.857	1	.000	.704	
	mixedS(1)	-.692	.107	42.067	1	.000	.501	46.798
Constant	-2.857	.156	335.463	1	.000	.057		

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, age, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS.



**Table A1.4: Protestants cohort 4 who prefer single religion neighbourhoods**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .12

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 5 <sup>a</sup>	rsex(1)	.516	.118	19.018	1	.000	1.676	19.278
	age			29.938	2	.000		29.670
	age(1)	1.107	.205	29.001	1	.000	3.024	
	age(2)	.403	.155	6.739	1	.009	1.497	
	identity			35.112	2	.000		39.194
	identity(1)	.890	.151	34.652	1	.000	2.434	
	identity(2)	-.280	1.437	.038	1	.846	.756	
	natid			23.407	4	.000		25.223
	natid(1)	.440	.143	9.488	1	.002	1.552	
	natid(2)	-.834	.592	1.987	1	.159	.434	
	natid(3)	.977	.248	15.507	1	.000	2.657	
	natid(4)	-.439	.652	.453	1	.501	.645	
	tenure			28.649	2	.000		27.115
	tenure(1)	.949	.178	28.449	1	.000	2.584	
	tenure(2)	.267	.180	2.183	1	.140	1.306	
	hied			13.035	2	.001		13.139
	hied(1)	-.690	.212	10.633	1	.001	.502	
	hied(2)	-.402	.139	8.345	1	.004	.669	
	Constant	-3.115	.235	175.106	1	.000	.044	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, age, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS.




**Table A1.5: Protestants cohort 5 who prefer single religion neighbourhoods**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .31

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log Likelihood
Step 5 <sup>a</sup>	rsex(1)	-.736	.260	8.036	1	.005	.479	8.317
	identity			29.437	2	.000		38.305
	identity(1)	1.758	.324	29.437	1	.000	5.803	
	identity(2)	-17.874	16627.425	.000	1	.999	.000	
	natid			9.387	4	.052		10.516
	natid(1)	.897	.366	6.019	1	.014	2.452	
	natid(2)	-.480	1.465	.107	1	.743	.619	
	natid(3)	1.905	.866	4.833	1	.028	6.719	
	natid(4)	-.428	1.479	.084	1	.772	.652	
	tenure			17.931	2	.000		18.494
	tenure(1)	1.501	.362	17.207	1	.000	4.485	
	tenure(2)	.583	.366	2.532	1	.112	1.791	
	hied			4.755	2	.093		5.388
	hied(1)	-.698	.498	1.961	1	.161	.498	
	hied(2)	.265	.289	.840	1	.359	1.304	
	mixedS(1)	-1.014	.439	5.343	1	.021	.363	6.208
	Constant	-3.195	.508	39.511	1	.000	.041	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: age, rsex, chattnd2, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS.



**Table A1.6: Protestants cohort 1 who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .21

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log-Likelihood
Step 8 <sup>a</sup>	chattnd2			13.763	2	.001		14.678
	chattnd2(1)	-.243	.236	1.057	1	.304	.784	
	chattnd2(2)	-1.089	.295	13.644	1	.000	.337	
	identity			31.404	2	.000		35.48
	identity(1)	1.419	.253	31.404	1	.000	4.134	
	identity(2)	-19.261	39625.122	.000	1	1.000	.000	
	natid			10.976	4	.027		12.104
	natid(1)	.780	.308	6.428	1	.011	2.181	
	natid(2)	.367	.638	.330	1	.566	1.443	
	natid(3)	.951	.434	4.804	1	.028	2.589	
	natid(4)	-.728	.776	.881	1	.348	.483	
	Constant	-1.571	.343	20.968	1	.000	.208	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, age.



**Table A1.7: Protestants cohort 2 who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .17

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 5 <sup>a</sup>	chattnd2			24.922	2	.000		25.112
	chattnd2(1)	-.602	.149	16.272	1	.000	.547	
	chattnd2(2)	-.688	.156	19.468	1	.000	.502	
	rsex(1)	.526	.126	17.292	1	.000	1.692	17.481
	identity			60.280	2	.000		68.981
	identity(1)	1.276	.165	59.951	1	.000	3.584	
	identity(2)	1.426	.814	3.068	1	.080	4.163	
	natid			20.373	4	.000		21.922
	natid(1)	.341	.171	3.982	1	.046	1.406	
	natid(2)	-.746	.431	2.986	1	.084	.474	
	natid(3)	.826	.240	11.834	1	.001	2.283	
	natid(4)	-.493	.636	.600	1	.438	.611	
	hied			4.682	2	.096		4.693
	hied(1)	-.322	.219	2.160	1	.142	.725	
	hied(2)	-.293	.144	4.149	1	.042	.746	
	age			6.476	2	.039		6.486
	age(1)	.526	.216	5.905	1	.015	1.692	
	age(2)	.172	.167	1.059	1	.303	1.188	
	Constant	-1.733	.257	45.607	1	.000	.177	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, age.

# Appendix 1:



**Table A1.8: Protestants cohort 3 who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .15

### Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log-Likelihood
Step 4 <sup>a</sup>	chattnd2			54.764	2	.000		55.128
	chattnd2(1)	-.445	.073	37.371	1	.000	.641	
	chattnd2(2)	-.640	.099	41.626	1	.000	.527	
	identity			211.460	2	.000		239.974
	identity(1)	1.239	.086	209.465	1	.000	3.453	
	identity(2)	.266	.449	.350	1	.554	1.304	
	natid			63.475	4	.000		65.157
	natid(1)	.398	.092	18.636	1	.000	1.488	
	natid(2)	-.307	.261	1.384	1	.239	.736	
	natid(3)	1.051	.144	53.127	1	.000	2.861	
	natid(4)	-.166	.314	.281	1	.596	.847	
	tenure			10.899	2	.004		10.835
	tenure(1)	.308	.095	10.573	1	.001	1.360	
	tenure(2)	-.008	.127	.004	1	.950	.992	
	hied			44.516	2	.000		44.910
	hied(1)	-.614	.114	29.235	1	.000	.541	
	hied(2)	-.434	.076	32.379	1	.000	.648	
	mixedS(1)	-.303	.098	9.513	1	.002	.739	9.734
	age			14.472	2	.001		14.565
	age(1)	.438	.118	13.866	1	.000	1.550	
age(2)	.227	.081	7.786	1	.005	1.255		
Constant	-1.537	.133	133.164	1	.000	.215		

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, age.

# Appendix 1:



**Table A1.9: Protestants cohort 4 who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .15

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log-Likelihood
Step 6 <sup>a</sup>	chattnd2			57.997	2	.000		62.284
	chattnd2(1)	-.504	.101	24.930	1	.000	.604	
	chattnd2(2)	-1.173	.168	48.528	1	.000	.309	
	rsex(1)	.210	.096	4.765	1	.029	1.234	4.769
	identity			84.652	2	.000		94.579
	identity(1)	1.112	.121	84.588	1	.000	3.040	
	identity(2)	.971	.683	2.024	1	.155	2.641	
	natid			30.617	4	.000		32.148
	natid(1)	.444	.112	15.587	1	.000	1.559	
	natid(2)	-.109	.315	.121	1	.728	.896	
	natid(3)	.928	.220	17.761	1	.000	2.529	
	natid(4)	-.764	.534	2.051	1	.152	.466	
	hied			6.093	2	.048		6.282
	hied(1)	-.355	.156	5.192	1	.023	.701	
	hied(2)	-.016	.106	.022	1	.881	.984	
	Constant	-1.578	.167	89.540	1	.000	.206	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, age.



**Table A1.10: Protestants cohort 5 who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .14

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log Likelihood
Step 6 <sup>a</sup>	chattnd2			10.709	2	.005		11.228
	chattnd2(1)	-.267	.258	1.074	1	.300	.765	
	chattnd2(2)	-.889	.276	10.386	1	.001	.411	
	identity			11.680	2	.003		
	identity(1)	.784	.237	10.953	1	.001	2.190	12.447
	identity(2)	-.778	1.480	.276	1	.599	.459	
	natid			10.802	4	.029		12.071
	natid(1)	.958	.295	10.521	1	.001	2.607	
	natid(2)	.581	.766	.576	1	.448	1.788	
	natid(3)	1.124	.812	1.916	1	.166	3.078	
	natid(4)	.760	.668	1.295	1	.255	2.139	
	tenure			5.235	2	.073		5.161
	tenure(1)	.745	.330	5.103	1	.024	2.107	
	tenure(2)	.261	.332	.617	1	.432	1.298	
	mixedS(1)	-.592	.338	3.077	1	.079	.553	3.322
	Constant	-1.850	.340	29.644	1	.000	.157	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: age, rsex, chattnd2, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS.





**Table A1.11: Catholics cohort 1 who prefer single religion neighbourhoods**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .17

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 4 <sup>a</sup>	age			20.502	2	.000		21.039
	age(1)	1.362	.351	15.048	1	.000	3.904	
	age(2)	.430	.307	1.966	1	.161	1.537	
	identity			13.169	2	.001		14.605
	identity(1)	-18.526	15546.366	.000	1	.999	.000	
	identity(2)	.743	.205	13.169	1	.000	2.101	
	natid			7.239	4	.124		9.085
	natid(1)	-.952	.520	3.348	1	.067	.386	
	natid(2)	.243	.243	1.003	1	.317	1.276	
	natid(3)	-1.209	1.476	.671	1	.413	.298	
	natid(4)	-.160	.794	.041	1	.840	.852	
	econ			8.611	2	.013		8.790
	econ(1)	.423	.350	1.461	1	.227	1.526	
	econ(2)	.702	.239	8.589	1	.003	2.018	
	hied			8.713	2	.013		10.644
	hied(1)	-2.049	1.036	3.915	1	.048	.129	
	hied(2)	-.568	.233	5.963	1	.015	.567	
	income(1)	.483	.226	4.574	1	.032	1.621	4.558
	mixedS(1)	-.745	.295	6.375	1	.012	.475	7.222
	Constant	-2.961	.421	49.490	1	.000	.052	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, age, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS.

# Appendix 1:



**Table A1.12: Catholics cohort 2 who prefer single religion neighbourhoods**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .20

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 4 <sup>a</sup>	identity			31.215	2	.000		38.722
	identity(1)	-18.485	10210.232	.000	1	.999	.000	
	identity(2)	1.079	.193	31.215	1	.000	2.943	
	natid			18.852	4	.001		27.105
	natid(1)	-1.150	.620	3.435	1	.064	.317	
	natid(2)	.708	.219	10.408	1	.001	2.030	
	natid(3)	-18.644	10753.784	.000	1	.999	.000	
	natid(4)	-.258	1.045	.061	1	.805	.773	
	tenure			22.441	2	.000		22.053
	tenure(1)	.872	.184	22.440	1	.000	2.393	
	tenure(2)	.322	.322	.999	1	.317	1.380	
	econ			6.534	2	.038		6.505
	econ(1)	.069	.280	.061	1	.804	1.072	
	econ(2)	.446	.191	5.456	1	.020	1.562	
	hied			5.199	2	.074		5.989
	hied(1)	-.709	.343	4.273	1	.039	.492	
	hied(2)	.068	.169	.161	1	.688	1.070	
	income(1)	.392	.182	4.665	1	.031	1.480	4.651
	mixedS(1)	-.436	.268	2.643	1	.104	.647	2.848
	Constant	-3.497	.284	151.502	1	.000	.030	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, age.



**Table A1.13: Catholics cohort 3 who prefer single religion neighbourhoods**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .14

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 3 <sup>a</sup>	identity			33.567	2	.000		37.528
	identity(1)	-1.546	1.001	2.387	1	.122	.213	
	identity(2)	.501	.091	30.099	1	.000	1.650	
	natid			84.262	4	.000		105.659
	natid(1)	-.227	.206	1.215	1	.270	.797	
	natid(2)	.771	.106	52.928	1	.000	2.163	
	natid(3)	-18.803	7675.722	.000	1	.998	.000	
	natid(4)	-1.150	.486	5.612	1	.018	.317	
	tenure			42.725	2	.000		41.641
	tenure(1)	.614	.094	42.709	1	.000	1.848	
	tenure(2)	.187	.132	1.999	1	.157	1.205	
	econ			16.178	2	.000		15.754
	econ(1)	.518	.129	16.164	1	.000	1.679	
	econ(2)	.178	.096	3.443	1	.064	1.194	
	hied			25.640	2	.000		28.200
	hied(1)	-.809	.161	25.310	1	.000	.445	
	hied(2)	-.217	.092	5.490	1	.019	.805	
	income(1)	.193	.083	5.364	1	.021	1.213	5.346
	mixedS(1)	-.903	.172	27.671	1	.000	.405	33.804
	age			19.931	2	.000		19.661
age(1)	.526	.144	13.350	1	.000	1.691		
age(2)	.107	.120	.795	1	.373	1.113		
Constant	-2.762	.174	252.383	1	.000	.063		

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, age.



**Table A1.14: Catholics cohort 4 who prefer single religion neighbourhoods**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .14

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 4 <sup>a</sup>	identity			23.848	2	.000		27.487
	identity(1)	-18.598	11453.659	.000	1	.999	.000	
	identity(2)	.751	.154	23.848	1	.000	2.119	
	natid			18.034	4	.001		20.085
	natid(1)	-.691	.445	2.412	1	.120	.501	
	natid(2)	.525	.181	8.466	1	.004	1.691	
	natid(3)	-.002	1.021	.000	1	.999	.998	
	natid(4)	-.320	.398	.647	1	.421	.726	
	tenure			8.317	2	.016		8.156
	tenure(1)	.468	.223	4.395	1	.036	1.597	
	tenure(2)	.434	.177	6.028	1	.014	1.543	
	econ			9.315	2	.009		9.099
	econ(1)	.797	.379	4.422	1	.035	2.220	
	econ(2)	.415	.164	6.419	1	.011	1.514	
	hied			7.358	2	.025		7.995
	hied(1)	-.565	.239	5.592	1	.018	.569	
	hied(2)	-.020	.168	.014	1	.907	.981	
	mixedS(1)	-.833	.258	10.427	1	.001	.435	12.313
	age			30.714	2	.000		31.130
	age(1)	1.328	.261	25.818	1	.000	3.773	
age(2)	.585	.223	6.871	1	.009	1.794		
Constant	-3.322	.309	115.404	1	.000	.036		

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, age.



**Table A1.15: Catholics cohort 5 who prefer single religion neighbourhoods**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .26

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log Likelihood
Step 6 <sup>a</sup>	rsex(1)	-.503	.255	3.891	1	.049	.605	3.962
	identity			10.651	2	.005		11.287
	identity(1)	-17.199	37688.738	.000	1	1.000	.000	
	identity(2)	.878	.269	10.651	1	.001	2.406	
	natid			15.855	4	.003		32.347
	natid(1)	-.262	.845	.096	1	.757	.770	
	natid(2)	1.554	.474	10.760	1	.001	4.733	
	natid(3)	-17.445	27177.874	.000	1	.999	.000	
	natid(4)	-18.360	6653.555	.000	1	.998	.000	
	tenure			15.961	2	.000		16.021
	tenure(1)	1.264	.323	15.339	1	.000	3.541	
	tenure(2)	.573	.336	2.908	1	.088	1.773	
	hied			6.272	2	.043		6.581
	hied(1)	-1.095	.442	6.138	1	.013	.334	
	hied(2)	-.459	.294	2.435	1	.119	.632	
	Constant	-2.796	.539	26.929	1	.000	.061	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: age, rsex, chattnd2, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS.

# Appendix 1:



**Table A1.16: Catholics cohort 1 who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .08

### Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 8 <sup>a</sup>	chattnd2			4.203	2	.122		
	chattnd2(1)	-.283	.592	.229	1	.632	.754	
	chattnd2(2)	1.359	.693	3.840	1	.050	3.891	
	identity			16.189	2	.000		15.683
	identity(1)	-18.803	28901.599	.000	1	.999	.000	
	identity(2)	1.385	.344	16.189	1	.000	3.996	
	econ			3.942	2	.139		
	econ(1)	.710	.461	2.378	1	.123	2.034	
	econ(2)	-.227	.354	.411	1	.521	.797	
	Constant	-2.400	.326	54.131	1	.000	.091	
Step 9 <sup>a</sup>	identity			14.580	2	.001		
	identity(1)	-18.910	28901.599	.000	1	.999	.000	
	identity(2)	1.251	.328	14.580	1	.000	3.495	
	econ			4.707	2	.095		
	econ(1)	.781	.453	2.966	1	.085	2.183	
	econ(2)	-.225	.353	.405	1	.524	.799	
	Constant	-2.293	.305	56.502	1	.000	.101	
Step 10 <sup>a</sup>	identity			14.176	2	.001		
	identity(1)	-18.952	28901.599	.000	1	.999	.000	
	identity(2)	1.219	.324	14.176	1	.000	3.382	
	Constant	-2.251	.252	79.818	1	.000	.105	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, age.

Note: Only one year 1989 so numbers very small.




**Table A1.17: Catholics cohort 2 who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .10

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 6 <sup>a</sup>	chattnd2			7.567	2	.023		10.145
	chattnd2(1)	-.262	.228	1.324	1	.250	.770	
	chattnd2(2)	-1.366	.524	6.798	1	.009	.255	
	rsex(1)	.368	.183	4.025	1	.045	1.444	4.020
	natid			11.939	4	.018		14.938
	natid(1)	-.616	.491	1.576	1	.209	.540	
	natid(2)	.558	.226	6.097	1	.014	1.748	
	natid(3)	-19.111	20513.081	.000	1	.999	.000	
	natid(4)	.815	.587	1.925	1	.165	2.259	
	tenure			9.448	2	.009		12.757
	tenure(1)	-.385	.245	2.464	1	.117	.680	
	tenure(2)	-1.597	.565	7.997	1	.005	.202	
	income(1)	.734	.196	14.049	1	.000	2.083	14.005
	Constant	-2.179	.240	82.466	1	.000	.113	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, age.



**Table A1.18: Catholics cohort 3 who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .08

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 5 <sup>a</sup>	chattnd2			10.106	2	.006		11.566
	chattnd2(1)	-.119	.109	1.178	1	.278	.888	
	chattnd2(2)	-.719	.229	9.881	1	.002	.487	
	identity			31.459	2	.000		33.538
	identity(1)	.677	.497	1.853	1	.173	1.968	
	identity(2)	.644	.116	31.043	1	.000	1.904	
	natid			18.037	4	.001		18.929
	natid(1)	.108	.219	.243	1	.622	1.114	
	natid(2)	.493	.128	14.914	1	.000	1.637	
	natid(3)	-.304	.855	.127	1	.722	.738	
	natid(4)	-.027	.368	.005	1	.942	.973	
	tenure			34.749	2	.000		33.829
	tenure(1)	.609	.116	27.604	1	.000	1.839	
	tenure(2)	.610	.161	14.418	1	.000	1.841	
	mixedS(1)	-.671	.203	10.915	1	.001	.511	12.727
	age			14.493	2	.001		13.935
	age(1)	-.546	.158	11.941	1	.001	.579	
	age(2)	-.423	.125	11.442	1	.001	.655	
	Constant	-2.244	.167	180.490	1	.000	.106	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, age.



# Appendix 1:



**Table A1.19: Catholics cohort 4 who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .09

### Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log- Likelihood
Step 3 <sup>a</sup>	chattnd2			12.540	2	.002		13.398
	chattnd2(1)	-.517	.173	8.916	1	.003	.596	
	chattnd2(2)	-.841	.361	5.432	1	.020	.431	
	rsex(1)	.282	.144	3.855	1	.050	1.326	3.856
	identity			12.279	2	.002		14.590
	identity(1)	-18.368	11562.337	.000	1	.999	.000	
	identity(2)	.576	.164	12.279	1	.000	1.779	
	natid			6.468	4	.167		10.865
	natid(1)	-.489	.407	1.447	1	.229	.613	
	natid(2)	.314	.182	2.968	1	.085	1.368	
	natid(3)	-19.100	10387.242	.000	1	.999	.000	
	natid(4)	.021	.403	.003	1	.959	1.021	
	hied			7.290	2	.026		
	hied(1)	-.213	.221	.927	1	.336	.808	7.318
	hied(2)	-.458	.172	7.113	1	.008	.633	
	income(1)	.301	.164	3.371	1	.066	1.352	3.308
	mixedS(1)	-.392	.247	2.523	1	.112	.676	2.725
	age			5.474	2	.065		5.448
	age(1)	-.114	.236	.235	1	.628	.892	
	age(2)	-.383	.186	4.251	1	.039	.682	
Constant	-1.906	.263	52.692	1	.000	.149		

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: chattnd2, rsex, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS, age.



**Table A1.20: Catholics cohort 5 who would mind a close relative marrying someone of a different religion**

Model significant, pseudo R Squared of .13

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Change in -2 Log Likelihood
Step 8 <sup>a</sup>	identity			5.135	2	.077		5.489
	identity(1)	-16.226	38435.309	.000	1	1.000	.000	
	identity(2)	.746	.329	5.135	1	.023	2.110	
	natid			9.526	4	.049		15.550
	natid(1)	-.976	1.502	.423	1	.516	.377	
	natid(2)	1.468	.642	5.224	1	.022	4.340	
	natid(3)	-17.202	27177.874	.000	1	.999	.000	
	natid(4)	1.952	.803	5.913	1	.015	7.046	
	tenure			10.439	2	.005		9.649
	tenure(1)	1.120	.347	10.400	1	.001	3.063	
	tenure(2)	.269	.401	.452	1	.502	1.309	
	Constant	-4.001	.652	37.633	1	.000	.018	

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: age, rsex, chattnd2, identity, natid, tenure, econ, hied, income, mixedS.



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